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We know from economic theory and the sociological literature that (non-
productive) identity and social networks matter to economic behavior. The dy-
namic and endogenous nature of social networks, identity and the economic
decisions, as well as the absence of detailed panel data well suited to analyz-
ing evolving social networks and identity, have made empirical analysis of the
effects of social networks and identity a challenging task. As a result, the litera-
ture has been limited in its ability to empirically identify when and where social
networks and identity matter to key economic behaviors.
This dissertation aims at filling this void by providing a better understand-
ing on how identity and social network affect educational investment in chil-
dren and agricultural technology adoption, arguably two key behaviors that
crucially affect the welfare trajectories of rural households in developing coun-
tries.
In the first paper I look at the role of social networks in the adoption process
of Bt cotton, a new type of cotton available on the Indian market since 2002.
The results demonstrate the importance of knowledge about the profitability
of a new technology in the adoption decision. This knowledge is established
through experimentation, observing other farmers’ past inputs and outputs and
talking to informed parties such as company representatives and input dealers.
In addition, I find strong evidence of farmers imitating successful farmers and
of social pressures inhibiting the adoption process of this new technology.
In the second paper I investigate the role of social customs and norms in
educational aspirations. I find that the aspirations that parents have for their
children are a complex function of wealth, time preferences, the perceived costs
and returns to education, and the prevailing social norms, customs and pres-
sures with regard to age of marriage and old age care. I do not find any evidence
of social pressures directly related to the level of education.
In the third paper, we examine farmers’ attitudes towards risk and find ev-
idence that credit constraints in combination with a production set shaped by
multiple technologies can increase the willingness to take up risks as farmers
gamble their way out of poverty.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Annemie Maertens was born in Dendermonde, Belgium to Toon Maertens and
Trees Verhaeghe, and brought up in Waasmunster together with her sister
Kristien. At the age of 17, she left Waasmunster for the city of Leuven to pursue
a Master’s degree in Engineering in Agriculture from the University of Leuven.
For her Master thesis she spent some time in Southeast Tanzania working with
rice farmers. This experience had a profound impact on her and she decided to
change careers and study development economics. She subsequently obtained
a Master’s in Development and International Economics from the University of
Namur. After a few years of working of for various NGOs, government agen-
cies and international organizations in Belgium, Japan and Vietnam, she moved
to Cornell to conduct her doctoral dissertation research under the guidance of
Chris Barrett, Kaushik Basu, George Jakubson and Stephen Coate. Her research
interest brought her to the semi-arid tropics of India where she collected data
among 600 households with the goal of studying the role of identity and social
networks in educational investment and agricultural technology adoption deci-
sions. Annemie is married to Amalavoyal V. Chari, whom she met in the office
of Kaushik Basu at Cornell University upon her return from India.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Chris Barrett, for guiding me with patience
and enthusiasm during the six years of my graduate study at Cornell Univer-
sity, and the other members of my committee, Kaushik Basu, Stephen Coate
and George Jakubson, for their comments and feedback during various stages
of my research. I am also grateful to Jeff Prince for generously agreeing to
take Kaushik’s place in his (Kaushik’s) absence. I am grateful to the AEM de-
partment at Cornell University for the financial support they provided, and to
Linda Morehouse for administrative and moral support throughout my time
in the PhD program. I would also like to acknowledge the outstanding work
done by my numerous research assistants: Sanjit Anilesh, Shraavya Bhagavat-
ula, Pramod Bangar, Sana Butool, V.D. Duche, Shital Duche, Madhav Dhere,
Anand Dhumale, Nishtha Gosh, Meenal Inamdar, Shilpa Indrakanti, Navika
Harshe, Sapna Kale, Jessica Lebo, Labhesh Lithikar, Nishita Medha, Ramesh
Babu Para, Abhijit Patnaik, Gore Parmeshwar, Amidala Sidappa, Nandavaram
Ramakrishna, K. Ramanareddy, P.D. Ranganath, Arjun Waghmode and Yu Qin.
I am extremely grateful to the agencies and departments that financially or lo-
gistically supported my fieldwork in India: the American Institute for Indian
Studies, the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics, the
National Science Foundation (Grant No. 0649330), the Agricultural and Ap-
plied Economics Association, and Cornell’s Mario Einaudi Center for Interna-
tional Studies, Graduate School and International Student and Scholar Office.
Finally, I would like to thank all my friends at Cornell, my parents and sister in
Belgium, and my cat Afro: their constant good cheer has been the backbone of
my academic enterprise.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction 1
Bibliography 11
2 Who cares what others think (or do?) Social learning, social pressures
and imitation in cotton farming in India 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Bt cotton in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Data collected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 A first look at the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Modeling the decision to adopt Bt cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Appendix E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Bibliography 77
3 High Returns, Low Aspirations? Social Norms and Education in Vil-
lage India 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Education in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 A first look at the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.5 Empirical specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Bibliography 124
4 Why farmers sometimes love risks: evidence from India 128
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.2 Description of the study site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3 Description of the experiment and preliminary results . . . . . . . 137
v
4.4 A simple model of behavior under risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Bibliography 156
Appendix 159
Bibliography 189
vi
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Basic cotton statistics of China, US and India . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Basic descriptive statistics of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed . 25
2.3 Bt cotton adoption process and current beliefs 2001-08 . . . . . . 32
2.4 Knowledge about others’ activities (based on the results of the
random matching within sample method) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Percentage of links correctly predicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Compare current beliefs with future plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.7 Characteristics of plans versus beliefs groups in Kanzara and
Kinkhed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.8 Effect of social pressures and behavioral imitation on plans to
cultivate Bt cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.9 Effect of learning and contemporary social interaction effects on
cultivating Bt cotton (based on results of ”how many adopters
do you know?”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.10 Effect of learning, imitation, social pressures and strategic delays
on cultivating Bt cotton (based on results of random-matching-
within-sample method, use actual links) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.11 Effect of learning, imitation, social pressures and strategic delays
on cultivating Bt cotton (based on results of random-matching-
within-sample method, use predicted links) . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.12 Number of households included in the sample, by date included
in VLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.13 Progressive farmers characteristics in Aurepalle . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.14 Progressive farmers characteristics in Kanzara . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.15 Progressive farmers characteristics in Kinkhed . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.16 Selection of PF for random matching within sample as percent-
age of village farmers mentioned by all VLS respondents . . . . . 69
2.17 Rank of 4 progressive farmers selected for the game in terms of
pf TALK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.18 OLS cotton price in 2007-08 N=427, Adj R=0.30 . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Introducing Dokur, Kalman and Shirapur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2 Schooling and education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 Minimum and maximum education planned . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4 Expectations with regard to earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.5 Transfers at the time of marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.6 Support expected from children at old age . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.7 The education obtained by the social network . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.8 Determinants of aspirations - minimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.9 Determinants of aspirations - maximum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.1 Basic descriptive statistics of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed . 133
vii
4.2 Risk experiment design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.3 Descriptive statistics of Willingness-to-Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.4 Further characterizing Willingness-to-Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.5 Determinants of Willingness-to-Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.6 Determinants of difference in Willingness-to-Pay . . . . . . . . . 149
4.7 Predicting individual level output price and input cost . . . . . . 155
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Adoption of Bt cotton [as % of cotton farmers] . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 Highest level of education completed for individuals who fin-
ished their education, excluding children under the age of six,
N=1329 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2 Minimum level of education aspired for children who are cur-
rently in school, including children under the age of six, N=557 . 100
3.3 Maximum level of education aspired for children who are cur-
rently in school, including children under the age of six, N=557 . 100
3.4 Percentage of individuals enrolled in an educational institute,
N=683 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.1 Difference in WTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.2 Complex family structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Seventy percent of the world’s poor and three-quarters of the world’s ex-
tremely poor people live and work in rural areas. Sustainably increasing the
rural poor’s income implies increasing the productivity of their main assets,
i.e., land and labor. We know that education is the primary means of increasing
labor productivity (Schultz 1989; Huffman 2001) and that adopting new agri-
cultural technologies increases both labor and land productivity among small-
holder farmers (Sunding and Zilberman 2001). Poverty reduction strategies in
rural areas therefore often and appropriately concentrate on education and agri-
cultural technologies.
Most of these poverty reduction strategies utilize price incentives, direct
(conditional or unconditional) cash transfers, or in the case of education, im-
prove the quality of education, to increase the uptake of new technologies and
stimulate investment in education. This choice of development tools is consis-
tent with the results of the earlier empirical research in development economics
which concludes that prices, income, wealth and the attributes of the new tech-
nology or quality of schools matter.
This dissertation takes an alternative approach and argues that in some set-
tings, identity and the structure of social interactions are likely important de-
terminants of investment in education and agricultural technology adoption.
This approach does not necessarily imply that we need to replace the traditional
policy instruments with newer ones. Instead, by illuminating how individuals
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make choices within their broader social context, it enriches our understanding
of how the same policy interventions can generate different outcomes. In some
instances, I will suggest some new policy interventions which might comple-
ment the existing ones.
The recent economics literature on identity can be roughly organized into
two strands. One strand, based on Arrow’s (1972) theory of statistical dis-
crimination, argues that non-productive dimensions of identity (e.g., race) can
nonetheless correlate with the underlying productive characteristics in equi-
librium (Akerlof 1976; Basu 2006). A second, more recent strand, inspired by
the literature on identity and categorization in sociology and psychology, goes
beyond statistical discrimination and links the concept of identity in different
ways to standard micro-economic concepts of beliefs (Fryer and Jackson, 2003),
constraints (Loury 2002; Sen 2006) and preferences (Akerlof and Kranton 2000,
2002; Kirman and Teschl 2006).
A separate line of economic research has started to integrate social networks
into economic analysis (see Jackson 2008 for an overview). While standard eco-
nomic theory acknowledges the indirect effects of other agents’ actions through
the price mechanism and direct effects through preferences and production pos-
sibilities (e.g., externalities, public goods), recent studies of behavior on net-
works include the direct effects of decision makers’ social connections on their
expectations, constraints and preferences, mainly through information sharing
(social learning), informal credit and insurance, bilateral trade and pecuniary
scale effects.
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These recent theoretical contributions in economics on identity and social
networks have only quite recently found their way into empirical development
economics. The dynamic and endogenous nature of social networks and iden-
tity, in addition to the lack of detailed social network data, has made empirical
analysis of their effects a challenging task. As a result, the limited empirical
research that exists on the topic typically limits itself to studying some particu-
lar channel of influence, e.g., social learning in agricultural technology adoption
(Foster and Rozenzweig 1995, Bandiera and Rasul 1996, Conley and Udry 2010),
or the role of the social custom of patrilocal exogamy (i.e., marriage into families
outside of the village) in investment in education (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001).
This dissertation aims at (partially) filling this void by providing a better
understanding of the various roles that identity and social networks play in
agricultural technology adoption and educational investment in children.
In the second chapter of this dissertation I show how it is possible to empir-
ically separate out the effects of social learning, imitation and social pressures
on the decision to adopt a new genetically modified crop. In the third chapter,
I empirically distinguish between the roles of various identity-based social cus-
toms, norms and pressures regarding marriage and old age care in the decision
to invest in upper secondary and higher education of one’s children.
The fourth chapter is a methodological contribution to the development lit-
erature on experimentally elicited risk preferences and investment behavior.
Here, we start from the observation that the farmer often has various technolo-
gies that are available to him. Some of these new technologies, for instance an
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irrigation system, might require a substantial investment. In this chapter, we
look at how these investment opportunities influence forward-looking risk tak-
ing attitudes of farmers when they are credit constrained.
I use two primary sources of data for this dissertation. The first is the
ICRISAT-VLS data, covering cropping seasons from 2001 to 2007. These data are
collected by the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) in Hyderabad as part of their Village Level Studies (VLS) program.
The second source is the data I collected in six ICRISAT-VLS villages during
2007-2008. In this supplementary survey, I elicited, in addition to the more stan-
dard modules on income, wealth, household composition, education, agricul-
tural input and output, detailed information on social networks, expectations
with regard to education and new agricultural technologies, risk and time pref-
erences, and aspirations and future plans.
I chose India as the setting for my dissertation due to the complexity of rural
life in India with its variety of jatis (local sub-castes), social classes, patron-client
relations, factions and religions, which cumulatively make the existence of a
completely integrated society unlikely. In short, this is a setting where identity
and social networks are particularly salient to economic decisions and outcomes
in rural India.
The second chapter of the dissertation builds on a longstanding literature on
technology adoption in agriculture. This literature has established that prices,
income and individuals’ attributes, such as risk aversion and education, are im-
portant determinants of adoption behavior. A more recent literature looks at
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the role of social interaction effects, a general term encompassing both the pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary effects of individuals’ decisions on each other, in
technology adoption. Most of these studies focus on one single type of social in-
teraction effect, primarily social learning, and conclude that farmers learn from
each others’ experimentation and delay their adoption decision strategically. In
terms of policy, this implies that subsidies for early adopters might counter-
act the free-rider effect and increase the adoption rate, but gives little guidance
on who should be targeted by agricultural extension and private agribusiness
agents in order to increase technology adoption rates.
In this chapter, I look at the role of social networks in the adoption process of
Bt cotton, a new type of (genetically engineered) cotton available on the Indian
market since 2002. Unlike existing studies, this particular setting combinedwith
the data that I collected allow me to parse out the various channels through
which social interaction effects operate. I explore these qualitatively and narrow
the field to the ones that seemed to matter: social learning, social pressures
and imitation. Then I develop a simple theoretical model and an econometric
identification strategy that enables me, for the first time, to distinguish among
these mechanisms.
The results demonstrate the importance of knowledge about the profitabil-
ity of a new technology in the adoption decision. This knowledge is established
by experimentation, observing other farmers’ past profits and talking to input
dealers, company representatives and government extension agents. For first-
time adopters, the last channels, i.e., talking to non-farmer sources, is the most
important channel for learning about the profitability of Bt cotton and the main
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driver of Bt cotton adoption, followed by learning from a handful of successful
farmers in the village. I find strong evidence of social pressures inhibiting the
adoption of Bt cotton as well as of imitative behavior, i.e., farmers adopting Bt
cotton on the basis of having observed the behavior of certain other farmers but
without having observed the yield outcomes or profitability of these other farm-
ers. In addition, I find some evidence of farmers free-riding on the experience
of successful farmers.
The lesson that emerges from this analysis is that multiple mechanisms mat-
ter, but not equally. And because these mechanisms are correlated, omitting
one tends to exaggerate the importance of others. Omitting the effects of non-
farmer sources from the analysis or omitting the most successful farmers from
the sample overestimates the importance of social learning. And by considering
only the past experiences of farmers in one’s network or focusing only on the
optimal input decision conditional on adoption, one neglects the role of social
pressures which can be a serious drag on adoption, whether these are due to
(erroneous) beliefs about the new technology (such as about Bt cotton’s health
and environmental effects) or simply reflect status quo bias.
From a policy perspective this implies that providing information to the
most successful farmers in the village is likely to be the most cost-effective strat-
egy. Tomitigate the free-rider effect, a small (temporary) subsidymight be given
to these early adopters. However, where social pressures are strong, as is the
case in one of the villages I investigate, a large-scale information campaign may
be required to shift the equilibrium.
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In the third chapter of this dissertation, I contribute to the literature on edu-
cation in developing countries. The literature to date has shown that in addition
to parental education, work opportunities, village and regional development,
school quality and costs, investments in education are significantly stratified
by gender and social groups. Using a detailed child level dataset from three vil-
lages in India, I dissect the roles of various identity-based social norms, customs
and pressures in the education decision, taking into account the differences in
(perceived) returns to education. Given that the large majority of the children
in these villages routinely complete elementary education and lower secondary
education, I instead focus on the parents’ plans to invest in upper secondary ed-
ucation and higher education, which I will refer to as educational aspirations.
Using regression analysis, I explain the variation in aspirations for each child
by the variation in (perceived) costs and returns, credit constraints, time pref-
erences, and social norms, customs and pressures. I first document that edu-
cational aspirations are much lower for girls (compared to boys) and for lower
caste groups (compared to upper caste groups). Lower aspirations for girls can
be partially explained by social norms concerning the ideal age of marriage and
the provision of old-age care. The ideal age of marriage (as per social norms) is
lower for girls (compared to boys). After marriage, the bride moves in with her
husband or his parents, a practice known as patrilocality. Once the bride has
switched homes, it is often socially unacceptable to continue to support her na-
tal family, either financially or in terms of physical care. Sons are the principal
providers of old-age care for the parents, and are therefore more likely to be the
recipients of higher education.
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Lower aspirations for lower caste groups can be partially explained through
lower expectations with regard to the returns to higher education, and different
social norms with regard to the ideal age of marriage (which is lower) and the
patrilocal system (more is expected from girls compared to the higher castes).
I do not find any evidence of social pressures directly related to the level
of education and cannot confirm a negative relationship between the price of
education (in terms of dowry price) and aspirations. On the contrary, increasing
the dowry associatedwith a certain education level, increases the chances of that
level being aspired to. This might point to social status effects dominating the
price effect of an increase in dowry.
The results of this study suggest that subsidizing education will not imme-
diately induce greater educational investments. There is a complex set of social
norms that determines the equilibrium value of education for different groups
in society, and the dissolution of these norms is likely to be a slow process.
In the fourth chapter, I investigate, together with David Just, how forward-
looking investment behavior can influence attitudes towards risk. These atti-
tudes were elicited via their evaluations of hypothetical but realistic farm alter-
natives involving various risky outcomes. The motivation for our work is the
anomalous finding that, using a marginal measure of risk aversion, i.e., based
on the difference in willingness-to-pay between a less and a more risky realistic
gamble, we find that most individuals are risk loving.
I this chapter, we test a simple model of forward-looking dynamic risk be-
havior, inspired by Lybbert et al. (2010). This model distinguishes between
8
the familiar static concept of risk aversion and forward-looking dynamic risk
responses. The latter takes into account the fact that in the absence of credit
markets, a lucky draw might enable the farmer to make a large fixed-cost in-
vestment which would allow the farmer to move to a higher level equilibrium
characterized by a higher annual income, and consequently higher standard of
living in future periods.
We find that 85% of the farmers are willing to pay more for a distribution
which is second-order stochastically dominated by the base line distribution,
indicating risk loving behavior and that, across distributions, the farmers pay a
disproportionate amount of attention to the probability of best yield outcome.
The (estimated) effect of increasing the probability of the best outcome by 10%
is about 4 times the (estimated) effect of decreasing the probability of the worst
outcome by 10%.
We find evidence in the data that supports the model proposed. For farmers
who are credit constrained, increasing the dryland owned by one acre increases
the difference in willingness-to-pay between a high variance distribution and
a low variance distribution (with the same mean). This indicates that farmers
who ownmore dryland are more risk loving compared to farmers who own less
dryland or farmers who own only irrigated land. Also, having one more school
going child over the age of 15 years in the household, increases the difference in
WTP. This indicates that farmers who might want to invest in higher education
of their children (but are credit constrained) are more willing to take on risks
compared to farmers who have no school going children in this age range.
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This implies that our standard measures of risk aversion which look only at
contemporaneous decisions, whether they are inferred from observed economic
behavior using structural models of behavior combined with econometric tech-
niques, or elicited via experimental techniques, might not be able to capture and
predict actual investment behavior under uncertainty.
To conclude, this dissertation makes a substantial contribution to our under-
standing of investment behavior in developing countries. From this dissertation
we know that various social interaction effects matter, but that they are not all
equally important. In addition, we learned that attitudes towards risk depend
on more than just static risk preferences.
10
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Akerlof, George A. 1976. ”The Economics of Caste and the Rat Race and
other Woeful Tales”’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90:4, pp. 599–617.
[2] Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. ”Economics and Identity”.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:3, pp.715-753.
[3] Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2002. ”Identity and Schooling:
Some Lessons for the Economics of Education.” Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 40:4, pp.1167–1201.
[4] Arrow, Kenneth, J. 1972. ”Models of Job Discrimination,” in Racial Discrmi-
nation in Economic Life, A. H. Pascal (ed.). DC Heath: Lexington Books.
[5] Bandiera, Oriana and Imran Rasul. 2006. ”Social Networks and Technology
Adoption in Northern Mozambique.” Economic Journal, 116:514, pp. 869-
902.
[6] Basu, Kaushik. 2006. ”Participatory Equity, Identity, and Productivity: Pol-
icy Implications for Promoting Development.”Working Paper Department
of Economics, Cornell University.
[7] Conley, Timothy G and Christopher Udry. 2010 ”Learning About a New
Technology: Pineapple in Ghana.” American Economic Review, 100:1, pp.
35–69.
[8] Foster, Andrew andMark R. Rosenzweig. 2001. ”MissingWomen, theMar-
riage Market, and Economic Growth.” Working Paper.
[9] Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. Learning by Doing and
Learning From Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agricul-
ture. Journal of Political Economy, 103:6, pp. 1176–1209.
[10] Fryer, Roland andMatthewO. Jackson. 2004. ”A Categorical Model of Cog-
nition and Biased Decision-Making.” Working Paper Department of Eco-
nomics, Harvard University and Stanford University.
[11] Huffman, Wallace E. 2001. ”Human Capital: Education and Agriculture,”
in Handbook of Agricultural Economics. Bruce L Gardner and Gordon C
Rausser eds: Elsevier Science, pp. 333-81.
11
[12] Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. The Economics of Social Networks. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
[13] Kirman, Alan and Miriam Teschl. 2006. Changing Identities. GREQAM
Working paper, Aix-en-Provence and Marseille.
[14] Lybbert, Travis J., David R. Just, and Christopher B. Barrett. 2010. ”Estimat-
ing Risk Preferences in the Presence of BifurcatedWealth Dynamics: DoWe
Misattribute Dynamic Risk Responses to Statis Risk Aversion?” Working
Paper Cornell University and UC Davis.
[15] Loury, Glenn C. 2002. The Anatomy of Racial Inequality. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
[16] Schultz, Paul T. 1989. ”Education Investments and Returns,” inHandbook of
Development Economics. Hollis B. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan eds: Elsevier
Science, pp. 544-630.
[17] Sen, Amartya. 2006. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. New York
and London: W.W Norton and Company.
[18] Sunding, David and David Zilberman. 2001. ”The Agricultural Innovation
Process: Research and Technology Adoption in a Changing Agricultural
Sector,” inHandbook of Agricultural Economics. Bruce L Gardner and Gordon
C. Rausser eds: Elsevier Science, pp. 207-61.
12
CHAPTER 2
WHO CARES WHAT OTHERS THINK (OR DO?) SOCIAL LEARNING,
SOCIAL PRESSURES AND IMITATION IN COTTON FARMING IN
INDIA
2.1 Introduction
The introduction of new agricultural technologies in developing countries has
the potential to significantly improve agricultural incomes and living standards
thereby transforming the rural economy. However, when new agricultural tech-
nologies are introduced, adoption often does not occur immediately. Farmers
instead appear to follow a complex pattern of gradual adoption, dis-adoption
and often non-adoption (Besley and Case 1993, Feder et al. 1985, Sunding and
Zilberman 2001).
So, what determines the pattern of adoption? Conditional on what an indi-
vidual knows and with whom he interacts, it is plausible that prices, incomes
and the attributes of the individual (such as risk-aversion, education, etc.) are
important predictors of adoption behavior and the earlier literature on technol-
ogy adoption indeed emphasized these factors.1 To understand the adoption
process completely however, we need to understand how an individual learns
about the profitability of a new technology and how his social relations might
influence his decision.
1For an overview of the earlier literature see Feder et al. (1985). This literature tells us that
prices, incomes, risk aversion and education matter, however as these studies do not control for
knowledge or social connections, some of this correlation might be spurious.
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A significant share of the recent literature on agricultural technology adop-
tion therefore has placed the individual’s adoption decision in the context of his
social relations. An interesting example of how social interactions can mediate
technology adoption is the phenomenon of strategic delay: because knowledge
is to some extent a public good, an individual may prefer to strategically de-
lay his own experimentation, and instead ’free-ride’ on the experimentation of
his peers. In the aggregate this may result in a poor equilibrium characterized
by extremely low rates of adoption. This learning from the experimentation
of others, often referred to in an agricultural context as social learning, can be
conceptually distinguished from the phenomenon of imitation, whereby an in-
dividual copies the behavior of another, without having observed the results of
the latter’s experimentation. This kind of behavior may arise from a desire to
’keep-up-with-the-Joneses’ (I will refer to this phenomenon as behavioral imi-
tation). Or it may reflect a kind of learning in which the adoption behavior of
the individual being copied is itself taken to be a signal about the profitability
of the new technology (I will refer to this phenomenon as learning imitation).
Finally, there are settings where new technologies are viewed with suspicion or
may be (correctly or incorrectly) associated with harmful externalities, in which
case social pressures may inhibit the adoption process of the new technology
(Appadurai 1989, Moser and Barrett 2006, Rogers 1965 and Vasavi 1994).
Identifying the relative importance of these various channels of influence is
obviously important from a policy perspective, but has turned out to be elusive
in practice. In the first place, obtaining an accurate picture of an individual’s so-
cial network from the information contained in a limited sample is not straight-
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forward, and existing methods of doing so are not without pitfalls. Even if
social networks are well-measured, there remains the thorny issue of inferring
causal effects from correlations in individuals’ behavior.2 First, one needs to
separate the social interaction effects from the so-called correlated effects, i.e.,
the unobservables that either coordinate the actions of individuals through sim-
ilar constraints or directly influence network formation. Second, one needs to
deal with the simultaneity problem, i.e., the problem of estimating the causal
effect of changing an individual’s action on another individual when these ac-
tions are jointly determined in equilibrium. Last, but not least, one still needs to
find identifying assumptions that will make it possible to separate out the var-
ious kinds of social interaction effects, namely, social learning (and associated
free-rider effects), social pressures and imitation.
Using a unique household-level dataset I collected for this purpose, I try to
separately quantify these three channels of influence. I study the adoption pro-
cess of Bacillus thurigiensis (Bt) cotton, a new type of cotton that requires fewer
pesticides and can increase expected yields, in three villages in India (Qaim
2003). In addition to social learning and imitation effects, there is reason to be-
lieve that social pressures are important to the adoption process because of the
2Manski (1993) shows that in a regression model of behavior in large groups in which indi-
vidual behavior is permitted to vary linearly with mean behavior in the group (expressing what
he terms endogenous social interaction effects), with the mean values of exogenous attributes
of group members (expressing what he terms contextual interactions effects), and with personal
characteristics that may be similar across group members (expressing what he terms correlated
effects), one is - assuming rational expectations - unable to identify endogenous social interac-
tion effects. Prospects of identification however improve if one relaxes one or more underlying
assumptions of Manski’s model. One could consider non-linear interaction effects instead of
linear effects (Bandiera and Rasul 2006), impose time sequencing on the endogenous effects in-
stead of considering contemporaneous endogenous effects (Conley and Udry 2010, Moser and
Barrett 2006), assume correlated and contextual effects are absent or move away from the as-
sumption of global interaction and consider network-based interactions.(Bandiara and Rasul
2006, Bramoulle´ et al. 2009, Conley and Udry 2010).
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commonly-held (erroneous) belief in these villages that the cultivation of Bt cot-
ton is harmful to animals (as well as humans and the environment).3 Using a
combination of experiments and questionnaires I elicited detailed information
on cotton production, (current) perceived bio-safety hazards of Bt cotton, (cur-
rent) beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt cotton and social networks. These
data are then combined with six years of a panel survey on the same households
that was previously collected by the International Crop Research Institute for
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), containing detailed agro-climatic, price and
wealth data which allow me to control for potentially confounding correlated
effects.
Using information on farmers’ beliefs about the profitability of Bt cotton I
directly distinguish social learning (including learning imitation) from (behav-
ioral) imitation and the effects of social pressures - essentially, adoption deci-
sions that are inconsistent with beliefs about the profitability of Bt cotton (after
controlling for credit constraints) must reflect the operation of the latter two
effects.
To further distinguish between social pressures and imitation, I use informa-
tion on the behavior of a set of ’progressive’ farmers. These generally successful
farmers, who were identified at the beginning of the survey, are the earliest
adopters of new technologies, play a central role in the diffusion of information
and are often an object of imitation. Equally important, their adoption deci-
sions are, by their own account, not influenced by social pressures or imitation,
3The scientific evidence available to date has shown that Bt cotton poses no significant risk
to the environment or human/animal health (see Menselsohn et al. 2005, Shelton et al. 2002).
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which implies a uni-directional imitation effect from the ’progressive’ farmers
to the ’non-progressive farmers’.
Using information on farmers’ beliefs about the profitability of Bt cotton, in
conjunction with a simple model of social pressures and data on farmers’ beliefs
about the bio-safety of Bt cotton, and information on the expected behavior of
the progressive farmers, I identify the social pressure and imitation effects. I
find strong evidence of social pressures, but no evidence of behavioral imitation.
Apparently, technology choice is not a potentially expensive fashion statement.
Using the panel dimension of the data, I investigate the role of social learn-
ing in the formation of beliefs about the profitability of Bt cotton. I construct, for
each farmer at each point in time, an aggregatemeasure of the information avail-
able to him on (historical) inputs and outputs of other farmers who cultivated
Bt cotton, differentiating between information available on the experiences of
progressive farmers from that on non-progressive farmers. Information on the
contemporaneous behavior of progressive and non-progressive farmers is used
to identify the operation of social pressures and imitation. Social pressures are
assumed to operate through the contemporaneous behavior of non-progressive
farmers, while imitation effects are captured by the contemporaneous behavior
of progressive farmers. Because contemporaneous actions of non-progressive
farmers are jointly determined, I use an instrumental variable strategy to iden-
tify these effects.
The results indicate that for first-time adopters, talking to informed parties
such as company representatives and input dealers is the most important driver
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of adoption. The second most important channel is learning from progressive
farmers. The learning effect is concave, suggesting decreasing returns to new
information. Consistent with this learning effect, I find evidence of farmers
free-riding on the experimentation of the progressive farmers, delaying their
adoption when they know more progressive farmers currently adopting. In ad-
dition, I find strong evidence of farmers imitating the progressive farmers, i.e.,
adopting Bt cotton without having observed the yield outcomes of these farm-
ers and social pressures inhibiting the adoption process of this new technology.
The separate identification of different social interaction effects has been at-
tempted in two other papers. Moser and Barrett (2006) look at the effects of
social learning and social pressures on the adoption of a new technique for rice
cultivation in Madagascar. Their identification strategy is based on the assump-
tion that a farmer’s probability of initial adoption of a new technology is a con-
cave function of the cumulative experience of village farmers. If so, the effect of
the cumulative experience of village farmers up to t 1 should be larger than the
effect of experience of village farmers at time t. They find this not to be the case
and attribute this difference to social pressures. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) look
at the effects of social learning on the decision to adopt sunflower cultivation
in Mozambique. They incorporate imitation effects by including the behavior
of a key individual in the village that could act as the focal point as a regressor.
However, they find no evidence of imitation using this strategy.
Among papers that study social learning alone, Conley and Udry (2010)
look at how farmers learn about the appropriate use of fertilizers from the ex-
perimentation of others in pineapple farming in Ghana. They capture social
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learning through the past profits of the contact of each farmer and control for
correlated effects by using information on soil and other location-specific char-
acteristics. They conclude that social learning is important in the diffusion of
knowledge regarding pineapple cultivation in Ghana.
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) investigate the adoption of high-yielding
seeds during India’s green revolution. As they have no measure of individu-
als’ social networks, a problem that is fairly common in this literature, they use
the total number of plots cultivated with improved seeds in the village up to
the previous year to capture the effects of social learning. They also find evi-
dence of social learning and learning spillovers in the shape of strategic delays
of experimentation.
In terms of policy, the importance of social learning and free-riding implies
that subsidies for early adopters might be required to increase the adoption rate.
However, the existing literature gives no guidance on who should be targeted
by agricultural extension officers and private agribusiness agents. The contribu-
tion of the present study is to show that multiple mechanisms matter (although
not equally). This is potentially important because to the extent that these mech-
anisms are correlated, which I show they are, omitting one tends to exaggerate
the importance of others. Omitting non-farmer sources of information or the
most successful farmers from the sample overestimates the importance of social
learning. And by considering only the past experiences of farmers in one’s net-
work or focusing only on the optimal input decision conditional on adoption,
one neglects the role of social pressures which can be a serious drag on adoption,
whether these are due to (erroneous) beliefs about externalities (as in this study)
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or simply reflect status quo bias (as in Moser and Barrett 2006). From a policy
perspective, the results of this paper imply that providing information to the
most successful farmers in the village is likely to be the most cost-effective strat-
egy. In India, the identity of these successful farmers is generally well-known
by the head of the village and the government extension agents who visit the
village every 2-3 months to provide information on subsidies, prices and new
technologies and collect land and irrigation taxes. As the private agribusiness
often have a better knowledge of the most recent technologies available, this
gives scope for public-private partnerships with the public side identifying the
key individuals and the private side providing information on the technology.
To mitigate the free-rider effect, a small (temporary) subsidy might be given to
early adopters. However, where social pressures are strong, as is the case in
one of the villages I investigate, a large-scale information campaign may be re-
quired to shift the equilibrium. Adoption rates that remain below 5-10% as well
as strong bio-safety or other concerns with regard to the new technology among
the progressive farmers might be indicators of social pressures being at play.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section pro-
vides some background information on the Bt cotton technology in India. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the data. To set the stage for the analysis, Section 4 discusses
some selected descriptive statistics and provides an informal description of the
adoption process in the three villages, based on conversations with respondents.
Section 5 outlines a simple theoretical model and the empirical identification
strategy. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Bt cotton in India
India produces almost twice as much cotton as the USA (see Table 2.1). In terms
of yield however, India is at the tail-end of the global distribution. The aver-
age cotton yield in India is only one third of China’s average yield. The main
cotton producing states in India are Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab and Andhra
Pradesh, producing over 80% of the total cotton production. In these regions,
cotton is one of the main cash crops of farmers and supports a significant section
of the population through the processing industries and trade.
Table 2.1: Basic cotton statistics of China, US and India
Cotton Average
exports¹ cotton yield²
1985 1990 1995 2000 2008 2008 2008
China 4,137 4,507 4,768 4,420 7,947 16 1,325
USA 2,924 3,376 3,897 3,742 2,985 2,830 951
India 1,964 1,989 2,885 2,380 5,443 1,328 579
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, PSD Online. Updated 10/10/2008. Notes: ¹in thousand metric 
tons; ²in kg/ha (ginned) cotton
Cotton production¹
Losses in cotton production in India are mainly due to its predominant cul-
tivation under rainfed conditions and its susceptibility to 166 species of insects,
pests and diseases. Today, nearby 50% of pesticides used in India are used on
cotton (ISAAA 2005). The major pests affecting cotton are jassids, aphids, white
fly and bollworms.4
4The cotton bollworm complex encompasses the American bollworm (Helicoverpa armigera),
pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiella), spiny bollworm (Earias insulana) and spotted bollworm
(Earias vittella) (ISAAA 2005, Asia-Pacific Consortium of Agricultural Biotechnology 2006).
21
As a response to bollworm pest problems, Monsanto, a US agricultural com-
pany, developed the Bt genetically modified technology during the 1980s. In
collaboration with the Maharashtra Hybrid Seed Company (Mahyco), the tech-
nology was then introduced into several of Mahyco’s breeding lines during the
1990s. In 2002, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), an In-
dian government body, approved the commercial release of three Bt cotton cul-
tivars5 ofMahyco. As of August 2008, 225 Bt cotton cultivars had been approved
by GEAC.
Since its introduction in India, the Bt technology has been surrounded by a
lot of controversy and debate largely centered around bio-safety of genetically
modified crops. These bio-safety concerns may lead to social pressures that
inhibit the adoption of Bt cotton, i.e., a farmer might be accused of endangering
the health of animals and people in the village as well as generating negative
impacts on the soil fertility andwater quality of neighboring plots. The scientific
evidence available to date has shown that Bt cotton poses no significant risk to
the environment or human/animal health (Menselsohn et al. 2005, Shelton et
al. 2002).
The Bt cultivars contain a gene sourced from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis in their DNA sequence.6 This gene produces a protein that is toxic
to the bollworms. The Bt gene does not effectively control against all bollworms
5A cultivar is a particular variety of plant species that is being cultivated.
6This protein, when entering the gut of the insect in the larvae phase, meets a receptor pro-
tein, binds with it and punctures the wall of the intestine, which leads to paralysis and eventu-
ally death of the insect. This receptor protein is only found in insects of the Lepidoptera order.
This implies that Bt cotton has no impacts on humans or other mammals.
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and provides no protection against other pests and diseases.7 Also, when a Bt
gene is inserted in the DNA of a plant it only affects its pest resistance. It does
not affect its duration, drought resistance, or fiber length, etc. These properties
are determined by the genetic properties of the cultivar in which the gene was
inserted.
Data from trials on Bt cotton and its isogenic non-Bt counterpart in India
show that in high bollworm pressure years, independent of soil and climatic
conditions, profits from Bt cotton are higher than profits from non-Bt cotton.8
If the bollworm pressure is low (and hence few pesticides are needed) and the
price of the Bt seed is high this result might not hold. Pemsla et al. (2004), using
farm data from non-isogenic Bt and non-Bt cultivars in Karnataka during 2002-
03, a low bollworm pressure year, conclude that, irrespective of soil and climatic
conditions, non-Bt cotton outperforms Bt cotton.9
In the three villages I consider in this paper, Aurepalle in the Mahbubnagar
district in Andhra Pradesh and Kanzara and Kinkhed in the Akola district in
Maharashtra, profits from Bt cotton are higher than profits from non-Bt cotton,
irrespective of bollworm pressure, soil and climatic conditions.10
7The protein is toxic to several insects of the Lepidoptera order, among others the American
bollworm, the spiny bollworm, the spotted bollworm and to a lesser extent, the pink bollworm.
8Data from Qaim and Zilberman (2003) from trials conducted in 25 districts on 175 farms in
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu andMadhya Pradesh during 2001-02, a high bollworm pressure year,
show that the cumulative distribution function of the profits of Bt cotton first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the non-Bt function. I am grateful to Matim Qaim for sharing the data with
me.
9More specifically, the cumulative distribution function of the profits of non-Bt cotton first-
order stochastically dominates the Bt cotton function.
10In particular, in 2006-07, a low bollworm pressure year in all the villages, the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the profits of Bt cotton first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative
distribution function of the profits of non-Bt cotton in Aurepalle and Kanzara. Little can be said
about Kinkhed as there are so few Bt cotton farmers. In 2007-08, a high bollworm pressure year
in the Akola villages, the cumulative distribution function of the profits of Bt cotton first-order
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2.3 Data collected
I use two primary sources to construct the dataset for this paper. The first is
six rounds of the ICRISAT-VLS data, covering cropping seasons from 2001 to
2007. These data are collected by the International Crop Research Institute of
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in Hyderabad as part of their Village Level
Studies (VLS) program.11
To obtain information on social networks and beliefs regarding Bt cot-
ton, I resurveyed the 246 ICRISAT-VLS households in Aurepalle, Kanzara and
Kinkhed in 2007-08.12 In this supplementary survey I also elicited each house-
stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function of the profits of non-Bt cotton in
Kanzara. Nothing can be said about Aurepalle as no cotton farmers cultivated non-Bt cotton in
2007-08. To get an idea of the magnitude of these profits, in 2007-08, in Aurepalle, the average
profit of Bt cotton farming stood at 7,760 Rs/acre (st. dev 6,055 Rs/acre). In Kanzara the average
profit of Bt cotton farming stood at 7,760 Rs/acre (st. dev.5,299 Rs/acre) versus 1,367 Rs/acre (st.
dev. 3,056 Rs/acre) for non-Bt cotton. In Kinkhed the average profit of Bt cotton farming stood
at 1,176 Rs/acre (st. dev.3,842 Rs/acre) versus 153 Rs/acre (st. dev. 2,762 Rs/acre) for non-Bt
cotton. To check whether Bt cotton farmers are operating in different conditions compared to
non-Bt cotton farmers I run a farmer/year fixed effect regression using farmer-level profits of
2001-08; the coefficient on Bt is 3,276 Rs/acre and is significantly different from zero at the 1%
level.
11In this program, ICRISAT followed 300 households from six villages during the period 1975-
1985 every three weeks. This dataset, known as the first generation VLS, contains detailed
household and plot level data. In 2001, ICRISAT restarted the panel, revisiting 185 of the first
generation VLS households and their split-offs, in addition to 261 newly added households, to
make the sample representative for each village in terms of land-holding size. For an overview
of the goals, methods and outcomes of, respectively, the first and second generation VLS see (i)
Singh et al. (1985) and Walker and Ryan (1990), (ii) Bantilan et al. (2006) and Rao and Charyulu
(2007). Of the ICRISAT-VLS data, I use the modules on household composition, landholding,
prices and wealth.
12Of the 199 households covered in 2001-02 by the ICRISAT-VLS, 92% were still in the sample
in 2007-08. The households that dropped out were, on average, smaller in terms of household
size, higher educated, with less total land, but more irrigable land compared to the household
that remained in the sample. I interviewed these 184 households plus some of their split-offs
and newly added households, a total of 246 households. This sample is representative for the
village in 2007-08 (see Bantilan et al. 2006 and Rao and Charyulu 2007). Of these, 68% have
data for all seven cropping years. Of the 32% of the households who are included in the sample
from a later date onwards, 30% are households that have split off from sample households
during 2001-2008. These split-off households are included from their date of split-off. See also
Appendix A.
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hold’s cultivation plans for the year 2008-09, past cotton production andmarket-
ing decisions covering the period 2001-08 and included questions on household
composition, landholding, wealth and per-plot agricultural inputs and outputs
all pertaining to the 2007-08 season.
Table 2.2 introduces the three villages. Aurepalle, with 925 households, is the
largest of the three villages. It is located in the drought-prone, poor, Telangana
region of Andhra Pradesh and in terms of average income situated between the
richer Kanzara and poorer Kinkhed. Kanzara and Kinkhed, with respectively
319 and 189 households, are located in the less drought-prone Akola district of
West Maharashtra. The ICRISAT-VLS sample includes 128, 63 and 55 house-
holds in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed, respectively. The average education
level of the respondent (i.e., the main decision-maker with regard to agriculture)
is low, especially in Aurepalle (2.31 years). The average size of a household is
between 4 and 5 members in all three villages.
Table 2.2: Basic descriptive statistics of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
Number of households in village 925 319 189
Number of households in sample 128 63 55
Median rainfall (mm/year)¹ 434 748 745
Distance to nearest town (km) 10 9 12
Average education level of respondent (in years) 2.31 6.61 6.89
Average number of household members 4.23 4.87 4.5
Average yearly income (Rs)² 43,543 53,720 38,087
Notes: ¹2001-2007; ²2004-2005
In addition to the ICRISAT-VLS households, I also collected data among 21
additional ’progressive’ farmers. These generally successful farmers play a cen-
tral role in the dispersion of information and are often an object of imitation.
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Omitting these progressive farmers from the analysis could cause spurious cor-
relation among farmers who are connected to the same progressive farmers.
Of the ICRISAT-VLS farmers, 22 farmers were also labelled progressive farm-
ers, totalling 43 progressive farmers. I identified this set of generally successful
farmers through group discussions with the village leaders, the junior VLS in-
vestigators who have been living in the village since 2001 and the senior VLS
investigators who have known the villagers since the beginning of the VLS sur-
vey in 1975. The tables in Appendix B show how these progressive farmers are
different from the remainder of the sample. On average, the progressive farmers
are more educated and own more land, of which a larger share is irrigated. The
progressive farmers are far more likely to adopt Bt cotton and, conditional on
adoption, are more profitable and adopt the new technology earlier compared
to the remainder of the sample. Appendix C shows that the VLS respondents
indeed approach these progressive farmers for advice in case of agricultural
problems.13
Finally, I completed a village questionnaire, including information on cli-
mate14, bollworm pressure15 and village infrastructure, with the assistance of
13Note that there is a possibility that I might have omitted progressive farmers who have
migrated from the village since 2001. I do not expect this to be a serious issue as, looking at the
characteristics of the households who have left the VLS sample since 2001, only one was a larger
farmer household that used to cultivate cotton.
14I use three different daily rainfall series: from June 2005 onwards, I use the daily rainfall data
as measured by the VLS resident investigators in the villages; before June 2005, I use the daily
rainfall data of Amangal (gauge data) as provided by the Tehsil office at Madgul for Aurepalle
and the daily rainfall data of Murtizapur (gauge data) as available from the Maharastra State
government website http://www.mahaagri.gov.in/.
15I obtained the bollworm pressure data from various AICIP and GEAC reports and double-
checked this information with the perceived bollworm pressure as recorded in the village ques-
tionnaires.
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the ICRISAT-VLS investigators, sarpanch16, three knowledgeable people in each
village, theMandal/Tehsil Revenue Office17 and the District Collector’s Office.
I measured social networks using three different methods. The first method
asked the respondent how many farmers he knew in each year since 2001-02
in different social groups (total, village, relatives) that adopted Bt cotton in that
year and what the experience of these farmers was on average with Bt cotton.
Recognizing measurement errors due to recall, this method has the advantage
of capturing most links of the respondent, but provides little information on the
nature of this link. Ideally, one would like to take into account certain aspects
of the relationship between the respondent and his contact. However, due to
time constraints, one cannot ask the respondent for information regarding his
relationship with every one of his peers.
This implies that one needs to think about sampling the social network of
each respondent. I opt for a technique called the ’random-matching-within-
sample’ method based on Conley and Udry (2001) and Santos and Barrett
(2007).18
16A sarpanch is a democratically elected head of a village level statutory institution of local
self-Government called the Gram (village) Panchayat in India.
17Mandal refers to the third-level administrative area in Andhra Pradesh, below state and
district. The equivalent in other states is tehsil (or taluka).
18The two most common techniques are respondent-driven ”snowball sampling” (i.e., ex-
isting study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances) and taking the
“network of a sample”. The first technique is useful when one is interested in properties of
the network itself, but as it results in a non-representative sample of the households, it is not
a useful technique for the economic analysis of the effects of social networks on behavior. The
second technique artificially truncates the network and is not representative of the “network of
the population”. As such, this technique might result in biased estimates of micro-economic
behavior in the presence of structured networks as unobservables influence both the probabil-
ity of a link and, independently, the behavior of interest (Santos and Barrett 2007). Note that
both the ”network of a sample” and the ”random matching within sample” will provide biased
estimates of the effects of social networks in the presence of star-shaped network structures.
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Through the random-matching-within-sample method, I elicit the details of
the relationship between two randomly drawn respondents from the VLS sam-
ple. Each respondent is matched with six randomly drawn VLS respondents
and four ex-ante identified fixed progressive farmers.19 The questions in the
random-matching-within-sample method include a set of questions regarding
the relationship between the respondent and the match and the knowledge that
the respondent has about the match’s farming activities in terms of inputs and
outputs.20
Note that two important assumptions are underlying the random-matching-
within-sample method. First, by using measures based on elicitation in 2008, I
assume that the nature of the relationship between two randomly drawn indi-
viduals has not changed in the last seven years. 21 Second, I assume that the
The reason for this bias is that if a ”source” in the network, i.e., someone who has many links
compared to others, is not sampled, its absence generates an omitted variable bias.
19Appendix C comments on the selection of these four fixed progressive farmers.
20One can use the information elicited through the random matching within sample game
in two different ways. First, one can extrapolate the information obtained through the random
matching within sample game to the population level as the percentage of links in the game pro-
vides an unbiased estimate of the percentage of links in the population. Assuming the absence
of unobservables which influence both the probability of a link and the probability to adopt Bt
cotton, one can then use this estimate to examine the effect of these links on the adoption deci-
sion. Second, one can regress the probability of a link on the attributes of the respondent and
the match, and use the results of this regression to predict out-of-sample (i.e., out of the random
matching within sample game) the probability of a link between any two individuals in the
sample. the advantage of the latter method is that it strips the independent variable ”link” of its
unobservable part and as such avoids the potential bias. In addition, it makes use from a larger
set of farmers each farmer is connected to. However, if the set of attributes poorly predict these
links, there might be too little variation left in the predicted link variable to asses the effects
of the links on the adoption decision. Note also that using the results of the random matching
within sample method directly implies that I have no link for the pairs which involve a match
that did not cultivate cotton in 2007-08. These links were set at zero, i.e., ”no link”. As 25% of
the respondents who have farmed cotton in the last 7 years did not farm cotton in 2007-08, this
might be a potential source of bias. This is not a problem for the regressions using the predicted
links.
21During the trial round, I tested this assumption, and went back in time with the set of
questions regarding the relationship between the respondent and thematch, i.e., how long have
you known X? How frequently do you talk to X?, etc. Only a couple respondents mentioned a
recent change in the relationship, in all cases caused by a quarrel between families. I could not
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relevant social network in terms of social learning, social pressures and imita-
tion does not exceed the village boundaries.22
The third method of measuring social networks asks the cotton farmer who
he would approach for information if he had problems with his cotton crop,
eliciting some characteristics of that individual’s farming activities and the rela-
tionship between the respondent and that individual.
In order to be able to take into account the information that the respondent
receives from non-farmer sources, I added a section on the information obtained
since 2001-02 from contacts with extension agents, NGOs, company agents, in-
put dealers and ICRISAT.23 The majority of the information (from non-farmer
sources) is received through unannounced visits of company agents to the vil-
lage and chats with the input-dealers in the nearest urban hub.
test the set of questions regarding the knowledge the respondent has about his match’s farming
activities as the respondent could not recall the yield, pesticide use and cultivar choice of the
match several years ago. However, using the predicted links based on the results of the random
matching within sample method, I constructed an estimate of the year when the respondent
heard first about Bt cotton and compared this with the year the respondent stated he heard first
about Bt cotton. For the respondent who farm cotton in 2007-08, I correctly predict this year
in all cases using the link ”know the cultivar of X” (i.e., link no. 6 in Table 2.5), but have an
estimate which is too early in 37.5% of the cases using the link ”know the cultivar, pesticide use
and yield of X” (i.e., link no. 7 in Table 2.5). This issue might cause the social learning coefficient
to be biased downwards in the regressions based on the results of the random matching within
sample method.
22The descriptive statistics suggest that this assumption is relatively innocious in the case of
Aurepalle and Kanzara where, respectively, each year, on average, over 85% of the Bt farm-
ers known to the respondent live in the village. However, in Kinkhed, over 40% of the farmers
known to the respondent who cultivate Bt cotton do not live in the village. The results of the ran-
dom matching within sample experiment, however, suggest that one is unlikely to learn from
these farmers about the profitability of Bt cotton as the two largest determinants of ”knowing
the pesticide use and yield” conditional on ”knowing the cultivar” are living in the same neigh-
borhood in the village and having a field neighboring the match’s field.
23Not all respondents could recall the month in which they received the information. I recon-
structed the month (before/after June) based on the adoption history of the farmer and knowl-
edge of visits of extension agents etc. from the village questionnaire.
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In addition to information on social networks, I elicited information on cur-
rent beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt and non-Bt cotton and bio-safety
hazards of Bt cotton. For the former, I used a yield distribution game, based on
Lybbert et al. (2007). In this game, I first elicited the minimum and maximum
yield (per acre) of two Bt and non-Bt cultivars of the respondent’s choice con-
ditional on the respondent’s soil characteristics, irrigation status and expected
input use. Then I made five boxes, evenly distributed between this minimum
and maximum and I asked the respondent to use 20 stones (each stone rep-
resenting a 5% probability) to form a yield density function. After each yield
distribution game, I asked the respondent howmuch he expects to pay i) for the
seed (per acre), and ii) for pesticides and for other inputs (per acre).24
For the latter, I collected data on the farmer’s view and the perceived views
of different social groups on the effects of Bt cotton on animal health, human
health and the environment. More specifically, I asked the respondent ”To what
degree do you think (or that ”others” think) that Bt cotton is hazardous for
(1) animal health, (2) for human health, (3) for the environment”, where the
’others’ refers to, in several sub-questions, other farmers, relatives, company
agents, government extension agents, input dealers and ICRISAT. Each of these
three questions has five possible answers, ranging from ’strongly disagree’ to
’strongly agree’ and a ’don’t know’ option.
24During the interview, I explicitly linked the number of stones to percentages. See also Dela-
vande et al. (2008) for various other methods that can be used.
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2.4 A first look at the data
Table 2.3 presents selected descriptive statistics regarding the Bt cotton adoption
process and the (current) knowledge and beliefs about Bt cotton. Figure 2.1 plots
the number of farmers cultivating Bt cotton as a percentage of the total number
of cotton farmers (the ”adoption curve”). In this section, I discuss this table
and figure and tell the story of the adoption process using qualitative interview
evidence, thereby setting the stage for the analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Adoption of Bt cotton [as % of cotton farmers]
In Andhra Pradesh, where Aurepalle is situated, one out of three of the
Bt cotton cultivars was not on the market during the first two cropping sea-
sons (2002-04). In addition, during the first three years NGOs and the Andhra
Pradesh government challenged the decision of GEAC with regard to the ap-
proval of Bt cotton, resulting in a discontinuation of the permission for com-
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Table 2.3: Bt cotton adoption process and current beliefs 2001-08
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
% of households that farm cotton, 2001-08 60 84 82
% of cotton farmers that adopt Bt cotton, 2001-08 77 51 11
% of cotton farmers that adopt Bt cotton, 2007-08 100 54 14
% of cotton acreage under Bt cotton, 2007-08 100 55 15
% of cotton acreage under Bt cotton, 2002-03 0 9 0
% of Bt cotton farmers that disadopt Bt cotton, 2007-08 0 14 0
% of Bt cotton farmers that partially adopt Bt cotton, 2007-08 0 31 40
Never heard of Bt cotton (as % of cotton farmers) 4 0 0
Av. perceived mean of Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)¹ 7.6 6.82 5.45
Av. perceived variance of Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)¹ 1.57 2.12 1.49
Av. perceived mean of non-Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)¹ 4.79 3.88 3.72
Av. perceived variance of non-Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)¹ 0.64 0.79 0.87
Av. perceived number of pesticide sprays needed for Bt cotton 3.4 4.7 2.9
Av.perceived number of pesticide sprays needed for non-Bt cotton 7.6 2.1 1.24
% of respondents with safety concerns regarding Bt cotton 13 51 53
Notes: ¹1 quintal=100kg; Av.=average; calculated assuming a step-wise distribution with the minimum and maximum of the 
distribution as specified by the respondent; the differences between Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton in perceived mean and perceived 
number of sprays needed is significant in all three villages
mercial cultivation of several Mahyco cultivars in 2005.25 The legal battle and
controversy around GM crops in the early years in Andhra Pradesh affected the
farmers in Aurepalle as company agents did not actively go around the country
side to promote the new Bt technology. Only one of the progressive farmers in
Aurepalle learned about Bt cotton from non-farmer sources as early as 2002 and
started to cultivate Bt cotton in 2003. The majority of the progressive farmers
heard first about Bt cotton from the media and each-other in 2003-2004 and the
other cotton farmers heard about Bt cotton from the progressive farmers and
company agents visiting the village in 2006-07. The large majority of the cot-
ton farmers, 91%, adopted Bt cotton in the same year that they heard about Bt
cotton for the first time, displaying great confidence (by their own account) in
the judgement of the progressive farmers and relying heavily on the advice of
company agents and input dealers.
25Sources: The list of approved hybrids as released by GEAC and confirmed through personal
communication with Mahyco, dated 7 September 2009.
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The few farmers who delayed adoption mentioned high seed cost, unavail-
ability of the seed with their dealer and the need to observe the results for them-
selves as the main reasons. Farmers who did not adopt up to 2007-08 mentioned
lack of land, family labor, credit, knowledge and high seed costs as the main
reasons. No disadoption occurred in Aurepalle. Two farmers adopted the tech-
nology partially in 2006, cultivating both Bt and non-Bt cotton. The current
adoption rate stands at 100%.
As can be seen from Table 2.3, the Aurepalle respondents currently have
little to no bio-safety concerns regarding Bt cotton. Only 13% of the respondents
’agreed’ or ’strongly agreed’ with (at least) one of the following statements: ’Bt
cotton is hazardous for animal health: they might get sick or die when they eat
it’, ’Bt cotton is hazardous for human health: if you touch it toomuch, youmight
get sick’ and ’Bt cotton is hazardous for the environment: it damages crops and
soils’.
In Kanzara, the Bt adoption process has been smooth, characterized by par-
tial adoption, strategic delays and disadoption. Disadoption of Bt cotton is be-
tween 14% and 27% each year and thepercentage of Bt farmers who are par-
tial adopters ranges from 31% to 80%. The progressive farmers in the villages
learned about Bt cotton from company agents, media and each other as early as
2001 and started cultivation as early as 2002. The other village farmers heard
first about Bt cotton from company agents, input dealers and progressive farm-
ers. Most farmers, including the progressive farmers, did not adopt Bt cotton in
the year that they first heard about it.
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The reasons mentioned for this delay are lack of experience, including the
experience of others in their network, lack of irrigation facilities, high seed
cost and lack of credit availability. The current adoption rate stands at 54%.
Presently, 51% of the respondents have bio-safety concerns regarding Bt cotton,
but none of the progressive farmers reported any of these concerns.
Kinkhed is located only a few of miles from Kanzara. Despite the fact that
the progressive farmers in the village heard about Bt cotton from the media,
company agents, input dealers and progressive farmers outside of the village as
early as 2002, they displayed a ’wait and see’ attitude and, as a result, the adop-
tion process started only in 2006. The other village farmers heard first about
Bt cotton from input dealers, farmers outside of the village and the progres-
sive farmers. The current adoption rate stands at 14%. In fact, only one farmer
classified as a non-progressive farmer has adopted the technology.
The reasons for non-adoption mentioned by the farmers are: lack of infor-
mation, irrigation, and land, the high price of the seed, lack of credit availability
and the danger Bt cotton poses to farm animals.
Currently, 53% of the respondents have bio-safety concerns and these safety
concerns are mentioned as one of the reasons for non-adoption by several farm-
ers. Unlike in Kanzara, even the progressive farmers in the village attach some
belief to these concerns.
While in all villages, on average, respondents currently believe that Bt cotton
provides a higher yield compared to non-Bt cotton, bio-safety concerns, the pro-
cess which formed these beliefs, and resulting adoption process are markedly
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different in the three villages. What are the underlying factors driving these dif-
ferent adoption processes? First, there are the usual constraints: credit, land and
irrigation which are different across villages. For instance, Aurepalle farmers,
using groundwater, have typically access to irrigation during the rainy season,
while Kanzara and Kinkhed farmers, using surface water, do not. The physical
environment is different in terms of climate, expected bollworm pressure and
soils and while the distance to the first urban hub is similar in all three villages,
the different in state policies and attitudes with regard to genetically modified
crops implied that Aurepalle was not visited by company agents until 2005. The
education level is higher in the Akola villages, and the Kanzara farmers have,
on average, better access to media sources.
This difference in education level and information received from non-farmer
sources not only results in different beliefs with regard to the profitability but
also different beliefs with regard to bio-safety. A regression analysis of the per-
ceived bio-safety concerns of other village farmers on various household charac-
teristics, information received from outside sources, information received from
village farmers, and the perceived relationship between animal deaths and Bt
cotton indicates that education significantly increases these concerns and infor-
mation received from non-farmer sources decreases these concerns.26 The data
do not allowme to check whether the perceived bio-safety concerns of other vil-
lage farmers are correct, i.e., whether surrounding village farmers’ concerns are
26This regression analysis includes the following independent variables: number of times in-
formation received from non-farmer sources, education, value of livestock, cumulative number
of farmers known who cultivated Bt cotton, the perceived relationship between animals died
and number of Bt farmers (measured as the individual-level estimated slope of this relationship
also interacted with how certain one is of this perceived relationship), land owned, number of
adult and total number of family members.
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indeed as the respondent perceives them. They do reveal a very high correla-
tion between own concerns and perceived concerns of others (with a correlation
coefficient of 0.92).
Last but not least, the different underlying network structures of who-
communicates-with-whom also plays a role in generating these different adop-
tion processes. In 2007-08, the respondents in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed
(on average) knew, respectively, 85, 38 and 34 farmers who cultivate Bt cotton in
2007-08.27 In Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed (on average), respectively, 78%,
85% and 57% of the Bt farmers known to the respondent live in the village. Table
2.4 presents selected results from the random-matching-within-sample method.
Recall that each respondent draws 6 name cards of VLS respondents and is
given a set of 4 fixed cards with names of progressive farmers. Denote the indi-
vidual on the card by X. One can see that in a small village like Kinkhed, liter-
ally everyone knows everyone. In Aurepalle, only 87.8% of the cards are known.
Conditional on knowing cotton farmer X, the respondent thinks he knows the
pesticide use, cultivar choice and yield of farmer X in 2007-08 in, respectively,
21.9%, 27.8% and 63.6% of the cases in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed.28
This implies that the average Aurepalle farmer, by sheer virtue of living in a
larger village, knows more farmers and as such has more opportunities to learn
by observing other farmers’ experimentation. The average Kinkhed farmer, on
27In case that a range was given by the respondent, the mean was taken. If the respondent
answered ”don’t know” I assumed they knew no Bt cotton farmers.
28Seperating these results out by progressive farmers status of the match, does not change
these results drastically. Comparing progressive farmer matches with non-progressive farmer
matches, in Kanzara and Kinkhed, the respondent is up to 10%more likely to know the cultivar,
yield and pesticide use conditional on knowing the farmer. In Aurepalle, the respondent is up
to 6% less likely to know the cultivar, yield and pesticide use.
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Table 2.4: Knowledge about others’ activities (based on the results of the ran-
dom matching within sample method)
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
1. Know X? (%) 87.8 99.2 100
2. Does X farm? (% of 1) 82.3 83.7 91.6
3. Does X farm cotton? (% of 2) 57.2 70.2 90
4. Know X's yield? (% of 3) 30.2 39.1 68.6
5. Know X's pesticide use? (% of 3) 29.5 31.1 75.9
6. Know X's cultivar? (% of 3) 69.3 85.8 75.4
7. Know X's yield, pesticide use and cultivar? (% of 3) 21.9 27.8 63.6
8. X's yield correct (% of 4) 31.4 21.2 16.3
9. X's pest correct? (% of 5) 14.6 25.1 61.1
10. X's cultivar correct? (% of 6) 86 81.9 77.3
11. X's yield, pesticide use and cultivar correct (% of 7) 7.4 5.7 12.4
Note: In (4), (5), (6) and (7) "knowing" means that the respondent was able to name the cultivar, the amount of 
pesticides used, the yield per acre obtained etc. of match X. Knowledge of yield and pesticide use was 
considered correct if the believed value was within a 10% range of the actual value. If X cultivated multiple 
cultivars, the believed value of the average yield of Bt and non-Bt was compared with the actual average. In case 
of pesticide use the discrete decision was often known (whether X uses pesticides or not) but not the exact 
number of sprays. In this case, knowledge was considered incorrect.
the other hand, knows fewer farmers but knows these farmers in a more pro-
found manner, by cultivar, yield and pesticide use and as such is more likely to
learn something useful conditional on knowing one Bt cotton farmer.
In, respectively, 7.4%, 5.7% and 12.4% of the cases in Aurepalle, Kanzara and
Kinkhed the knowledge about yield, pesticide use and cultivar choice is correct.
Incorrect knowledge about other farmers’ activities might be one of the factors
underlying dis-adoption, i.e., a farmer could adopt Bt cotton based on the per-
ceived knowledge that x number of sprays are needed to obtain, on average, y
quintal/acre, but once the farmer has adopted Bt cotton, he experiences a lower
yield than expected and decides to disadopt. While the figures on yield in the
Akola villages of Table 2.4 should be taken with a grain of salt, as the respon-
dent had to convert the yields from an intercropping system to quintal/acre,
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note that Kanzara, where knowledge is most frequently incorrect, is also the
village with the highest disadoption rate.
Note that in the random-matching-within-sample method one only obtains
information about the links between the respondent and 6 randomly selected
VLS farmers and 4 fixed progressive farmers. In order to obtain a link variable
for any two randomly drawn VLS respondents, I use a probit regression of the
link variable of interest on a set of attributes of the respondent and match. I
then use the results of this regression to predict out-of-sample, i.e., out of the
random-matching-within-sample method but within the VLS sample.29
The results of this regression suggest that the probability of knowing X’s
yield, pesticide use and cultivar choice increases when either respondent or
match are a progressive farmer, the respondent and match belong to the same
caste, either respondent or match are of the male gender, a higher education
level of respondent or match and the respondent and match live in the same
sub-village. Unfortunately, I cannot include the two variables with the largest
predictive power, ‘living in the same neighborhood’ and ‘having a field next
to each other’ as I only have this information on the respondents and matches
drawn in the random-matching-within-sample method. However, as one can
29Concretely, for each village, I run a probit regression with two-way clustering (the first clus-
ter is the respondent and the second cluster is the match) and each variable entered up to the
third degree. Denote an arbitrary correlate with x, then the suffix ”add” and ”min” refer, re-
spectively, to xrespondent + xmatch and xrespondent   xmatch. The list of correlates included is: ”being
a progressive farmer” (PFadd, PFmin), ”being a laborer” (laboreradd, laborermin), ”belonging
to the same caste”, ”having the same family name”, ”acreage of land owned” (landadd, land-
min), ”years of education obtained by the decision-maker” (educationadd, educationmin), gen-
der (genderadd, gendermin), ”income per capita in kharif 2007-08” (incomeadd, incomemin),
”number of children” (childrenadd, childrenmin), ”value of agricultural machinery” (machin-
eryadd, machinerymin) and ”living in the same (sub)-village”.
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see from Table 2.5, the model still performs reasonably well with between 72%
and 88% of the links correctly predicted.
Table 2.5: Percentage of links correctly predicted
Link no. 5 Link no. 7
Aurepalle
Kanzara
Kinkhed
Know cultivar
77
Know cultivar, pesticide and yield
88
80
74
83
72
2.5 Modeling the decision to adopt Bt cotton
In this section I present a simple model of the decision to cultivate Bt cotton,
conditional on having decided to cultivate cotton, and derive a reduced-form
solution which I can then directly estimate. Following Besley and Case (1993)
and Moser and Barrett (2006) I abstract from the details of the learning process
by including a state variable denoted Ki;t representing the knowledge the farmer
i has about about Bt cotton. In addition, I refrain from characterizing the equilib-
rium of the strategic interaction between individuals underlying the free-rider
and social pressure effects among non-progressive farmers.30 In the empirical
specification, I use an instrumental variable strategy to deal with this issue of
simultaneity.
Regarding notation, three kinds of subscripts are employed, the first sub-
script denotes the individual i or the contacts of individual i, denoted  i; the
30Finding an analytical solution for the fixed point problem such an equilibriumwould imply
is challenging due to the overlapping network structure. As such, I leave such a characterization
to future work.
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second subscript denotes the crop (c refers to cotton, b to Bt cotton and n to
non-Bt cotton) and the third subscript denotes time t. Vectors are indicated in
bold.
Assuming a time-separable utility function and discrete time steps,  2
ft; t + 1; :::g, where  is the ‘integration dummy’, the farmer maximizes at each
time period t the discounted flow of instantaneous utility over an infinite hori-
zon:
V(Ki;t) = maxfAi;b;;xi;b;;xi;n;g1=t
E
266666666664
P1
=t 
t+ui(i;b;() + i;n;())+
s(Ai;b;;

A i;b;
	
8 i2NPi ;

A i;b;
	
8 i2NIi )
377777777775 (2.1)
In (2.1),V() is the value function of the maximization problem,  2 (0; 1) is the
discount rate, summarizing preferences over time and E is the expected value
operator (over  and

A i;b;
	
8 i;8). In terms of choice variables, Ai;b; denotes the
acreage under Bt cotton and xi;b; and xi;n;, respectively, denote the vector of
inputs for Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton.
The farmer’s per-period well-being is a function of the farmer’s consump-
tion, as captured by the standard individual-specific ui() Bernoulli utility func-
tion and a non-material satisfaction term, denoted s() included to capture the
influence of social pressures and the (behavioral) imitation. The set of fellow,
i.e., non-progressive, farmers relevant to farmer i in terms of social pressures is
denoted NPi and the set of progressive farmers relevant to farmer i in terms of
imitation is denoted NIi .
The profit of Bt cotton (i;b;) and non-Bt cotton (i;n;) are, respectively, de-
fined as:
i;b; = p:Fb(Ai;b;; xi;b;; jKi;t)   px:xi;b; (2.2)
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i;n; = p:Fn(Ai   Ai;b;; xi;n;t; )   px:xi;b; (2.3)
where p denotes the price of cotton31, pxdenote the vector of prices of inputs,
 t denotes a random variable capturing unexpected shocks caused by weather
fluctuations and bollworm pressure (distributed according to H) and Fb and
Fn denote, respectively, the production function of Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton.
Note that I assume that the profitability of non-Bt cotton32 and the prices of all
inputs and outputs are well known.33
Denote the realization of F by f . The production function of Bt cotton is a
function of the the knowledge the farmer i has about about Bt cotton, Ki;t, and is
subject to the following law of motion:
Ki;t+1 = K

Ki;t; fb;i;t;

f i;b;t; x i;b;t
	
8 i2NLi ;

A i;b;t+1
	
8 i2NIi ;Oi;t

(2.4)
where NLi denotes the set of farmers whose inputs and output choices farmer i
has observed in period t andOi;t the information farmer i has received from non-
farmer sources, such as company agents and input dealers in period t. Thus,
according to (2.4) farmer i updates his knowledge regarding the profitability of
31Note that the price of cotton is assumed to be the same for Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton.
Using the 2007-08 input-output data, I show in Appendix D that this assumption is correct.
32This is a reasonable assumption as the large majority of the farmers who switch to Bt cotton
have been farming cotton for several years. Only ten farmers make the switch from no cotton
to Bt cotton directly, but even in these cases it is possible that these farmers have farmed cotton
before 2001. At the minimum, these ten farmers have observed other farmers for minimum of
ten years, which should be sufficient to establish their beliefs with regard to these well-known
non-Bt cotton cultivars.
33This might be a strong assumption, especially with regard to the seed prices of Bt and non-
Bt cotton. Even though I elicited expected price of seeds in 2008 and have the actual price paid in
2007-08, I cannot compare these two directly as the former was elicited on a per acre basis while
the latter is in kg or bag, and the majority of the farmers did not stick to the recommended 1 bag
per acre (most farmers use 2 to 8 bags per acre). Extrapolating their 2007-08 use to 2008-09, about
40 percent of the farmers who plan to grow cotton in 2008-09 correctly knew the price of the Bt
cultivar. I however expect this figure to underestimate the knowledge of the farmers in this
regard as the prices change from year to year, and the farmers, according to their own account,
are generally well aware of these new prices. In addition, the prices are publicly advertised on
boards in front of the shops in the mandal capital which is frequently visited by most farmers.
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Bt cotton through experimentation, observing other farmers’ input and output
choices, observing the progressive farmers input choices, i.e., learning imitation,
and interactions with non-farmer sources.
The control variables in this dynamic optimization problem are subject to a
non-negativity constraint and the state variables to a set of initial conditions:
Ai  Ai;b;t  0 8t (2.5)
xi;b;t; xi;n;t  0 8t (2.6)
Ki;0 = K0 (2.7)
Equations (4.4) - (2.7) jointly specify a dynamic optimization problem. Without
imposing any learning model or preferences, write the reduced form solution
for the choice of interest Ab;i;t at time period t as:
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Ab;i;t = A(Ai;Ki;t; p;px;

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NPi ;

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NIi ;H ; ;Ri) (2.8)
where Ri captures preferences with regard to risk. Plugging (2.4) in (2.8) this
yields:
Ab;i;t = A(Ai;K0;

fb;i;
	=t 1
=0 ;
n
f i;b;; x i;b;
	
8 i2NLi
o=t 1
=0
; (2.9)n
A i;b;
	
8 i2NIi
o=t
=0
;

Oi;
	=t 1
=0 ;
p;px;

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NPi ;

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NIi ;H ; ;Ri)
In order to bring (2.9) to the data, one needs to determine, for each farmer,
the set of farmers NPi ;NIi and NLi and decide on a aggregation rule to aggregate
34Note the abuse in notation with regard to

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NPi and

A i;b;
	
8;8 i2NIi , i.e., the adop-
tion decision might depend on the entire perceived joint distribution of the current and future
actions of others.
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the experiences and actions of the different farmers  i.35 Ideally, one would like
to include all the information contacts of farmer i in NPi ;NIi and NLi . This is ex-
actly what the first social network question does, asking the number of farmers
farmer i knew each year since 2001-02 who cultivated Bt cotton. One can take
the total number of adopters farmer i has known up to t   1 as a proxy for what
farmer i has learned about the production function of Bt cotton and the current
number of adopters known as a measure of the aggregate effects of (behavioral)
imitation, learning imitation, social pressures, and free-rider effects. As I expect
the role of social pressures to be different in the acreage decision, conditional on
adoption, let’s focus on the binary decision adoption decision, denoted ADOPT
in (2.9)):
P(ADOPTi;t) = 
266666666664 Ai;K0;
Pt 1
=1 ADOPTi;;
P
8 i2N
Pt 1
=1 ADOPT i;Pt 1
=1 Oi;; p;px;
P
8 i2N ADOPT i;t;H ; ;Ri
377777777775 (2.10)
where N denotes the total set of farmers farmer i interacts with, i.e., N = NPi[NIi[
NLi .In the empirical specification, instead of Ai;t, I use the acreage of land owned
and the Mills ratio predicted by a regression modelling the decision to cultivate
cotton to capture selection effect. In addition, I add education (as education
might help in processing new information) and measures of soil fertility, irriga-
tion and credit constraints.
Using the results of the random-matching-within-sample experiment, one
can take into account certain aspects of the relationship between farmer i and
35Moving from (2.9) to the empirical specification I make two simplifications. First, I do not
include the past cultivar decisions of the progressive farmers in the imitation network. This sim-
plification does not entail any loss of information. As none of the progressive farmers dis-adopt,
both current adoption and past adoption (without observing yields) gives the same information
to farmer i: ’progressive farmer x believes Bt cotton will increase his profits compare to non-Bt
cotton’. Second, I assume that the free-rider effects only work from period t + 1 to period t, i.e.,
what a farmer expects his contact to do in period t + 2 does not matter to him.
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his contact  i:
P(ADOPTi;t) = 
2666666666666666666664
Ai;K0;
Pt 1
=1 ADOPTi;;
P
8 i2NLiPt 1
=1 ADOPT i;;
P
8 i2NIi ADOPT i;b;t;Pt 1
=1 Oi;; p;px;
P
8 i2NNi ADOPT i;t;H ; ;Ri
3777777777777777777775
(2.11)
where NLi is the set of farmers for whom farmer i thinks he knows the cultivar,
yield and number of pesticide sprays, including fellow farmers and progressive
farmers. NNi is the set of fellow farmers for whom farmer i thinks he knows
the cultivar and NIi is the set of progressive farmers for whom farmer i thinks
he knows the cultivar. In the econometric specification, I include both the frac-
tion (of total cotton farmers known) and the absolute number of the progressive
farmers adopters known at time t. The latter captures the free-rider effects only,
while the former captures imitation effects.
I use (2.10) and (2.11) to estimate the effects of social learning, social pres-
sures and imitation using the panel data 2001-08. For the 2008-09 year I
can directly use the (subjective) beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt cotton
versus non-Bt cotton and the (perceived) strength of the bio-safety concerns
of other farmers. I terms of social pressures, what is relevant for the deci-
sion of farmer i is the strength of these concerns, as captured by the variable
OTHER BIOS AFETY , relative to the number of people known who plan to
adopt Bt cotton as the latter represents the probability of being blamed when
something would go wrong in the village. Rewriting (2.8):
P(ADOPTi;t) = 
266666666664 Ai;t;Mi;b;t;Vi;b;t;Mi;n;t;Vi;n;t;

A i;b;t
	
8 i2NIi ;
OTHER BIOS AFETYP
8 i2N ADOPT i;t+1
;H ; ;Ri
377777777775 (2.12)
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where Mi;b;t, Vi;b;t; Mi;n;t, Vi;n;t denote the mean and variance of the sub-
jective conditional distribution of profits of Bt and non-Bt cotton36, and
OTHER BIOS AFETY constructed as the average of the answers to: ’To what
degree do you think that other village farmers think that Bt cotton is hazardous
for (1) animal health, (2) for human health, (3) for the environment’. Specifica-
tion (2.12) implies that social pressures can be reduced through two channels:
by decreasing the perceived bio-safety concerns of others or by increasing the
number of current adopters in the village.
2.6 Results
In this section, I present the main results of the cross-sectional analysis of the
future adoption decisions regarding the 2008-09 cropping year and the panel
data analysis, encompassing the period 2001-2008. In order not to interrupt the
flow of this section, I have relegated most comments regarding data quality,
construction of control variables and assumption checks to either footnotes or
appendices.
Throughout the analysis, the main population of interest are the cotton farm-
ers, i.e., I will look at the decision to cultivate Bt cotton conditional on culti-
vating cotton.37 In order to extrapolate the influences of the social interaction
36Note that as the prices are included in the profit calculation, there is no need to include
additional prices in (2.12).
37As it is only for the cotton farmers that the preference ordering between Bt-cotton and non-
Bt cotton is revealed through their choice, and on a more practical level, the profitability of non-
cotton crops can be ignored (conditional on controlling for risk aversion). As farmers do not
change their intercropping arrangement after switching to Bt cotton, including only the price of
cotton as the output price is sufficient after having controlled for the selection effect.
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effects to the village population, I will take into account the ’self-selection’ of
the respondents into this ’cotton-farming’ status.38 Note also that by using the
social networks and the beliefs of the respondent, I implicitly assume that the
respondent interviewed is also the decision maker of the household in terms of
agricultural decisions.39
With regard to measurement of risk aversion, one remark is in order. I con-
structed a measure of risk aversion based on a risk experiment that I conducted
in 2007-08.40 By using the same coefficient across years, I assume that the risk
preferences of the decision maker have not changed over time.
38According to the respondents’ own account the choice between cotton and non-cotton crops
depend on many factors, notably, soil quality, weather expectations and access to irrigation, soil
fertility/pest management and the need for crop rotation, the need for cash, the availability of
labor and how labor intensive each crop is and the prevailing input and output prices. Among
these, the need for crop rotation, which is not observable, might potentially bias the social inter-
action effects of interest when one includes only the cotton farmers in the analysis. An example
can make this clear. Imagine that the (reduced form) true model of social learning is the fol-
lowing: for each farmer one has observed adopting Bt cotton, the probability of adoption goes
up with 10%. Imagine that a farmer has observed 5 farmers and would like to adopt Bt cotton,
however due to crop rotation rules (an unobservable), the farmer delays his decision to adopt
with one year, after which he has observed an additional three farmers. If this happens at a large
scale, the effect of social learning might be biased downward. As such, in the panel data analy-
sis, I dropped the ten households that according to their own account practice crop rotation and
switch in and out of cotton farming.
39During the fieldwork, I set up interviews each time with the person who the resident VLS
investigators thought makes the agricultural decisions in the household. During the interview,
several open questions were asked regarding the decision making process, among others ”in
year X, who decided on the cultivar”. In the few cases that the answers to these questions did
not correspond to the person being interviewed, the interview was repeated with, this time, the
correct respondent. As such, this assumption can be considered correct. Even though in theory
the landlord might have a say in the input choices of a farmer who shares-in land, in practice,
this appears not to be the case in the three villages I consider. In 2007-08, 4.5% of the plots were
shared-in or shared-out and only 2.3% of the cotton plots were shared-in or shared-out. In only
one case, the respondent mentioned that the landlord had a say in choices of inputs, and this
household did not farm cotton at any point in time and was not planning to farm cotton in
2008-09.
40Using the results of the risk experiment, I calculate a risk aversion measure as the difference
in willingness-to-pay for a bag of cotton seeds when moving from a baseline yield distribution
to a yield distribution with the same mean but a higher variance (see Maertens and Just 2009).
A larger coefficient indicates a higher degree of risk aversion.
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Finally, I assume that for all farmers both Bt and non-Bt cotton seeds are
available in the market where they usually buy inputs. As only 11 farmers men-
tioned that they were unable to purchase the cultivar they intended to purchase
with their usual input dealer, availability of seeds does not seem to be a problem
in the villages.41
Starting with the results of the cross-sectional analysis, recall that to identify
non-monetary effects I exploit the data on current beliefs regarding the prof-
itability of Bt cotton versus non-Bt cotton and compare these beliefs with the
planned Bt cotton cultivation decisions for the 2008-09 season.
Using the results of the yield distribution game, and assuming a uniform
distribution within each yield category, I calculated the expected profits and
reconstructed the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the profit of each
cultivar (per acre) for each respondent at the time of the interview in 2008.42
41I deleted the three households from the panel data analysis who could not find a Bt or non-
Bt cultivar of their choice and ended up buying, respectively, a non-Bt and Bt cultivar.
42The profit is defined as the output price multiplied by the output minus the paid out input
costs. These paid out inputs do not include own labor. Using the 2007-08 data I checked that
this input does not differ much between Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton. Note that the results of the
yield distribution game provide values for all these variables except for the output price of cot-
ton. To construct an individual-level output price, I use the 2007-08 input-output data collected
and regress the output price of cotton on village dummies, the number of adult familymembers,
the education level of the decision maker (years), the acreage of owned land, the square acreage
of owned land and whether or not the household had a functional irrigation source in 2007-08.
I determined the choice of these variables based on the analysis presented in Table 2.18 in the
Appendix. By using this predicted price, I avoid the potential bias cause by unobservables cor-
related with both price and social interaction effects. It must be noted that the results did not
change much when using the actual price (in combination with a village-average price for the
respondents who did not farm cotton in 2007-08) instead of this predicted price. Note that, in
the case of Aurepalle, the total amount expected to be paid for other inputs (all inputs excluding
pesticides) was not recorded. I used the total amount paid for other inputs per acre in 2006-07
as a measure for the Bt cultivars and this amount minus 1671 Rs (the average difference in cost
between Bt and non-Bt cultivars in 2006-07) as a measure for the non-Bt cultivars. It should be
noted that the results presented here are robust with respect to this particular number.
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Table 2.6 compares the plans to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09 with the subjec-
tive beliefs regarding the profitability of Bt cotton.43 In Aurepalle, all 73 farmers
who plan to grow cotton in 2008-09, plan to grow Bt cotton. All of these farm-
ers expect a higher average profit for Bt cotton compared to non-Bt cotton. In
Kanzara there are two farmers who plan to grow Bt cotton despite the fact that
they expect a lower average profit for Bt compared to non-Bt. On the flipside, in
Kanzara and Kinkhed, respectively, five and fifteen farmers plan to grow non-Bt
cotton despite the fact that they expect a lower average profit for non-Bt cotton
compared to Bt cotton.
Table 2.6: Compare current beliefs with future plans
Plans for 2008-09 E[pi-BT]>E[pi-NBT] E[pi-BT]<E[pi-NBT] Total
Cultivate Bt-cotton 15 2 17
Cultivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 0 1 1
Cultivate non-Bt cotton 5 0 5
Cultivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 0 0 0
Do not cultivate cotton 35 3 38
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 2 0 2
Total observations in Kanzara 57 6 63
Cultivate Bt-cotton 11 0 11
Cultivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 6 1 7
Cultivate non-Bt cotton 15 0 15
Cultivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 2 0 2
Do not cultivate cotton 12 3 15
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 4 1 5
Total observations in Kinkhed 50 5 55
Cultivate Bt-cotton 64 0 64
Cultivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 9 0 9
Cultivate non-Bt cotton 0 0 0
Cultivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 1 1 2
Do not cultivate cotton 40 8 48
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 3 2 5
Total observations in Aurepalle 117 11 128
Total observations 246
Kanzara
Kinkhed
Aurepalle
Beliefs in 2008
43In practice, as I have data on 2 Bt cultivars and 2 non-Bt cultivars, the expected profit of one
of the Bt cultivars should be larger or equal to the expected profit of the two non-Bt cultivars in
order to chose for Bt cotton.
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These results might point at non-monetary effects or the fact that other as-
pects of the distribution, apart from the average, matter to the respondents. As
for none of the Kanzara farmers who plan to grow Bt cotton does the profit CDF
of non-Bt cotton First Order Stochastically Dominates (FOSD) the profit CDF
of Bt cotton, risk preferences cannot be excluded as a reason to opt for non-Bt
cotton. However, in Kanzara and Kinkhed, there are, respectively, three and
five farmers who plan to grow non-Bt cotton and whose profit CDF of Bt-cotton
FOSD the profit CDF of non-Bt cotton. In these cases, risk preferences can be
excluded and non-monetary effects, conditional on the absence of credit con-
straints, are cleary driving these decisions.
Table 2.7 presents the average and variance of selected characteristics of the
groups introduced in Table 2.6. The two farmers in Kanzara who plan to grow
Bt cotton and expect a lower average profit for Bt compared to non-Bt are sur-
rounded by progressive farmers who all plan to cultivate Bt cotton. The five
and fifteen farmers in, respectively, Kanzara and Kinkhed who plan to grow
non-Bt cotton and expect a lower average profit for non-Bt cotton compared
to Bt cotton are surrounded by farmers who are, on average, more concerned
with bio-safety issues and by fewer farmers who plan to cultivate Bt cotton.
Disregarding credit constraints, these statistics point at the existence of social
pressures and (behavioral) imitation.
Continuing with the analysis of the 2008-09 data, Table 2.8 presents the re-
sults of a probit analysis estimating the parameters of (2.12) The dependent vari-
able is the discrete decision to plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09, conditional
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on cultivating cotton.44 The analysis includes all Kanzara and Kinkhed house-
holds45 who had decided to cultivate cotton in the 2008-09 Kharif season and
had decided on a cultivar, except for the progressive farmers. The progressive
farmers are excluded as these are, according to their own account, not influ-
enced by social pressures and do not imitate others.46
The coefficient on OTHER BIOS AFETY=KNOWN is statistically signifi-
cantly negative, suggesting social pressures. Everything else equal, if one
knows sixteen adopters and is surrounded by farmers who have strong bio-
safety concerns instead of farmers who have no bio-safety concernsl, decreases
the probability of cultivating Bt cotton with about 10%. If one knows only four
adopters, this effect is much larger, about 40%. The effect of the fraction of pro-
gressive farmer adopters known is not significantly different from zero pointing
at the absence of behavioral imitation. Note that the analysis in Table 2.8 con-
trols for credit constraints, risk aversion and the bio-safety concerns a farmer
himself might have with regard to Bt cotton. All the other variables have the ex-
pected sign, but only few are significantly different from zero. Surprisingly, the
bio-safety concerns the farmer has himself about the technology do not seem to
matter. This might be due to the fact that most farmers have not a lot of live-
44The results of the first stage regression, which in addition includes various measures of
wealth, soil fertility, irrigation availability, weather expectations and the predicted prices of all
crops, are available upon request.
45This analysis does not include the Aurepalle households as the measure of other input use
is not comparable across states due to a mistake during the data collection stage.
46Note that this assumption cannot be tested directly as there are too few progressive farm-
ers in the dataset. However, re-estimating the regression presented in Table 2.8 including the
progressive farmers results in an insignificant social pressure effect.
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stock themselves, apart from a bullock pair. The knowledge variables are jointly
significantly different from zero.47
Moving on with the panel data analysis covering the period 2001-08, one
remark is in order. Recall that both the ICRISAT-VLS data and the recall data
collected in 2008 provide information on the binary decision to cultivate Bt cot-
ton and the acreage under Bt and non-Bt cotton. I opt to use the recall data
for the descriptive statistics and the analysis as the ICRISAT-VLS data do not
always contain information on which cultivar is used (in terms of Bt versus
non-Bt) and, in addition, the input-output information is sometimes missing for
households classified as agricultural laborers and/or households who lease in
land.48
Table 2.9 presents the results of a probit analysis estimating the parameters
of specification (2.10), i.e., based on the total number of adopters known each
year. The dependent variable is the discrete decision to cultivate Bt cotton, con-
47If, as rational expectations would predict, the expected number of adopters is correct, the
constructed social pressure variable might suffer from endogeneity problems. I repeat the anal-
ysis using MLE instrumental variable Probit estimation using the number of adopters known
in the previous period as an instrument and do not find any significant differences. The Wald
test of exogeneity of the instrumental variable shows that there is not sufficient information to
confirm an endogeneity problem. This might be due to the small number of observations or
the fact that one month before sowing on, in effect, observes an out-of-equilibrium situation.
Due to the small number of observations, I opt to report the non-IV results as these will report
unbiased coefficient estimates in the absence of endogeneity.
48Comparing the two sources of data reveals that in 80% of the cases the binary cotton culti-
vation decision in the recall data corresponds with the ICRISAT-VLS data, and conditional on
cultivating cotton according to the recall data, in 77% of the cases the binary Bt cotton cultiva-
tion decision in the recall data corresponds with the ICRISAT-VLS data. As I collected data on
the binary cotton and Bt cotton decision in several modules of the questionnaire and these are
consistent with each other, I am confident of a high quality of the recall data, as far as these
binary decisions are concerned. But as the information on acreage is of lesser quality I opt to
exclude the analysis of acreage under Bt cotton, conditional on adoption, from this paper.
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ditional on cultivating cotton.49 The analysis includes all household up to (and
including) the first year they adopt Bt cotton, except for the progressive farm-
ers.50 I opt to focus on the decision to first adopt Bt cotton as one would expect
the role of social learning and learning imitation to change after adoption. The
control variables included are described in Appendix E.
From Table 2.9, one can see that the coefficients on the total number of
adopters known from the village and from outside of the village are not sig-
nificantly different from zero. The effect of non-farmer information on Bt cotton
adoption is significant, positive, concave and large. Hearing from one input
dealer, company agent or government extension agent about Bt cotton increases
the probability of adoption, on average, with 5%. Recall that the majority of
this information is received through unannounced visits of company agents to
the village and chats with the input-dealers in the nearest urban hub and few
farmers had to travel or pay for this information. As I control for education and
other individual-fixed effects such as risk aversion, I do not expect any residual
endogeneity problems.51 Neither is the large magnitude of this effect, compared
to the effect of past experiences of one’s contacts, due to concavity as in only a
49Again, the results of the first stage regression, which contains additional measures of
wealth, weather expectations, output prices, soil fertility and irrigation constraints, are avail-
able upon request.
50In case of split-off households or households that have been recently added to the ICRISAT-
VLS, households were considered for inclusion in the analysis from the date of split-off or in-
clusion in the ICRISAT-VLS onwards. Recall also that the households facing seed availibility
or crop rotation constraints are not included in the analysis. In addition, 99 observations were
dropped after the inclusion of an Aurepalle*before2005 fixed effect (which I included to capture
the difference state level policies in the pre-2005 period). Including these 99 observations does
not change the results significantly.
51In all specifications, the non-farmer information excluded the information received from
input dealers in May/June.
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couple of cases did non-farmer information preceeds all observed past experi-
ences of others.
The contemporary social interaction effects including social pressures, imi-
tation and free rider effects have an aggregate significant positive effect. But the
effect is small in size. Note, however, that this effect might be biased due to the
fact that the farmers in the village make their decision simultaneously and, as
such, the current behavior of other farmers is endogenous.
Table 2.10 presents the results a probit analysis estimating the parameters of
specification using specification (2.11), i.e., based on the results of the random-
matching-within-sample method. Table 2.11 presents the results of the same
specification but using the predicted links rather than the actual links of the
random-matching-within-sample method. The dependent variable is the dis-
crete decision to cultivate Bt cotton, conditional on cultivating cotton. Again,
this analysis includes all cotton farmers up to (and including) the first year they
adopt Bt cotton, excluding the progressive farmers.
The first two columns of Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 present the results of a
standard probit regression, the last column of Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 shows
the results of a MLE probit instrumenting the ”total number of non-PF adopters
known at t” with the ”total number of non-PF adopters known at t   1”. Theo-
retically, as I control for learning, these instruments have no effect on adoption
behavior and the data reveals that this instrument is strongly correlated with
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the endogenous variable in both tables. The Wald test of exogeneity of the in-
strumental variables, as expected, rejects exogeneity, in both cases.52
From third column in Table 2.10 one can see that the coefficient on ”non-
farmer information” is large and significantly different from zero. In contrast
with the results in Table 2.9, the past experience of the farmers one is connected
to matters to the farmer’s adoption decision. In particular, the farmer learns
from the experiences of the progressive farmers he has observed in the village.
For every ten progressive farmers’ experiences observed in the past, the proba-
bility of adoption, on average, increases with about 19%. The past experiences
of fellow, non-progressive, farmers seem to matter little. Even though the co-
efficient is almost significantly different from zero at the 10% level, the size is
still small. In all cases, the second derivative has a negative estimated sign, in-
dicating decreasing returns to new information, consistent with, among others,
a Bayesian learning model.
The large difference between the effect of the progressive farmers’ past expe-
riences and hearing about Bt cotton from a non-farmer source, is most likely due
to the fact that from the latter, the farmer receives information about the entire
distribution of Bt cotton, i.e., what the farmer can expect on average conditional
on a certain number of pesticide sprays, and what can be expected in case of
bad weather. In addition, the farmer, in some cases, receives information about
52Note that even though I assume that Manski’s contextual effects play no role in the decision
making process, using the current properties of other farmers instead as instruments is unlikely
to work well as (1) the variables which matter to the Bt cotton decision making process, land,
irrigation and education level, vary little over time and (2) one has many missing ’instruments’
in the case of farmers with zero ”know cultivar” or ”know cultivar, pest and yield” links.
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the bio-safety properties of the new technology. This decreases the perceived
safety concerns of other farmers and, as such, decreases social pressures.
The coefficient on the total number of progressive farmer adopters currently
known is negative and significant, pointing at free-rider effects with regard to
the progressive farmers one knows and observes, i.e., expecting a ’draw’ from
the production functionwill decreases the farmer’s probability to adopt the new
technology. The coefficient on the fraction of progressive farmer adopters cur-
rently known is positive, significant and large, pointing at learning imitation
effects. This implies that if only, for instance, 2 out 4 progressive farmers known
to the farmer are adopting the new technology, the farmer will become suspi-
cious as to why 2 out of 4 are not adopting the technology.
The effect of the current behavior of fellow, non-progressive, farmers is not
significantly different from zero in the standard probit, but the total number of
fellow, non-progressive, farmers currently known is positive and significant in
the IV specification. This results is consistent with the cross-sectional analysis of
2008-09, i.e., conditional on (perceived) bio-safety concerns of others, knowing
more current adopters decreases social pressures. Note that free-rider effects, if
present, are dominated by these positive social pressure effects.
Table 2.11 presents the results of the same analysis, using the predicted links
instead of the actual links. The sign of the coefficients are consistent with the
analysis presented in Table 2.10, and the sizes of the coefficients are within the
same order of magnitude.
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Table 2.7: Characteristics of plans versus beliefs groups in Kanzara and Kinkhed
Plans for 2008-09 E[pi-BT]>E[pi-NBT] E[pi-BT]<E[pi-NBT]
Cult ivate Bt-cotton 92.99 100.00
(9.12) (0.00)
Cult ivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 77.77 94.44
(27.21) (7.85)
Cult ivate non-Bt cotton 87.77 NA
(11.34) NA
Cult ivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 50.00 NA
(54.99) NA
Do not cultivate cotton 94.08 92.59
(13.07) (9.07)
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 72.22 88.88
(34.24) NA
Cult ivate Bt-cotton 2.70 2.83
(0.60) (0.23)
Cult ivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 2.88 2.66
(0.77) (0.00)
Cult ivate non-Bt cotton 3.00 NA
(0.69) NA
Cult ivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 3.16 NA
(0.23) NA
Do not cultivate cotton 3.09 3.00
(0.43) (0.59)
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 2.66 2.66
(0.36) NA
Cult ivate Bt-cotton 35.94 65.00
(31.70) (49.49)
Cult ivate Bt-cotton and non-Bt cotton 27.50 52.5
(6.12) (38.89)
Cult ivate non-Bt cotton 16.95 NA
(12.22) NA
Cult ivate cotton, but don't know which cultivar 15.00 NA
(7.07) NA
Do not cultivate cotton 17.03 14.16
(18.09) (14.63)
Don't know whether to cultivate cotton 21.41 5.00
(22.67) NA
Beliefs in 2008
% of progressive farmers adopters known
Biosafety concern of others 
Number of adopters known
Notes: standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the means; "% of progressive farmers adopters known" is the 
number of progressive farmers who plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09 predicted to be known using the results of the random 
matching within sample game as a percentage of the total number of progressive farmers predicted to be known (the results are 
very similar using the actual , and not the predicted links); "Biosafety concern of others" is the average of the answers to "To which 
degree do you think that other village farmers think that Bt cotton is hazardous for (1) animal health, (2) human health and (3) the 
environment", this variable ranges from 1 to 5 with higher number referring to an increased concern with biosafety issues; "number 
of adopters known" is the number of vil lage farmers known that plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09. 
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Table 2.8: Effect of social pressures and behavioral imitation on plans to culti-
vate Bt cotton
Probit regression with dependent variable:
Coefficient Marginal Effect
Mean of perceived profit Bt cotton (in 1,000 Rs) 0.05752 0.00989
(0.14091) (0.02394)
Mean of perceived profit non-Bt cotton (in 1,000 Rs) -0.66237*** -0.11385***
(0.24764) (0.03741)
Variance of perceived profit Bt cotton (in 1,000 Rs) -0.0711 -0.01222
(0.07374) (0.01227)
Variance of perceived profit non-Bt cotton (in 1,000 Rs) 0.10084 0.01733
(0.19297) (0.03257)
Risk aversion coefficient -0.00146 -0.00025
(0.00097) (0.00016)
Fraction of progressive farmers adopters known 1.93828 0.33317
(2.11919) (0.34242)
Biosafety concern of others  / number of adopters known -2.16864*** -0.37277***
(0.5186) (0.05880)
Own biosafety concerns -0.44299 -0.07614
(0.38351) (0.06317)
Income (in 1,000 Rs) 0.01178 0.00203
(0.00964) (0.00167)
Income * credit constraint 0.05499** 0.00945**
(0.01963) (0.00274)
Constant 3.5908
(2.73347)
Control for selection? yes yes
Number of observations 47 47
Plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and average 
marginal effects estimates; The mean of the profit of Bt is calculated as the average of the means of the profit of both Bt cultivars 
(and vice versa for non-Bt); the variance of the profit of Bt is calculated as the average of the variances of the profit of both Bt 
cultivars (and vice versa for non-Bt); "Risk aversion coefficient" is the difference in willingness-to-pay for a bag of seeds when 
moving from a baseline yield distribution to a yield distribution with the same mean but a higher variance (see Maertens and Just 
2009), a larger coefficient indicates a higher degree of risk aversion; "Fraction of progressive farmers adopters known" is the 
number of progressive farmers who plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09 predicted to be known using the results of the random 
matching within sample game as a fraction of the total number of progressive farmers predicted to be known (the results are very 
similar using the actual (and not the predicted) links or the total number instead of the fraction); "Biosafety concern of others" is the a
to "To which degree do you think that other village farmers think that Bt cotton is hazardous for (1) animal health, (2) human health 
and (3) the environment, this variable ranges from 1 to 5 with higher number referring to an increased concern with biosafety 
issues;"Own biosafety concerns" is the average of the answers to "To which degree do you think that Bt cotton is hazardous for (1) 
animal health, (2) human heal th and (3) the environment", this variable ranges from 1 to 5 with higher number referring to an 
increased concern with biosafety issues; "number of adopters known" is the number of village farmers is the number of village 
farmers known that plan to cultivate Bt cotton in 2008-09; "credit constraint" is a dummy variable referring to whether or not the 
farmer has access to credit from an input dealer. The knowledge variables are jointly significantly d ifferent from zero at the 1% 
level. Note: using the difference in means and the difference in variance does not change the results significantly but does result in 
an insignificant effect of knowledge. 
57
Table 2.9: Effect of learning and contemporary social interaction effects on cul-
tivating Bt cotton (based on results of ”how many adopters do you know?”)
Probit regression with dependent variable:
Coefficient Marginal Effect
Non-farmer information up to t 1.72822*** 0.04996***
(0.58657) (0.02097)
Non-farmer information up to t square -0.92848***
(0.29598)
Total number of adopters known up to t (village) -0.01925 -0.00115
(0.01527) (0.00081)
Total number of adopters known up to t square (village) 0.00007
(0.00013)
Total number of adopters known up to t (outside of village) -0.00817 -0.00066
(0.0335) (0.00226)
Total number of adopters known up to t square (outside of village) -0.00008
(0.00032)
Total number of village adopters known at t 0.06118** 0.00395***
(0.02572) (0.00098)
Total number of village adopters known at t  square -0.00012
(0.00031)
Risk aversion coefficient -0.00101 -0.00007
(0.00079) (0.00006)
Education decision maker (years) 0.06971 0.00496
(0.04515) (0.00307)
Control for total number of people known? yes yes
Control for credit constraints? yes yes
Control for soil fertility and irrigation? yes yes
Control for individual prices? yes yes
Control for selection? yes yes
Control for state-f ixed effects? yes yes
Number of observations 408 408
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and 
average marginal effects estimates; "non-farmer information up to t" is total number of times the respondent has 
received information about Bt cotton from a non-farmer source, excluding the information received in May-June, up to 
the start of season t; "total number of adopters known up to to t" is the, self-reported, total number of adopters know up 
the start of season t; "total number of vilage adopters known a t t" is the, self-reported, total number of adopters known in 
the village during season t.  
Cultivate Bt cotton
Standard
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Table 2.10: Effect of learning, imitation, social pressures and strategic delays
on cultivating Bt cotton (based on results of random-matching-within-sample
method, use actual links)
Probit regression with dependent variable:
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Non-farmer information up to t 1.61023*** 0.05818*** 1.30359*** 0.09619***
(0.40241) (0.01988) (0.35383) (0.02800)
Non-farmer information up to t square -0.82445*** -0.61062***
(0.16751) (0.15545)
Total number of PF adopters known up to t 0.23055** 0.01360** 0.21929*** 0.01899***
(0.09941) (0.00579) (0.07777) (0.00629)
Total number of PF adopters known up to t square -0.01542* -0.01754***
(0.00790) (0.00678)
Total number of non-PF known up to t 0.00047 0.00001 0.0016 0.00012
(0.00849) (0.00059) (0.00874) (0.00099)
Total number of non-PF known up to t square -0.00001 -0.00004
(0.00003) (0.00004)
Total number of PF adopters known at t -0.11959** -0.00933** -0.18664*** -0.02268***
(0.05667) (0.00455) (0.05509) (0.00673)
Fraction of PF adopters known at t 3.02467*** 0.23597*** 2.35255** 0.28588***
(1.15199) (0.09080) (1.06184) (0.10059)
Total number of non-PF adopters known at t 0.00107 0.00008 0.01624*** 0.00197***
(0.00172) (0.00013) (0.00243) (0.00066)
Instrumental Variable MLE
Cultivate Bt cotton
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and average marginal effects estimates of 
the probit and the MLE Instrumental Variable probit; "non-farmer information up to t" is defined as in Table 9; "total number of (non-)PF adopters known up 
to t" is the cumulative number of times the set of (non) progressive farmers for whom the respondent thinks he knows the cultivar, yield and number of 
pesticide sprays, has cultivated Bt cotton up to t-1 scaled up to the village level; "total number of (non-)PF adopters known at t" is number of (non) 
progressive farmers for whom the respondent thinks he knows the cultivar that cultivate Bt cotton at t scaled up to the vi llage level; the "fraction" refers to 
the ratio of adopters over total number "known"; analysis controls for risk aversion, education decision-maker, total number of people known, credit 
constraints, soil fertility and irrigation, individual-level prices, and selection; includes state-fixed effects. Number of observations=408. 
Standard MLE
Table 2.11: Effect of learning, imitation, social pressures and strategic delays
on cultivating Bt cotton (based on results of random-matching-within-sample
method, use predicted links)
Probit regression with dependent variable:
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Non-farmer information up to t 1.81264*** 0.06939*** 1.53073*** 0.07093***
(0.45756) (0.02317) (0.49161) (0.02431)
Non-farmer information up to t square -0.98275*** -0.80964***
(0.25217) (0.26759)
Total number of PF adopters known up to t 0.39862 0.02813 0.71090** 0.05591*
(0.28820) (0.01846) (0.32882) (0.02919)
Total number of PF adopters known up to t square -0.02258 -0.04265
(0.04230) (0.04175)
Total number of non-PF known up to t 0.04561 0.00298 -0.00936 -0.00105
(0.03314) (0.00223) (0.04258) (0.00342)
Total number of non-PF known up to t square -0.00079 -0.00034
(0.00077) (0.00066)
Total number of PF adopters known at t -0.22432** -0.01713** -0.47446*** -0.04083**
(0.09688) (0.00749) (0.15906) (0.01909)
Fraction of PF adopters known at t 1.74352* 0.13311* 2.26626** 0.19504**
(0.99742) (0.07557) (0.92308) (0.08506)
Total number of non-PF adopters known at t 0.02515** 0.00192** 0.06250*** 0.00538**
(0.01169) (0.00086) (0.02183) (0.00259)
Instrumental Variable MLE
Cultivate Bt cotton
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient and average marginal effects estimates of 
the probit and the MLE Instrumental Variable probit; "non-farmer information up to t" is defined as in Table 9; "total number of (non-)PF adopters known up 
to t" is the cumulative number of times the set of (non) progressive farmers for whom the respondent thinks he knows the cultivar, yield and number of 
pesticide sprays, has cultivated Bt cotton up to t-1 scaled up to the village level; "total number of (non-)PF adopters known at t" is number of (non) 
progressive farmers for whom the respondent thinks he knows the cultivar that cultivate Bt cotton at t scaled up to the vi llage level; the "fraction" refers to 
the ratio of adopters over total number "known"; analysis controls for risk aversion, education decision-maker, total number of people known, credit 
constraints, soil fertility and irrigation, individual-level prices, and selection; includes state-fixed effects. Number of observations=408.  
Standard MLE
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2.7 Conclusions
This paper looks at the role of social networks in the adoption process of Bt
cotton, a new type of (genetically engineered) cotton available on the Indian
market since 2002. I take advantage of a panel dataset which contains detailed
information on social networks and beliefs with regard to bio-safety and prof-
itability, to, for the first time, identify and estimate the effects of social learning,
social pressures and imitation on the technology adoption decision.
The results demonstrate the importance of knowledge about the profitabil-
ity of a new technology in the adoption decision. This knowledge is established
through experimentation, observing other farmers’ inputs and outputs and talk-
ing to informed parties such as company representatives and seed dealers. For
first-time adopters, the last channel is the most important driver to switch to
Bt cotton; one conversation with an informed party increases the probability
to adopt Bt cotton with 5% to 9%. This finding confirms the results of Conley
and Udry (2010) who find that farmers who have received advice from a local
extension agent are less likely to change the amount of fertilizers they use on
pineapples in Ghana. As farmers, according to their own account, learn about
the general properties of the new technology (mean, variance), proper input use
and bio-safety issues through these conversations, this result is not surprising
and points at the importance of including all sources of information into any
analysis of social learning. Note that part of this effect might be due to a de-
creased perceived bio-safety concern of other’s, i.e., decreased social pressures.
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The second most important source of information for first-time adopters is
the past experience from the progressive farmers to whom one is connected.
Consistent with this effect, I also find a (small) free-rider effect of the progres-
sive farmers, i.e., one is more likely to postpone adoption if one knows an addi-
tional progressive farmer who plans to cultivate Bt cotton. Surprisingly, the past
adoption behavior of the non-progressive farmers one is connected to matters
little. This implies that even though, for most farmers, the conditions in which
they operate (soil and irrigation) are quite different from the conditions under
which the progressive farmers work, they are still more likely to learn from
these progressive farmers’ experiences than from each other’s experiences. In
all specifications, the learning effect is concave, suggesting decreasing returns to
new information coming in, consistent with, among others, a Bayesian learning
model.
Most other studies do not control for different kinds of social interaction ef-
fects and , as such, may end up overestimating the extent of social learning.
On the other hand, because most studies use a measure of social networks that
is likely to be larger than the set of people that a farmer actually learns from,
they may end up underestimating social learning effects. Also this effect could
depend on the nature of the new technology being introduced such as the dif-
ference in expected profit with the old technology. Interestingly, the magnitude
of the estimated social learning effects I find is in same range as what Bandi-
ara and Rasul (2006) find in their study of the adoption of sunflower cultiva-
tion in Mozambique: knowing one additional farmer, or in this study, knowing
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an additional progressive farmer, increases the probability of adopting the new
technology by 1.3% to 5.5%.
In addition, I find strong evidence of farmers imitating the progressive farm-
ers they are connected to, i.e., adopting Bt cotton without having observed the
yield outcomes of these farmers. As I do not find any evidence of behavioral
imitation, I interpret this effect as learning imitation, i.e., a farmer makes infer-
ences about the profitability of the technique if he observes progressive farmers
using this technology. Note that while the farmer might not observe the pro-
gressive farmer’s outputs, he does have some general information about the
profitability of this farmer judging by his wealth and income. Compared to the
other effects, the magnitude of this effect is large: a farmer who knows only
progressive farmers who currently cultivate Bt cotton is about 13% to 28%more
likely to adopt the Bt cotton compared to a farmer who knows only progressive
farmers who currently cultivate non-Bt cotton.
I find strong evidence of social pressures inhibiting the adoption of Bt cotton.
These social pressures find their origin in bio-safety concerns with regard to
Bt cotton: a farmer may be accused of endangering the health of the animals
and people in the village as well as generating negative impacts on the soil
fertility and water quality of neighboring plots. A farmer who is surrounded by
farmers who have strong bio-safety concerns instead of farmers who have no
bio-safety concerns at all is about 10% less likely to adopt Bt cotton (conditional
on knowing sixteen adopters). Note that, technically speaking, I cannot exclude
the option that these accusations might lead to financial penalties. While no
such case has been observed in any of the villages, it is theoretically possible that
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some farmers perceive there to be positive probability of accusations leading to
penalties.
A limitation of this study is that the lack of quality profit data prohibits a
credible analysis of the determinants of profitability as in Foster and Rosen-
zweig (1995). Similarly, the lack of quality acreage data means that I cannot
further investigate the partial adoption phenomenon, prevalent in one of the
village. Qualitative information and an analysis of the cross-sectional data how-
ever indicate that farmers who are more sure of the profit and expect a higher
profit are more likely to convert all their cotton land to Bt cotton, while farmers
with more doubts and who expect a lower profit are more likely to use only a
share of their land.
In addition, because social networks were measured at only one point in
time, the identification strategy is based on the assumption that the nature of the
relationship between two individuals in the village has not changed in the last
seven years and that the social network in terms of learning, imitation and social
pressures does not exceed the village boundaries. Comparing the results using
various measures of social networks point to the importance of identifying the
network correctly. While most farmers knew everyone in this village, this did
not imply that they knew whether or not a certain village farmer is using the
new technology and certainly did not imply that they knew the input choices
and outcomes of each village farmer.
Finally, note that the analysis presented in this paper critically hinges upon
the selection of the progressive farmers. Ideally one would want to make this
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selection endogenous and let the data determine which type of farmers are most
influential. One could interacts the social interaction variable of interest with,
for instance, the average soil quality of the network contacts, but due to the fact
that the social interaction variables are constructed as an aggregate over time
and network contacts it is not clear how one could interpret the results of such
an analysis. Nevertheless, making this selection endogenous seems to be an
important avenue for future research.
Along the same lines, it is important to think through the interpretation of
the results in case I have accidently placed some of the progressive farmers into
the non-progressive farmers category. In this case the importance of learning
from non-progressive farmers would be over-estimated and the importance of
social pressures would be under-estimated. This is unlikely to be the case as in
this case one would expect the effect of learning from non-progressive farmers
to be significantly different from zero, which it is not. If, on the other hand,
some of the non-progressive farmers ended up in the progressive farmers cate-
gory, the importance of learning from progressive farmers and imitation effects
would be under-estimated.
To conclude, using a fertile setting, rural India, and detailed quality panel
data, this paper takes a first step in distinguishing various social interaction
effects. I show that multiple mechanisms matter, but not equally. And as these
mechanisms are correlated, omitting one tends to exaggerate the importance of
others. In addition, I point to the importance of including non-farmer sources
of information and correctly identifying the relevant social network.
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APPENDIX A
Of the 199 households covered in 2001-02 by the ICRISAT-VLS, 92% were
still in the sample in 2007-08. The households that dropped out were, on aver-
age, smaller in terms of household size, higher educated andwith less total land,
but more irrigable land. I interviewed these 184 households plus some of their
split-offs and newly added households, a total of 246 households. This sample
is representative for the village in 2007-08 (see Bantilan et al. 2006 and Rao and
Charyulu 2007). Of these, 68% have data for all seven cropping years. Of the
32% of the households who are included in the sample from a later date on-
wards, 30% are households that have split off from sample households during
2001-2008. These split-off households are included from their date of split-off.
Table 2.12 lists the number of households in the sample, by date included in
the ICRISAT-VLS.
Table 2.12: Number of households included in the sample, by date included in
VLS
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
From 2001-02 onwards 94 46 29
From 2002-03 onwards 0 0 0
From 2003-04 onwards 5 0 2
From 2004-05 onwards 0 0 0
From 2005-06 onwards 18 13 22
From 2006-07 onwards 11 4 1
From 2007-08 onwards 0 0 1
Total sample 128 63 55
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APPENDIX B
In 2007-2008, I interviewed 246 ICRISAT-VLS households and an additional
21 progressive farmers that were not part of the ICRISAT-VLS at the time of
the interview. Of these 246 ICRISAT-VLS farmers, I labelled 22 ‘progressive
farmers’. As such, in total, there are 43 progressive farmers in the sample. Table
2.13, Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 show how these progressive farmers diff from the
other households. On average, the progressive farmers are more educated and
own more land, of which a larger share is irrigated. The progressive farmers
are far more likely to adopt Bt cotton and, conditional on adoption, achieve a
higher profit per acre and adopt the new technology earlier. The exceptionally
low profit per acre of the Kinkhed progressive farmers is due to the crop failure
of two progressive farmers in the village due to floods.
Table 2.13: Progressive farmers characteristics in Aurepalle
Non-progressive farmers Progressive farmers
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Per acre profit of Bt cotton (Rs) 48 6,588 6,753 11 10,349 3,422
First year of adoption 49 2006.22 0.47 21 2006.2 0.89
Number of household members 116 4.15 1.55 28 4.29 2.66
Education level decision maker (year) 116 2.24 3.98 28 4.2 4.77
Owned dry land (acres) 116 2.1 2.42 28 7.1 8.4
Owned irrigated land (acres) 116 0.64 1.36 28 7.31 8.76
% adopted Bt cotton at any point in time 116 42 28 75
Note: All variables, except for the first year of adoption and the % adopted Bt cotton at any point in time relate to the year 2007-08.
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Table 2.14: Progressive farmers characteristics in Kanzara
Non-progressive farmers Progressive farmers
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Per acre profit of Bt cotton (Rs) 15 4,783 5,240 4 6,183 11,691
First year of adoption 23 2004.48 1.56 6 2003.67 1.97
Number of household members 59 4.86 1.78 6 6.67 4.27
Education level decision maker (year) 59 6.34 3.98 6 10.5 2.81
Owned dry land (acres) 59 2.17 4.46 6 0 0
Owned irrigated land (acres) 59 20.06 3.79 6 18.37 6.23
% adopted Bt cotton at any point in time 59 38 6 100
Note: All variables, except for the first year of adoption and the % adopted Bt cotton at any point in time relate to the year 2007-08.
Table 2.15: Progressive farmers characteristics in Kinkhed
Non-progressive farmers Progressive farmers
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Per acre profit of Bt cotton (Rs) 1 3,959 NA 4 -214 2,311
First year of adoption 1 2007 NA 7 2005.85 0.75
Number of household members 49 4.53 1.86 9 4.44 1.24
Education level decision maker (year) 49 6.35 3.61 9 11.56 2.7
Owned dry land (acres) 49 2.2 4.44 9 7.13 6.25
Owned irrigated land (acres) 49 1.49 2.91 9 13.08 7.71
% adopted Bt cotton at any point in time 49 2 9 77
Note: All variables, except for the first year of adoption and the % adopted Bt cotton at any point in time relate to the year 2007-08.
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APPENDIX C
Regarding the selection of the progressive farmers for the random-matching-
within-sample method, recall that only 4 progressive farmers were selected for
each village out of these 43 progressive farmers. In the case of Aurepalle, 2
different sets of progressive farmers were identified, one for the main village of
Aurepalle and one for the sub-village of Nallavaripalli. Each Aurepalle farmer
was then matched up with the three main progressive farmers of Aurepalle and
the main progressive farmers of Nallavaripalle and vice versa. The idea was
to select all progressive farmers who could play a central role in the dispersion
of information and potentially be role models for the farmers and as such the
object of imitation.
Aurepalle consists of two separate sub-villages: the main village of Au-
repalle and the sub-village of Nallavaripalle. I presented the respondent with
4 out of 6 matches from the same village and 2 out of 6 from the other villages.
Similarly, for the progressive farmers, 3 out of 4 were from the same village and
1 out of 4 from the other village.
In order to get a sense of how successful this selection was, I compare the
result of two social network questions, one from the perspective of the non-
progressive farmers, the other from the perspective of the progressive farmers,
with the farmers selected for the game.
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From the perspective of the non-progressive farmers, Table 2.16 presents
the results of the question ”If you, today, would have a specific problem with
your cotton crop who or where would you go to (up to 5 answers allowed)?”53
Of all the village farmers mentioned by the respondents, I could retrieve data
for 80% to 92% of the cases54 and 63% to 91% were labelled as ”progressive
farmer” before the data collection started. In Aurepalle and Kinkhed about 40%
of the farmers mentioned by all the VLS respondents of these were selected for
the random-matching-within-sample method. The lowpercentage in Aurepalle
is due to the fact that several Aurepalle farmers in case of trouble would ap-
proach a progressive farmer located in Nallavaripalle. This was confirmed by
the ICRISAT-VLS resident investigators in Aurepalle who mentioned that ”Au-
repalle does not have any real progressive farmers, these are all in Nallavari-
palle”. The lowpercentage in Kinkhed, on the other hand, is due to the fact that
many respondents would approach farmers that were not labelled progressive
farmers.
Table 2.16: Selection of PF for randommatching within sample as percentage of
village farmers mentioned by all VLS respondents
Data available Labelled PF Selected for game
Aurepalle 79.65 76.21 37.29
Nallavaripalle 92.3 90.38 78.85
Kanzara 89.74 78.21 70.51
Kinkhed 89.09 62.73 40
From the perspective of the progressive farmers, Table 2.17 mentions the
rank of the 4 progressive farmers selected for the game in terms of the variable
53This question was asked to all the respondents who ever cultivated cotton since 2001-02 or
who plan to cultivate cotton in the future.
54The remainder of the farmers referred to were not part of the ICRISAT-VLS or the set of
progressive farmers identified before the data collection started.
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”pf TALK”. This variable ”pf TALK” indicates the number of VLS farmers the
progressive farmers talks to on an at least monthly basis. Thus the progressive
farmer with rank one talks to the largest number of VLS farmers (compared
to the other progressive farmers)55 In the case of Kinkhed the four top farmers
were also the ones selected for the game. In the case of Aurepalle, only one of
the top five progressive farmers based in Aurepalle was selected for the game
and in the case of Nallavaripalle, three farmers from the top four farmers based
in Nallavaripalle were selected for the game.
Table 2.17: Rank of 4 progressive farmers selected for the game in terms of pf
TALK
Rank Total number of PF
Aurepalle 7,9,12,17 28
Nallavaripalle 2,5,6,26 28
Kanzara 1,2,5,6 6
Kinkhed 1,2,3,4 9
To conclude, it appears that I did a relatively good job in identifying themost
important progressive farmers ex-ante in Nallavaripalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed
but failed to include the most important progressive farmers in Aurepalle. As
such, I repeat the analysis using two different sets of measures of the imitation
and social learning from progressive farmers component. The first set of mea-
sures is based on the random-matching-within-sample method. The second set
of measures includes all progressive farmers who, according to their own ac-
count, talk on a at least monthly basis to the respondent in case of the imita-
tion component and all the progressive farmers who, according to their own
55I asked each progressive farmer (both VLS and non-VLS) to tell us, for each VLS respondent,
whether he talks daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, twice a year or never to this person. The
variable ”TALK” was constructed as the sum of the number of individuals each progressive
farmer talks to on a daily, weekly and monthly basis.
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account, believe that the respondent knows their cultivar use and yield output
in case of the social learning component.56
56With regard to the latter measure - it must be noted that four progressive farmers in Au-
repalle could not answer the question ”Do you think the following person (show VLS respon-
dent) knows which cultivars you have sown and how much yield you got from each cultivar
this year” and answered ”don’t know” for all the VLS respondents.
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APPENDIX D
Table 2.18 presents the results of a OLS regression of individual prices (in
Rs/quintal) received for cotton in 2007-08 on variables representing the who,
when and where aspects of the sales of cotton using the 2007-08 data of cot-
ton price (in Rs/Quintal). Note that the price of Bt cotton is not significantly
different from the price of non-Bt cotton. The location and time of sale matter
and selling in the village yields a lower price compared to selling at the mar-
ket. Note that the location of sale is responsible for the large majority of the
variation in output price. The difference in price received when one sells in the
market versus whether one sells in the village reflect the transportation costs
between market and village (it would cost about 50 Rs to hire a small three-
wheeler truck). When a farmer sells his produce will depend on in the first
place on the duration of the cultivar (as cotton is a perishable product), i.e., how
many weeks it takes for the crop to mature and in the second place on whether
he needs to reimburse a input dealer or money lender urgently. In general a
farmer will pick a short-duration cultivar if he plans to cultivate crops during
the summer season (March-May), and this in turn will depend on whether he
has access to a functional irrigation source during the summer.
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Table 2.18: OLS cotton price in 2007-08 N=427, Adj R=0.30
Coeff. St. Error
Quantity (quintal) 1.45 1.3
Aurepalle -194.33*** 32.47
Kinkhed -10.63 30.04
Weeks since 1 October 7.74*** 1.34
Dummy Bt cultivar 47.1 34.61
Sold to trader/agent in the village -43.34** 17
Sold to farmer in the village -51.70*** 15.86
Sold to same person from whom input was bought 3.78 11.16
Constant 2077.41*** 33.61
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
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APPENDIX E
The control for soil fertility is the number of plots the farmer has access to
(owned, leased/shared in, leased/shared out) larger or equal to one acre of
”good” or ”very good” quality (as perceived by the farmer). As not all the VLS
years contain data on the value of soil in Rs/acre, I construct a soil fertility mea-
sure based on the perceived quality of soil in the VLS panel data. As no land-
holding module was included in the 2002-03 and 2003-04 round, I extrapolated
the information of, respectively, 2001-02 and 2004-05.
The measure for credit constraints and risk aversion are constructed in the
same way as in the cross sectional analysis, as such I assume that, controlling
for wealth (land owned) which does vary over time, these attributes of the indi-
vidual do not change over time.
The irrigation constraints are captured by an individual-level effect captures
whether or not the farmer, in the past seven year, ever has faced a situation
where he wanted to give additional irrigation to his cotton crop, but there was
insufficient water available to him.
The prices used are individual-level predicted prices for each year. The
input-output and Y-modules of the ICRISAT-VLS 2001-07 data contain a year,
individual, plot and activity specific price for each input and output, not in-
cluding the cost of credit. In case no market transaction took place the price
provided is an estimate by the enumerator or respondent on the field. Similarly,
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the 2007-08 data contains also individual, plot and activity specific prices, but
only for the items for which a market transaction took place.
I selected a set of input and output prices, relevant to the cotton cultivation
decision. The choice of which output prices to include is complex, as the com-
peting crops change each year. I based my choice on the number of farmers
who cultivate a certain crop in 2007-08 and included cotton, blackgram, green-
gram, sorghum, rice, cowpea, pigeonpea, soybean and castor. As the output
prices are not know per crop in 2001-02 in the input-output schedule, I used the
production and utilization schedule instead for this year. In terms of fertilizers
and pesticide prices, I computed the ’average price’ of fertilizers (pesticides) for
each individual as follows: the sum of the total value spent on fertilizers (pes-
ticides) divided by the total amount of fertilizers in kg (liter), excluding farm
yard manure and the price of labor. Note that these prices are a function of the
input choice of farmers in terms of fertilizers (pesticides). Constructing an av-
erage price for fertilizers and pesticides is necessary as the available fertilizers
and pesticides change each year and for 2004-05 and 2002-03 no information
is available on the type of fertilizers and pesticides used. In terms of other in-
put prices, as the Bt plots -as evident from the 2007-08 input-output data - on
average receive more inputs, the set of relevant prices must include all other
input prices, namely the price of female, male and bullock labor and the rent of
a tractor.
I then computed an year/individual specific average using the various plot
and activity specific prices of the Kharif season (except for 2001-02 and 2002-03
which use both Kharif and Rabi prices as they cannot be separated out) and pre-
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dicted the price that each individual farmer faces each year using the following
OLS regression pi jt = 0+1Li jt+
2
2L
2
i jt+VT jt+ IRRIi jt+  i jt, where L stands for the
acreage of land owned, IRRI is a dummy variable capturing whether or not the
farmer has irrigable land and VT stands for a time-village level fixed effect. In
terms of seed costs, as the seed costs are not always known per crop in 2001-04
and the unit is not always recorded in the later years, I used the medium price
for non-Bt cotton seeds, excluding the outliers in this calculation, and the official
Bt price for Bt seeds.
Finally, I deflated the price series using the State-wise Consumer Price
Index Numbers for Agricultural Labourers in India available from INDIAS-
TAT.SECTION 1
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CHAPTER 3
HIGH RETURNS, LOW ASPIRATIONS? SOCIAL NORMS AND
EDUCATION IN VILLAGE INDIA
3.1 Introduction
Parents in developing countries invest in the education of their children as they
expect this will increase their and their children’s welfare in the long term. The
literature to date has shown that the magnitude of this investment depends on
many factors, including parental education, social and economic background,
work opportunities, village and regional development, school quality, costs and
educational subsidies.1 Variation in these factors impacts credit constraints,
and the costs of and returns to education, and therefore explains a significant
amount of the difference often observed in educational attainment between
boys and girls and between social groups in developing countries. But it does
not explain most of it. In India, girls and children belonging to lower caste
groups (controlling for credit constraints, costs and returns to education) are sig-
nificantly less likely to go to school compared to boys and children from upper
caste groups (Dre`ze and Kingdon, 2000).2 So what is driving these unexplained
gender and caste based differences?
1The literature in economics on education is vast. Rosenzweig (1995), Schultz (1961) and
Schultz (1989) provide good introductions.
2The Indian caste system describes the social stratification and social restrictions in the In-
dian subcontinent in which social classes are structured along four principle castes (termed
varna) and defined by thousands of endogamous local groups (termed ja¯tis or sub-castes). The
formerly called untouchables constitute a ”fifth caste”, those people who fall below the and are,
in a sense, outside of the caste system altogether.
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A part of the explanation might be group-based heterogeneity in market re-
turns (due to, for instance, labor market discrimination3) or imperfect informa-
tion. Indeed, what will matter to the parents is not the average cost and benefits
of education, but what they perceive these cost and benefits to be for their par-
ticular child. Parents form their opinion based on the limited information they
receive from schools, media and interactions with their children, relatives and
friends. As such, due to assortative matching by social groups, opinions might
be correlated within groups.4
In addition to learning from relatives and friends, the social network in
which parents are embedded might also influence their investment in educa-
tion in a different manner, through social norms, customs and pressures. For
instance, in a uneducated family getting a higher education might be frowned
upon and alienate family members, while in educated families, stopping one’s
education prematurely might be criticized.5
3Studies indicate that women and lower caste groups might suffer fromwage discrimination
(Ito 2009, Kingdon 1998, Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). One needs to be careful however in
interpreting these results. As women in India tend to be found in very different jobs than men,
a difference in wages can not be interpreted as evidence of direct discrimination against women.
Once the nature of the job is taken into account, Chakravarty and Somanathan (2007) find no
evidence of wage discrimination against women.
4Recent literature has pointed to the importance of subjective versus ’objective’ beliefs with
regard to educational returns. Jensen (2010) finds that measured returns to schooling in the Do-
minican Republic are high, but the returns perceived by students are extremely low. Nguygen
(2008) finds that parents’ median perceived return matches the average return estimated from
household survey data in Madagascar. In addition, she finds a lot of dispersion in both percep-
tion of the average return and perception of the child’s own return. She attributes the latter to
both heterogeneity in the actual returns and imperfect information. Attanasio and Kaufmann
(2008) show that these subjective returns matter and are significant predictors of college and
high school attendance choices in Mexico, but only for richer individuals.
5Few economists have explicitly studied social norms in the education decision in India.
Some work has been done by Chamarbagwala (2009). Outside of the Indian context, Akerlof
and Kranton (2005) and Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) discuss, theoretically, how one’s group
identity might influence one’s investment in education.
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Using a detailed child level dataset I collected in three villages in rural India
in 2007-08, I dissect the role of these social norms, customs and pressures in the
education decision, taking into account the differences in (perceived) returns
to education. As the large majority of the children in these villages complete
elementary education and lower secondary education, I focus on future plans
to invest in upper secondary and higher education. Considering these future
plans to invest in education, which I will refer to as educational aspirations,
instead of the actual investment in education has some benefits. First, future
plans to invest in education determine educational attainment 10-15 years from
now, and as education is known to be an important determinant of micro level
growth, one is basically examining one of the main drivers of growth directly.
Second, looking at aspirations has the methodological advantage that one can
directly control for (perceived) costs and benefits of education as it is feasible to
elicit both aspirations and expectations during one survey.6
The main idea behind the empirical strategy is simple. I check whether the
beliefs with regard to the returns to education are consistent with future invest-
ment plans with regard to education, meaning if one believes higher education
has benefits, net of costs, then one should invest in higher education. If this
is not the case, something else is constraining the individual. Using regres-
sion analysis, I explain the variation in child-level aspirations by the variation
in child-level (perceived) costs and returns, credit constraints and time prefer-
ences, and social norms, customs and pressures.
6If one were to look at educational attainment instead, one would have to estimate the beliefs
parents had several years back with regard to the costs and benefits of education.
85
In this context, social pressures might directly relate to the level of education
and/or indirectly influence aspirations through affecting the (perceived) costs
and benefits of education. The latter relates to wedding and marriage customs
as practiced in most of rural India. When a girl is in her late teens to early twen-
ties, her parents are often pressured by relatives and friends to get her married.
Once a suitable groom is found, the two families negotiate the dowry, i.e., the
transfer of gifts and money that the bride brings to the groom’s household. This
dowry can be perceived as a price for a groom, and will (among others) depend
on the level of education of both parties. After marriage, the bride moves in
with her husband or his parents, a practice known as patrilocality. Once the
bride has switched homes, it is often socially unacceptable to continue to sup-
port her natal family, either financially or in terms of physical care. Using child
level data on these marriage-related social customs and information on the ed-
ucation obtained by the household’s social network, I disentangle the influence
of marriage age, dowry, patrilocality and social pressures which relate directly
to the level of education.
I find that educational aspirations are much lower for girls and for lower
caste groups. Not taking into account the difference in dowry and old age care,
the perceived returns to education are significantly lower for girls at all educa-
tion levels. As expected, the ideal age of marriage is lower for girls (compared
to boys) and sons are expected to be the main financial providers at old age. The
fraction of the parents’ social network that has received some higher education
is also much lower when considering the women in the network compared to
the men in the network. Similarly, this fraction is lower for lower caste parents.
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Aspirations are a complex function of wealth, time preferences and the age
of the parent, the perceived costs of and returns to education, and the prevailing
social norms, customs and pressures with regard to marriage and old age care.
The most important social norm is the one regarding the ideal age of marriage.
Increasing the ideal age of marriage significantly increases the probability that
parents want higher education for their daughter. The custom of patrilocality
through old age care influences the perceived net returns to education from the
perspective of the parents and influence aspirations as expected. I do not find
any evidence of social pressures directly related to the level of education and
cannot confirm a negative relationship between the price of education (in terms
of dowry price) and aspirations. On the contrary, increasing the dowry asso-
ciated with a certain education level, increases the chances of that level being
aspired to. This might point to social status effects dominating the price effect
of an increase in dowry.
In terms of policy, this study shows how important it is to address the educa-
tional gap, as observed between gender and castes in India, in a comprehensive
manner. In order to change the aspirations parents have for their female chil-
dren and that parents of lower castes have for their children, one has to address
the various constraints simultaneously. These include, most importantly, credit
constraints and information constraints. In addition, one needs to pay attention
the role of imperfect land and labor markets in rural India, as these affect the
opportunity costs of education in rural areas. Finally, one needs to take into
account the current social customs and norms with regard to marriage and old
age care.
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The identification of the effects of social norms and customs on the educa-
tion decisions has been attempted in two prior papers. Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001), using panel data from India, find that the practice of patrilocal exogamy
- marriage into families outside of the village – may make parents reluctant to
invest in their girls. Field and Ambrus (2009) directly test the hypothesis that
women attain less schooling as a result of what they believe to be social and fi-
nancial pressure to marry young. Using household data from rural Bangladesh,
they are able to isolate the causal effect of marriage timing using age of menar-
che as an instrumental variable. They find that delaying marriage results in
additional schooling. Then, the interaction between dowry and education is
discussed, theoretically, by Lahira and Self (2007) who show that a groom spe-
cific dowry can result in an additional bias against the female children (resulting
is less education) while a bride specific dowry can result in less bias against the
female children (resulting in more education).7
Among the papers that study social interaction effects in the schooling deci-
sion, Bobonis and Finan (2009), using experimental evidence from the Mexican
Progresa program, find that enrollment of program-ineligible children increases
significantly as more program-eligible children in their peer group start going
to school. At a more conceptual level, this study is also linked to the work of
Ray (2003) and Appadurai (2004) on aspirations and social groups. Appadurai
argues that aspirations are socially determined and that the capacity to aspire is
unevenly divided between rich and poor. The instrumental consequence of this
7Relatedly, Dasgupta and Mukherjee (2003) show (also theoretically) how parents’ prefer-
ences for their sons to stay at home after marriage, together with the institution of arranged
marriage, can lead to a preference for under-educated brides. According to their analysis, only
a switch from arranged marriage to love marriage could raise female literacy.
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is that the poor thereby lack the ”[aspirational] resources to contest and alter
the conditions of their own poverty” 8 Ray further explores the determinants
of these aspirations (theoretically) and reasons that people form an ”aspiration
window” based on the experiences of similar individuals. He then defines the
aspirations gap as the difference between the standard of living to which one
aspires and the standard of living that one already eperiences, and argues that
this gap that drives behavior.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section pro-
vides some background information on the education system in India. Section
3 introduces the data. To set the stage for the analysis, Section 4 discusses some
selected descriptive statistics, exploring the variation in plans and expectations
with regard to education and provides a description of how dowry, marriage
age and old age care interact with the education decision, based on conversa-
tions with respondents. Section 5 derives the empirical specification. Section 6
presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Education in India
The education system in India comprises school education from 1st to 12th stan-
dard, and higher education, beyond 12th standard, also referred to as 12+. A
child typically enrolls in school at the age of six. The first eight standards of
school education are known as elementary education. Up to the age of four-
8Cited from Debraj Ray as a comment on Appadurai’s working paper at the World Bank
Conference on Culture and Development, June 2002.
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teen, school education is (almost) free and compulsory. While the current (gross)
enrollment rate for elementary education in India is over 90 %, this aggregate
number masks some regional, religious, caste and gender based diversity, with
fewer female, Muslim and lower caste children enrolled in school.9
The last four standards of school education are known as secondary educa-
tion. Before entering 11th standard the child has to pass a central or state level
administered exam. From the 11th standard onwards, the student chooses three
to four subjects in which he or she will specialize. The student completes his
or her school education by taking another central or state level administered
exam. Gross enrollment figures in India range from about 70 % for lower sec-
ondary education to 40 % for higher secondary education.10
After 12th standard, there are several options for a student to continue his
or her education in colleges, universities and training institutions. One can en-
roll in a two year diploma course to become, for instance, a teacher or a textile
designer. One can opt for technical training at an I.T.I. (Industrial Training In-
stitutions), a two diploma year course, after which one can become electrician,
mechanic, painter, welder, etc. Or one can enroll in a three year degree program
for a bachelor’s degree in sciences, commerce, or arts. A few degrees take four
to five years, such as an engineering, law or medicine degree. After finishing
a bachelor’s degree, a student can opt for a master’s degree. In India, about 12
% of the relevant age cohort attend higher education, again with a large, but
9See the work of Geeta Kingdon and Anjini Kochar in Basu and Maertens (2010) for an
overview of India’s school education.
10See Geeta Kingdon in Basu and Maertens (2010).
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decreasing gap between lower and upper castes and between states. Women
make up about 40 % of all enrollments.11
Gender and caste affect the cost and returns to education through a com-
plex system of quotas (also called ”reservations”) in the public sector and gov-
ernment funded educational institutions (for higher education), and caste and
gender based subsidies.12 After independence, the Government of India rec-
ognized that the (formerly called) untouchables and (aboriginal) tribal groups
were on average economically worse off compared to the Hindu majority. The
administrative categories of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)
were created to refer to these untouchables and tribal groups, respectively, and a
system of positive discrimination was set up. Today, quotas and subsidies are
extended to women, girls, and members of other lower caste groups and reli-
gions. The latter two are grouped in a new category termed Other Backward
Castes (OBC). The remaining caste groups are referred to as the Upper Castes
(UC).
3.3 Data
I collected the data used for this study in 2007-08 in three villages in India. These
three villages were selected in 1975 by the International Crop Research Institute
11For an overview of India’s higher education see Devesh Kapur and Pratab Bhanu Mehta in
Basu and Maertens (2010).
12For instance, in the three villages I study, free text books are provided to all the children
from 6th to 10th standard belonging to Other Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. Then, 2 out of 9 Other Backward Caste individuals and 1 out of 1 Scheduled Caste
individual (under the age of 26) who pursued higher education obtained a higher education
position through the reservation system.
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of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) as part of their Village Level Studies (VLS)
program. This ongoing program collects detailed household and plot level agri-
cultural data among a sample of households in six villages in semi-arid India.13
To obtain information on social networks, expectations and aspirations with
regard to education, I resurveyed 339 ICRISAT-VLS households in Dokur,
Kalman and Shirapur. In this survey I also elicited, for each individual up to
the age of 25, details about their education and activities since age six14, and
included questions on household composition, income, time preferences15, and
current activities and education obtained for household members older than
25 years. I also completed a village questionnaire and school questionnaires
among the top five most attended schools in each village with the assistance of
the ICRISAT-VLS investigators, the school principals and the sarpanch.16 This
included information on village infrastructure, educational programs in the vil-
lage, the direct cost of education, school infrastructure, facilities and instruction.
Table 3.1 introduces the three villages. Dokur, with 530 households, is the
smallest of the three villages. It is located in the drought prone, poor, Telangana
13The sample selected is representative for each village in terms of landholding size. For an
overview of the ICRISAT-VLS program see Bantilan et al. (2006), Rao and Charyulu (2007),
Singh et al. (1985) and Walker and Ryan (1990).
14I did not elicit detailed education and employment information for the daughters (and
sons)-in-law up to the age of 25 living in the household as they did not receive their educa-
tion within the household.
15As time preferences might be identity dependent and correlated with social norms, one
needs to control for them. Implementing a traditional experiment to elicit long-term discount
rates appeared infeasible. As such, I followed Loewenstein et al. (2001) to get an estimate of
the various dimensions of time preferences (i) impulsivity, (ii) planning/compulsivity, and (iii)
behavioral/emotional inhibition. See also Pender (1996) for estimates of traditional discount
rates in the ICRISAT villages.
16A sarpanch is a democratically elected head of a village level statutory institution of local
self-Government called the Gram (village) Panchayat in India.
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region of Andhra Pradesh. In terms of income17, Dokur is situated between the
poorer Kalman and richer Shirapur. Kalman and Shirapur, with, respectively,
610 and 580 households, are located in the Solapur district of southwest Ma-
harashtra. At present, Dokur has one public school which offers education up
to 10th standard. Kalman and Shirapur have two public schools each offering,
respectively, up to 12th and 10th standard (Table 3.2).
Table 3.1: Introducing Dokur, Kalman and Shirapur
Dokur Kalman Shirapur
Distance to nearest town (km) 7 15 12
Number of households in village 530 610 580
Number of households in sample 93 102 144
Number of adults in the sample1 294 338 409
Number of young adults in the sample1 106 124 145
Number of children in the sample1 120 151 189
Number of UC individuals2 80 352 430
Number of OBC indivduals2 417 128 53
Number of SC individuals2 23 32 118
Number of T individuals2 0 101 142
Average number of household members 5.59 6.00 5.19
Average Kharif income (Rs)3 44524 40713 62965
Average education level of respondent (in years)4 3.60 4.66 5.76
Notes: 1 An adult is defined as an individual over the age of 25, a young adult is defined as an individual between the ages of 15 and 
25 and a child is defined as an individual under the age of 15. Note that the adults also include the daughters-in-law under 25 who did 
not received their education in the household; 2 FC=Forward Castes (open category), OBC=Other Backward Castes, SC=Scheduled 
Castes, T=tribes, including Scheduled Tribes; 3 the Kharif season is the rainy season; 4 the respondent is the main decision-maker with 
regard the education of the children under 25 year in the household .
Table 3.2: Schooling and education
Dokur Kalman Shirapur
Number of schools located in the village 1 2 2
Highest grade offered in the village 10 12 10
Children enrolled in school (%)1 90 96 91
Young adults enrolled in school (%)1 30 36 19
Notes:  1See definition in Table 1; as a percentage of all individuals within the relevant age group; children under the age of 6 were 
excluded from this calculation.
17Table 3.1 reports Kharif income. The Kharif season is the rainy season, and the main agricul-
tural season in the semi-arid tropics of India.
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The ICRISAT-VLS sample includes 93, 102 and 144 households in Dokur,
Kalman and Shirapur, respectively, a total of 1876 individuals. The average size
of a household is between 5 and 6 members in all three villages. In Dokur, 80 %
of the individuals are classified as OBC and 15 % as UC.18 In the Maharashtra
villages, 60 % of the individuals belong to UC, and between 16 and 19 % of the
individuals are members of the tribal category.19
Only one individual was interviewed in each household, the main decision
maker with regard to the education of the individuals up to the age 25 years. In
many cases, this is the father of the children, in some cases, the mother, grand-
father or uncle. In the remainder of this article I will refer to this decision maker
as the ”parent” of the child.
The average education level of the respondent is low, especially in Dokur
(3.6 years). Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the highest level of education
obtained for the individuals who have finished their education.20 About 36%
have not completed first standard and only 6% have done at least one year of
higher education. The large majority of the individuals received some school
18In Andhra Pradesh, the following categories are recognized of socially and educationally
backward classes: the SCs, the STs, Group A (other tribes), Group B (vocational groups), Group
C (SC who converted to christianity), Group D (others), and Group E (Muslims). For the pur-
pose of inter-state comparison, I categorised Group C under SC and Group D and the other
groups under OBC. I followed the classification as reported by the respondent.
19In Maharashtra, the following categories are recognized of backward classes: (1) SC and
SC converts to Buddhism, (2) ST including those living outside specified areas, (3) Vimukta
Jati & Denotified Tribes, (4) Nomadic Tribes– 1, (5) Nomadic Tribes, (5) Nomadic Tribes– 3, (6)
Other Backward Classes. For the purpose of inter-state comparison, I categorized, Group (6)
under OBC, Group (1) under SC and the remainder of the groups under T, referring to Tribes. I
followed the classification as reported by the respondent.
20There are a handful of individuals who have stopped their education but have intentions to
re-enroll in the future. These individuals are included in Figure 3.1.
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education. It is interesting to note that relatively few individuals are located at
the natural stopping points: 8th, 10th, 12th standard, etc.
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Figure 3.1: Highest level of education completed for individuals who finished
their education, excluding children under the age of six, N=1329
The data collection focused on obtaining information on social networks, as-
pirations and expectations with regard to education and the education obtained
by individuals up to the age of 25 years - as the existing ICRISAT-VLS data lacks
such information. Of these, 556 individuals are currently enrolled in an educa-
tional institute or under the age of six (and, as such, planning to go to school).
The educational aspirations with regard to each child (currently enrolled in
school or planning to go to school) were established as answers to the questions:
”What is the minimum amount of education you want this particular child to
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obtain?” and ”What is the maximum amount of education you would allow this
particular child to complete?” 21
One would expect the plans to invest in a child’s education to depend on
(among other) the expectations the decision maker has with regard to the re-
turns to education. As such, I elicited current beliefs regarding the returns to
education, conditional on the child’s abilities and other characteristics, but un-
conditional on the nature of the employment. To obtain a density function of
future earnings for each education level and for each child, I used a method
inspired by Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Lybbert et al. (2007) 22
Concretely, I first elicited the minimum and maximum earnings the respon-
dent thought the child would earn when finishing particular schooling mile-
stones, for instance, 12th standard. During this exercise, the respondent was
asked to imagine the various options possible, i.e., various types of employ-
ment, including self employment, and various locations where the child might
live in the future, anticipating migration. Then, I made three boxes, evenly dis-
tributed between this minimum and maximum and I asked the respondent to
use 20 stones (each stone representing a 5% probability) to form a earnings den-
sity function. This question was repeated for the various levels that the child
21Note that both questions elicit investment plans with regard to education, and even though
they might suffer from measurement error, these measurement errors will not pose any prob-
lems as long they are not correlated with any of the other independent variables in the econo-
metric models (see also Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In some cases, the mimimum and
maximum are identical, but in many cases the decision maker anticipates receiving more in-
formation with regard to the child’s ability and the future financial situation of the household,
and the minimum and maximum represent, respectively, the worst and best case scenario in the
decision maker’s mind.
22For an overview on how one can elicit subjective expectations see Delavande et al. (2008)
and Delavande et al. (forthcoming).
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still had ahead of him/her, and could include, 8th standard, 10th standard, 12th
standard, diploma, bachelor’s, engineering, medical doctor, master’s.23
In addition to these future earnings, the parents take into account the finan-
cial and physical care expected from each child at old age and other monetary
aspects of each level of education such as the direct and opportunity cost and
the expected dowry. As such, I included an extensive dowry section for the
children who were married, a section on the expected direct cost of the various
levels of education (in addition to the cost information in the school question-
naires), and asked the decision maker howmuch he or she expects each child to
contribute to their ”old age pension”.24
Finally, I elicited the (perceived) ideal age of marriage, and the education of
the members in the parent’s social network as both might influence the aspira-
tions through non-monetary social pressures.25 I used two different methods
to elicit the relevant social network. The first method asks the respondent how
many people he knows who completed 12th standard, a diploma, a bachelor’s,
etc., in different social groups (total, relatives,village) and more position-based
questions (inspired by Lin, 1999), for instance ”Howmany people do you know
whowork as a civil servant?”26 Even though this networkmight correctly repre-
23So for a child currently enrolled in 11th standard, one was asked to reconstruct the density
function for 12th standard, diploma, bachelors, engineering, medical doctor, masters, but not for
8th or 10thstandard.
24As most people in rural areas do not suddenly stop working, but rather gradually reduce
the number of hours they work on the farm, in the business and in the household, pre and post
retirement remittances were not explicitly distinguished.
25The survey includes some questions on the reaction of various peer groups when enrolling
the child in a particular standard or removing the child from school.
26This question was repeated for a selection of occupations: medical doctor, teacher, engineer,
technician and information technology specialist.
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sent the information network of the parents, it is likely that some of these distant
connections might not be relevant in terms of social pressures.
So the second method asks the respondent to think about his immediate rel-
atives: his family, his parents, his wife’s parents, his brothers and sisters and
their children and his wife’s brothers and sisters and their children. For each
of these family members, I elicited the education level, approximate age when
education was completed, current occupation and income.
3.4 A first look at the data
The sample includes 835 individuals up to the age of 25 years (Table 3.1). Of the
children between the ages of 6 and 15 years, over 90 % are enrolled in school in
all three villages (Table 3.2). Of the young adults, between the ages of 15 and 25
years, respectively, 30 %, 36 % and 19 % are enrolled in an educational institute,
in, Dokur, Kalman and Shirapur.
There is little gender difference in enrollment up to the age of 15 years, but
compared to male young adults, fewer female young adults are enrolled in an
educational institute (30 % versus 24 %). In terms of caste, UC children and
young adults are, respectively, up to 10 and 20 % more likely to be enrolled in
an educational institute compared to other castes.27
27Detailed descriptive statistics by caste and gender are available on request. Naturally, en-
rollment does not imply regular attendance. Of all the children and young adults enrolled in
an educational institute, 87% does not miss classes more than 10% of the time. Again there is
some variation between caste groups and gender, with girls being less likely to miss classes and
members of lower caste groups being more likely to miss classes.
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For the individuals currently enrolled in an educational institute, Figure 3.2
and Figure 3.3 show, respectively, the distribution of the minimum amount of
education the respondent wants this individual to obtain and the maximum
amount of education allowed to complete. A first thing to note, comparing
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 with Figure 3.1, is the discontinuous nature of these
educational plans. While the parents might not plan on stopping their child’s
education before a program or level is completed, in practice many children do
drop out. The (main) reasons mentioned by the parents are: sudden financial
problems, discovering the child is of ”low ability” (often after having failed) and
unexpected marriage prospects.28 Inspection of the data reveals that drop out is
often preceded by failure and low attendance.29
The second difference between these two sets of figures, the lower average
level of education of Figure 3.1 compared to Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, might
point to an age cohort effect (due to limited access to schools, credit and in-
come constraints, limited employment opportunities etc. a generation ago)
and a migration effect (highly educated individuals are likely to migrate to the
cities). This mismatch between aspirations for one’s children and what one has
achieved oneself is, in effect, a large driver of intergenerational growth at the
micro level.
28Relatedly, Holla (2007) finds that income volatility, as measured by rainfall shocks, dispro-
portionately affects girls’ school drop out.
29When asked about attendance, Dokur respondents and lower caste respondents often felt
that missing classes to help in the household or on the farm is ’sometimes acceptable’. The
difference observed with the Maharashtra villages and higher caste groups could be purely a
wealth effect though, as no difference can be found between the sexes, i.e., conditional on being
enrolled in an educational institute it is equally acceptable for girls as for boys to miss classes
because of illness, help needed in the household help, help needed in the farm, help neededwith
the preparation of a festival or to attend a festival. Detailed results on attendance are available
on request.
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Figure 3.2: Minimum level of education aspired for children who are currently
in school, including children under the age of six, N=557
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Figure 3.3: Maximum level of education aspired for children who are currently
in school, including children under the age of six, N=557
About 80% of the individuals currently enrolled are expected to complete a
minimum of 10 or 12 years of education (Figure 3.2) and 45% are allowed to
continue for a bachelor’s degree or ”as long the child wants” (Figure 3.3). These
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aggregate numbers however conceal a substantial amount of regional, gender
and caste based variation (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Minimum and maximum education planned
[in percentage of individuals currently enrolled in school]
By village:
Min Max Min Max Min Max
10th or lower 66 32 44 4 50 9
12th 25 20 34 19 30 40
higher than 12th 7 47 20 73 19 49
By gender:
Min Max Min Max
10th or lower 40 7 68 21
12th 37 20 22 38
higher than 12th 22 71 8 39
By caste group:
Min Max Min Max Min Max
10th or lower 36 3 69 28 64 15
12th 38 24 22 24 24 39
higher than 12th 26 72 9 44 8 42
Notes: Totals do not add up to 100% due to a small fraction of people who answered "don't know" or "it 
depends"; N=557.
SC/T
Female
Dokur Kalman Shirapur
Male
UC OBC
In the Maharashtra villages, about 20 % of the individuals are expected to
complete a higher education degree; compared to 7 % in Dokur. Consistent
with the standards available within the village boundaries, more individuals
are expected to complete (at a minimum) 12th standard in Kalman compared to
Shirapur. The difference between boys and girls is striking. The large majority
of the girls is expected to complete 10th or 12th standard (at a minimum) and
only 39 % would be allowed to pursue higher education, compared to 71 % of
the boys. A similar difference can be found between UC, OBC and SC/T: 70 %
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of the UC individuals are allowed to continue higher education, compared to 42
to 44 % of the backward caste groups.
In qualitative terms, the respondents mention a ”high salary” or a ”gov-
ernment job” as the most important characteristic of the future occupation for
about 60 % of the children and young adults. While in Dokur respondents have
a strong preference for government jobs, overall, there are few differences be-
tween the villages in this regard. Similarly, there are few differences between
boys and girls with regard to the ideal characteristics of the future occupation,
even though in the case of girls the most important characteristic mentioned
is sometimes ”(geographically) close to the relatives”, ”a job through which
one helps others” and ”a job which is approved by the spouse”, characteris-
tics which are (almost) never mentioned in the case of boys. In addition to these
non-monetary criteria mentioned (”(geographically) close to the relatives”, ”a
job through which one helps others”), the UC also consider the ”career poten-
tial” of an occupation to be important and SC/T respondents give relatively
more importance to a ”stable income” compared to the other castes.30
The difference found between villages, gender and castes in terms of aspi-
rations might be (partially) explained by a difference in expectations with re-
gard to the returns to education. Table 3.4 shows that, on average, respondents
in Dokur believe that medical doctors, engineers, and ”postgraduates” (i.e.,
someone with a masters degree) earn, respectively, 31,035 Rs/month, 24,576
Rs/month and 17,634 Rs/month (40,000 Rs is about 1,000 US Dollar). This is
significantly higher than to the Maharashtra villages. While this difference is
30Detailed descriptive statistics are available on request.
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reversed for the bachelors level (i.e., for a ”graduate”), it is clear that expecta-
tions alone cannot explain the difference in educational plans observed between
the villages.31
With regard to gender, girls are expected to earn less on a monthly basis,
compared to boys, independent of the level of education. Using a simple (un-
equal variance) t-test it appears that this difference is significant for all education
levels at the 5 % level, except for 10th standard and the master’s level. This is
consistent with the difference in educational plans found. Even if there were no
systematic difference in perceived ability between girls and boys, this does not
imply that the parents anticipate wage discrimination for certain jobs, as these
expectations also capture the fact that girls might be expected to do different
kinds of work.
The difference in expectations between castes is again somewhat puzzling
and inconsistent with the differences in aspirations education. UC respondents,
on average, expect a lower return to higher education compared to OBC respon-
dents, but a higher return compared to SC/T respondents. The difference be-
tween OBC and UC is significant at the 5 % level for all education levels except
for 8th standard, 10th standard and a bachelor’s degree. The difference between
UC and SC/T is significant for all education levels except for the bachelor’s
level. Part of the explanation might be the caste based quota system in higher
education and government institutions. According to their own account, it is
31There are 121 children, mostly in Dokur, for whom the respondent could not answer one
or more of the ”stone game” questions (to elicit their expectations with regard to the returns
to education). These respondents answered ”no idea”. Comparing these respondents with the
other respondents in Dokur, it appears that they are (on average) somewhat lower educated,
older and have younger children. Their aspirations for their children (minimum andmaximum)
are lower compared to the other children in Dokur. These children are omitted from the analysis.
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Table 3.4: Expectations with regard to earnings
[in Rs/month]
By village:
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
8th standard 1,706 724 2,256 2,028 1,422 570
10th standard 3,650 5,108 3,036 1,970 2,082 837
12th standard 3,870 1,366 4,382 3,171 2,924 1,184
diploma 8,953 3,968 8,756 5,174 6,403 1,941
bachelor's 8,063 2,606 9,991 5,621 9,383 3,099
medical doctor 31,035 8,545 22,909 8,511 19,745 8,441
engineer 24,576 7,624 17,904 6,806 15,332 6,565
master's 17,634 13,339 14,324 9,148 12,471 4,725
By gender:
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
8th standard 1,787 1,359 1,921 1,277 1,616 1,436
10th standard 2,793 2,853 2,886 2,496 2,679 3,241
12th standard 3,689 2,276 3,945 2,273 3,370 2,245
diploma 7,794 4,074 8,262 4,355 7,187 3,601
bachelor's 9,402 4,313 10,016 4,652 8,620 3,708
medical doctor 22,496 9,150 23,559 8,810 21,146 9,421
engineer 17,651 7,400 19,080 7,643 15,808 6,658
master's 13,892 8,306 14,238 7,510 13,404 9,242
By caste group: UC OBC SC/T
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
8th standard 1,887 1,753 1,816 889 1,550 785
10th standard 3,069 3,856 2,786 1,360 2,229 1,015
12th standard 3,652 2,337 4,158 2,562 3,212 1,579
diploma 7,773 3,926 9,387 5,141 6,411 2,598
bachelor's 9,309 4,060 10,192 5,586 8,876 3,362
medical doctor 23,076 8,432 26,164 10,464 18,302 8,242
engineer 17,903 6,808 20,457 8,698 14,839 6,773
master's 13,747 6,918 17,893 13,163 11,203 4,913
Notes: For each individual currently enrolled in an educational institute, the expected average monthly earnings 
is calculated assuming a step-wise distribution with the minimum and maximum of the distribution of earnings as 
specified by the respondent for each level/program of education completed. These earnings are equivalent to the 
wage in case of wage employment and are earnings net of costs in the case of self employment. The numbers 
presented in this Table are the sample averages of these individual averages. 
Dokur Kalman Shirapur
Total Male Female
becoming more and more difficult for UC to get admitted to the better colleges
and universities, or to secure a government job.
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In addition to expectations, social norms and pressures could also influence
the planned education levels. Direct elicitation of social pressures with regard
to enrollment and drop out reveals little information. When asked how vari-
ous social groups reacted when a child was enrolled in school, or when a child
dropped out of school, very few respondents mention extreme reactions such as
”very negative”, or ”very positive”.
The education decision could also be influenced indirectly by social norms
regarding the ”ideal age of marriage”. According to the respondents, a fam-
ily who has an unmarried older daughter at home is often criticized, the vari-
ous members’ every move being scrutinized, often compromising the marriage
prospects of the other children and resulting in social exclusion of the adult
household members. As such, it’s in the parents’ interest to marry their daugh-
ter around the ”ideal age of marriage”.
The (average) ideal age of marriage is 18.3 years in the case of girls and 22.7
years in the case of boys. This is a bit higher for both sexes in Dokur compared to
the Maharashtra village, and a bit lower for SC/T compared to the other castes.
When a couple gets married, the two families exchange gifts and money, in
addition to splitting the cost of the wedding ceremony. The value of these gifts,
as well as the financial transfer, is set by both parties through a bargaining pro-
cess. The final amounts set will depend on the education of the children, their
current and future jobs, their age and caste and personal characteristics, such as
beauty. Table 3.5 presents the average value of the transfers. On average, the
bride’s family spends a total of 87,293 Rs on gifts, dowry and ceremonial ex-
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penses (net of the gifts received) and the groom’s family spends a total of 3,887
Rs on gifts, ceremonial expenses (net of the dowry and gifts received). Wedding
expenses are markedly higher in the Maharashtra villages compare to Dokur
and among the UC compared to the OBC and SC/T. According the respondents’
own account, the relationship between education and dowry is complex. While
a bride’s family has to pay more for a more educated groom, a highly educated
groom typically does not marry a bride who received little education. And as
increasing the education of the bride could lower the dowry, as the bride could
financially contribute to the family-in-law’s household, the overall effect of in-
creasing the bride’s education on the dowry is theoretically ambiguous.32 In
practice, it appears that increasing the education of groom increases the dowry,
but only if the groom lives with his parents, and increasing the education of
the bride reduces the dowry, but only if the groom lives separately from his
parents.33
Table 3.5: Transfers at the time of marriage
[Averages, in Rs paid by the respective families]
Total Dokur Kalman Shirapur UC OBC SC/T
By bride's family 97,293 73,220 128,611 92,459 132,857 82,385 79,000
(81,587) (41,122) (128,611) (76,088) (120,820) (51,205) (43,646)
By groom's family 3,887 -27,570 5,986 29,336 17,414 -20,105 24,984
(41,261) (25,357) (5,986) (38,270) (35,743) (30,839) (43,378)
Notes: The standard deviatiations are mentioned under the averages in paranthesis. The bride's family offer gifts and presents 
to the groom's family and vice  versa, both families transfer gifts and cash to the bride and groom and both families contribute 
to the expenses of the wedding ceremony. The amounts shown in Table 5 are the net amounts paid by the respective families 
(assuming that the bride keeps her gifts to herself and the groom shares his with his family); N=115.
32In addition, education a daughter might have other benefits of the marriage market: for a
highly educated daughter, the family does not have to bother looking for candidates themselves,
but candidates will present themselves.
33The regression included all observations in Table 3.5 and controlled for income, the dif-
ference in wealth between the two families, whether the bride was joining a joint or nuclear
household and caste and village fixed effects. The regressions results reported are available on
request.
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Table 3.6 presents the financial support and physical care parents expect
from their children in old age. With the exception of a handful of respondents
who have access to savings or an old age pension, most respondents reported
that they would have to rely 100% on their children. The patrilocal marriage
system, as practised in the three villages, in which married couples reside with
or near the family of the husband, imply that the (majority) of the returns to ed-
ucation after marriage go to the family in law. Table 3.6 shows that, indeed, in
all villages and all caste groups, the majority of the care and support is expected
from the male children. The difference between support expected from male
versus female children is larger in the case of UC and smaller in Dokur. The
latter might be due to the phenomenon of cousin marriage in Andhra Pradesh,
making the future earnings of daughters more ”accessible” to parents as she
stays within the family.34
Table 3.6: Support expected from children at old age
[Averages, in percentage support expected]
Total Dokur Kalman Shirapur UC OBC SC/T
Financial support
boys 76 70 74 81 80 72 75
girls 36 44 31 35 32 44 33
Physical care
boys 59 56 63 58 61 59 54
girls 58 59 46 65 58 60 56
Notes: The numbers presented in Table 6 are the sample averages of the percentage care/support expected from male/female 
children. Note tha t at a household level, these two percentages add up to 100% in most cases (except for the case where the 
respondent has access to savings or a pension); N=273 boys and N=238 girls.   
34In south India it is common for Hindu cross cousins to marry, with matrilateral cross-cousin
(mother’s brother’s daughter) marriages being especially favored. This southern kinship model
prevails in the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. On the cost and
benefits of cousin marriages, see the ongoing work of Seema Jayachandran, Mohammed Al
Shafaee and Erica Field.
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To conclude this section, Table 3.7 presents selected descriptive statistics on
the education attained by the members of the parents’ social network. One can
see that, on average, only 9.3% of the male relatives over the age of 18 (in the
extended family) did some higher education, compared to 3.6% of the female
relatives. Once again, these numbers are higher for the Maharashtra villages
compared to Dokur, and for UC compared to the backward castes.
Table 3.7: The education obtained by the social network
[Averages, in percentage of extended family members who did (some) higher education]
Total Dokur Kalman Shirapur UC OBC SC/T
Men 9.3 6.3 11.3 9.8 12.9 6.5 5.9
Women 3.6 1.7 4.1 4.4 4.5 2.3 3.3
Notes: Based on the education level of all members of the extended family older than 18 years of age (of the same gender) as 
reported by the decision maker.  
3.5 Empirical specification
I abstract from the details of the dynamic optimization problem of the parent
and assume that the parent receives an expected (lifetime) utility u(ei j) from
educating child i up to education level e j. Using an additive random utility
framework, write:
u(ei j) = f j(ri j; ci j;dowryi j; contri j;N j; age marr; sexi; caste;H) +  i j (3.1)
where ri j denotes the (perceived) monthly earnings of child i having completed
education level e j, ci j; the direct cost of education level e j for child i, dowryi j,
the dowry to be expected (which is typically negative for girls and positive for
boys), contri; the contribution expected from the child at old age, N j the share
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of (male/female) relatives who have obtained education level e j, age marr, the
ideal age of marriage according to the parent, and household specific variables
denoted H. These include education and age of the decision maker, wealth, and
time preferences.
S exi, denotes the gender of the child and caste denotes the caste group of the
family. Note that the opportunity cost of education level e j are largely captured
by the (perceived) monthly earnings of the education level e j 1. What is not
being captured though are the forgone value of non-market labor activities such
as household work (note that farm work and other household business’ work
are included in ri j). One would expect this value to depend on the age and
gender of the child, and the demand for household work within the household.
As such, the coefficient on sexi partially captures the difference in the forgone
value of non-market activities of girls versus boys. In addition, the coefficient on
sexi might also capture the fact that parents tend to be more concerned about the
personal safety of a daughter compared to a son. Sending one’s daughter off to
dubious hostels or on the road to travel to college without a suitable chaperone
is a source of concern to parents in addition to a source of social pressures. Note
that the latter would (partially) be captured by the coefficient on N j.
The coefficient on caste captures any remaining caste-based aspirations un-
explained through the dowry, age of marriage and pratrilocal channel as well
as unrelated to the education attained by the members of the extended family.
A part of this unexplained caste based variation might be due to a preference
for caste specific occupations for one’s children, such as, shepherd, blacksmith,
barber and toddy tapper. Note that child order is not explicitly taken into ac-
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count in this model. The only way a child can affect another child of the same
household is through the income and wealth channel.
The parent opts for education level e j for child i if education level e j gives
the highest utility among the set of education levels available:
P(choose e j for child i) = P( f j() +  i j > fs() +  is;8s 2 Bi) (3.2)
P(choose e j for child i) = P( f j()   fs() >  is    i j;8s 2 Bi) (3.3)
which implies Bi is the set of education levels available to child i. Techni-
cally, this set is the budget set of child i, but as I have no information on
credit constraints, I have to assume that this is the set of all education lev-
els ahead. For instance, for a child enrolled in 12th standard, the set Bi equalsn
diploma, bachelor’s, engineering, medical doctor, master’s
o
.
Assume now that all  is are mutually independent with a log Weibull distri-
bution. In this case, the distribution of each  is is given by:
F(t) = exp( e t) (3.4)
Under these assumptions, following McFadden (1974), it can be shown that:
P(choose e j for child i) =
exp( f j())X
s2Bi
exp( fs())
(3.5)
Finally, assuming that fs() is a linear function of the alternative specific variables
(denoted Xi j) and child/household specific variables (denoted Zi), let’s rewrite
(3.5) as:
P(choose e j for child i) =
e(X
0
i j+Z0i  j)X
s2Bi
e(X
0
i j+Z0i  j)
(3.6)
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Specification (??) together with assumption (3.4) outline a conditional logit
model. While this model allows for sufficient education level specific flexibil-
ity, it does not impose an order among the various education levels available
(such as between and engineering degree and a medical doctor degree). The
assumption that all  is are mutually independent implies that the utility levels
(conditional on observed characteristics) of any two education levels are inde-
pendent. So the probability ratio, or odds ratio, between any two alternatives,
does not depend on the other alternatives available:
P(choose e j for child i)
P(choose ek for child i)
=
e(X
0
i j+Z0i  j)
e(X0is+Z0i s)
(3.7)
While it is possible to relax this Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property, this would lead to a more complex model, with more coefficients to
be estimated. As, according to their own account, the parents decide on their
plans to invest in education in a simultaneous manner, rather than a sequential
manner (first decide on whether or not one pursue higher education and then
on which type of higher education), it is not clear what the advantages of a
more flexible approach would be given that I have only data on a small sample
of children and young adults.
3.6 Results
The basic intuition behind the identification strategy is simple. I check whether
the beliefs with regard to the returns to education are consistent with the aspira-
tions with regard to education. For instance, if someone believes that obtaining
a bachelor’s degree could yield a return that more than compensates for the di-
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rect and indirect costs involved compared to just finishing high school, then this
person should plan to invest in higher education. The discrepancy between be-
liefs and plans could be explained by a number of factors, among others, credit
constraints35, time preferences and social norms and pressures.
This implies that one could isolate the roles of social norms and pressures
by decomposing the variance in educational plans into a part explained by the
variance in costs, returns, credit constraints and impatience and an unexplained
part which could be attributed to social norms and pressures. Using detailed
child level information on the various sources of these social norms and pres-
sures in rural India, I can separately identify the effects of social norms through
dowry, expectations with regard to old age care and with regard to the ideal age
of marriage. As what is ”acceptable” depends on the child’s caste and gender,
in addition to household characteristics, there is sufficient variation to identify
these social norm effects, if present. To check whether there are social pressures
present which are directly related to the level of education itself, I include infor-
mation on the education level of the household’s social network members.
The analysis presented in this section takes into account the fact that not
all children and young adults are enrolled in school (see Table 3.2). Figure 3.4
shows the percentage of children and young adults enrolled in an educational
institute by age group. One can see that aggregate enrollment decreases by
age. While 93% of the 6 to 14 years old are enrolled, only 37% of the 17 to
35The direct costs of education can be substantial, ranging from 17% of the average annual
income per capita for elementary education to over 80% for secondary school education, and
over 100% for higher education. While several respondents mentioned they would be willing
to borrow money for the education of their sons and daughters, these type of loans are non-
existent up to 12th standard. Banks provide loans only for higher education and borrowing
from relatives or friends to finance education is not socially acceptable.
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18 years old are enrolled. If the children who are enrolled are systematically
different from the children who are not enrolled, the estimates of specification
(3.6) might suffer from selection bias and using them to say something about the
population, i.e., all individuals up to 25 years, would be incorrect. For instance,
imagine that less able children are more likely to drop out of school and that
ability affects aspirations as more able children are more likely to pass entrance
examinations and finish a degree that they started. In this case, the effects of
expectations on the educational plans will be biased upwards.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of individuals enrolled in an educational institute, N=683
As the data contain more information than usual with regard to the educa-
tion decision, including several measures of ability36, and my information set
is therefore very similar to the decision maker’s information set, I do not ex-
pect this selection bias to be severe. Nevertheless, I used a traditional Heckman
36Even though ‘true’ innate ability is a somewhat of an elusive concept, I can (partially) con-
trol for ability using standardized test scores, school grades and the subjective ranking of the
children’s ability by the parents.
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(1979) approach to deal with issues of sample selection . Briefly, whether or not
a child is included in the sample mainly depends (non-linearly) on his or her
age, gender, caste and village.37
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the results of a conditional logit model, es-
timating (3.6) using, respectively, the minimum and maximum education as-
pired. From the first section of the table one can see that the minimum educa-
tion aspired depends on the average and variance of the (perceived) returns to
education, the cost of education and the dowry expected. Notice however that
the sign on the dowry effect is the opposite of what one would expect: increas-
ing the price of education in terms of the dowry costs, increases the chances of
planning to invest in that option. Increasing the expected dowry of a specific
education level with 1000 Rs, increases the relative odds ratio of choosing that
particular education level, rather than 12th standard, by a factor of 1.02. This
might be due to the fact that this dowry includes both the gifts and transfers
as well as the wedding expenses, and the latter, being a source of social sta-
tus, might actual imply that more expenses might be preferred to less expenses.
The ideal age of marriage appears to be an important determinant of the (min-
imum) aspirations. Increasing the age of marriage increases the chances of the
child obtaining (at least) a bachelor’s degree and decreases the chance of the
child ending up with just 10 years of education (at a minimum). The magni-
tude of this effect is substantial. Increasing the age of marriage with one year,
changes the relative odds of aspiring 10th standard, rather than 12th standard,
by a factor of 0.86, and the relative odds of aspiring a bachelor’s degree, rather
37Measures of ability and past attendance are also statistically significant when considering
only the children who have ever been to school (results available on request).
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than 12th standard, by a factor of 1.30. Gender does not affect the relative odds
ratio of aspiring a bachelors’ degree rather than 12th standard, but does have an
impact on the relative odds ratio of aspiring a diploma or only 10th standard,
rather than 12the standard, with lower aspirations for girls. Caste also affects the
likelihood of aspiring for 10th standard, rather than 12th standard, with lower
aspirations associated with lower castes.
From the first section of the results in Table 3.9 one can see that maximum
education level aspired depends on the education of the extended family mem-
bers, but not in theway I expected. Increasing the percentage of familymembers
who have obtained a particular level decreases the relative odds ratio of aspir-
ing for that particular level, rather than 12th standard, by a factor of 0.97. Thus
I find no evidence of direct social pressures to conform in terms of education.
The expected contribution from the child at old age affects the maximum level
of education aspired. Increasing the child’s contribution with 1%, increases the
relative odds ratio of choosing a bachelor’s degree, rather than 12th standard, by
a factor of 1.03 and decreases the relative odds ratio of choosing 10th standard,
rather than 12th standard, by a factor of 0.94. The effect is reversed (compared
to the bachelor’s level) when considering the other higher education options:
engineering, medical doctor and master’s. Maybe the parents fear that a too
highly educated child might leave the region and break contact with the family,
and as such they would only allow the children whom they do plan to rely as
much on to continue for post-graduate education. Again, increasing the age of
marriage increases the chances of the child to be allowed to continue for a bache-
lor’s, master’s and engineering degree. Increasing the age of marriage with one
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year, changes the relative odds of aspiring a bachelor’s degree, rather than 12th
standard, by a factor of 1.57, an engineering degree, rather than 12th standard,
by a factor of 1.21, and a master’s degree, rather than 12th standard by a factor
of 1.61. Girls are less likely to be allowed to continue for any of the higher edu-
cation degrees (except for a diploma) compared to boys, and children of lower
caste groups are less likely to be allowed to continue for a master’s degree and
more likely to be allowed to go to school only up to 10th standard compared to
UC children.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of aspirations - minimum
Conditional logit regression (base category 12th standard)
Coeff. St.Error Coeff. St. Error
Mean of perceived return (in 1,000 Rs) 0.2524*** 0.0666 1.2871*** 0.0858
Deviation of perceived return (in 1,000 Rs) -0.7022** 0.3277 0.4955** 0.1624
Percentage of family members (in 1,000 Rs) -0.005 0.0071 0.995 0.0071
Net contribution at time of marriage (in 1,000 Rs) 0.0199** 0.0088 1.0201** 0.009
Direct cost of education (in 1,000 Rs) -0.1208*** 0.0588 0.8862*** 0.0521
Finish 10th standard
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0192 0.0176 0.981 0.0172
                Interacted with age parent 0.0005 0.0005 1.0005 0.0005
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls -0.1442* 0.0823 0.8657* 0.0713
Child is female 2.1273*** 0.6614 8.3919*** 5.5507
Belong to OBC 1.1275*** 0.4266 3.0879*** 1.3174
Belong to SC/ST 1.3064** 0.5398 3.6929** 1.9936
Finish a diploma
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0232 0.0712 0.9771 0.0696
                Interacted with age parent 0.0005 0.0017 1.0005 0.0017
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls -0.3464 0.244 0.7073 0.1725
Child is female -2.889* 1.4392 0.0556* 0.0801
Belong to OBC -47.031 41010 0 0
Belong to SC/ST -17.9096 22169 0 0.0004
Finish a bachelor's  degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0088 0.0302 0.9912 0.03
                Interacted with age parent 0.0006 0.0008 1.0006 0.0008
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.2682** 0.1337 1.3076** 0.1748
Child is female -1.5541 1.1054 0.2114 0.2337
Belong to OBC -0.6465 1.0125 0.5239 0.5304
Belong to SC/ST -37.1967 32127 0 0
Finish an engineering degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.2598 1.23 0.7712 0.9486
                Interacted with age parent 0.0059 0.0255 1.0059 0.0257
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls -0.6592 1.7161 0.5173 0.8876
Child is female -37.9647 706 0 0
Belong to OBC -127.2932 3966 0 0
Belong to SC/ST 19.9072 8.64E7 4E+9 4E+16
Coefficient Odds Ratio
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Includes all children up to the age of 18 currently enrolled in school except for the ones with 
missing data. Controlled for wealth, credit constraints, time preferences and selection effects. The mean and averages are computed 
following the procedure outlined in Table 4, and then averaged across the various levels of, respectively, primary and secondary, and 
higher education. The net contributions at the time of marriage are predicted on the basis of recall data (on dowry, education of bride 
and groom, joint versus nuclear family status, village and caste) on these contributions from the same villages. Note that as the recall 
data contains few children who received higher education, these estimates might be imprecise at these higher education levels. The 
percentage of family members who did no or some higher education is based on the education level of all members of the extended 
family older than 18 years of age (of the same gender) as reported by the decision maker. N=423. Master's degree, medical doctor 
degree and 8th standard are included in the analysis but results not shown as the limited number of observations implies that one canno
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Table 3.9: Determinants of aspirations - maximum
Conditional logit regression (base category 12th standard)
Coeff. St.Error Coeff. St. Error
Mean of perceived return (in 1,000 Rs) 0.0214 0.0149 1.0217 0.0152
Deviation of perceived return (in 1,000 Rs) -0.1017 0.0904 0.9033 0.0816
Percentage of family members (in 1,000 Rs) -0.0205** 0.0088 0.9797** 0.0086
Net contribution at time of marriage (in 1,000 Rs) 0.0051** 0.0026 1.0051** 0.0026
Direct cost of education (in 1,000 Rs) -0.0085 0.006 0.9915 0.0059
Finish 10th standard
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0544* 0.0324 0.947* 0.0307
                Interacted with age parent 0.001 0.0009 1.001 0.0009
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls -0.0188 0.1436 0.9814 0.1409
Child is female 1.0722 0.8477 2.9218 2.4769
Belong to OBC 2.3469*** 0.5852 10.4532*** 6.1176
Belong to SC/ST 1.055 0.6659 2.8719 1.9123
Finish a diploma
Percentage of financial support expected of the child 0.0535 0.0521 1.055 0.0549
                Interacted with age parent -0.0014 0.0015 0.9986 0.0015
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.095 0.2335 1.0996 0.2567
Child is female -0.9027 1.1841 0.4055 0.4802
Belong to OBC -0.5764 1.2641 0.5619 0.7104
Belong to SC/ST -0.6658 1.2703 0.5139 0.6528
Finish a bachelor's  degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child 0.0385** 0.0216 1.0393** 0.0225
                Interacted with age parent -0.001 0.0006 0.999 0.0006
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.4516 0.1032 1.5708 0.1621
Child is female -1.1297** 0.6031 0.3231** 0.1949
Belong to OBC 0.159 0.4843 1.1723 0.5677
Belong to SC/ST -0.8885 0.6096 0.4113 0.2507
Finish an engineering degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0759*** 0.0291 0.9269*** 0.027
                Interacted with age parent 0.0016** 0.0008 1.0016** 0.0008
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.1931* 0.1127 1.213* 0.1367
Child is female -3.2748*** 0.7721 0.0378*** 0.0292
Belong to OBC 0.1059 0.5407 1.1117 0.6011
Belong to SC/ST -1.0623 0.6577 0.3457 0.2274
Finish a medical doctor's degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.0732** 0.0296 0.9294** 0.0276
                Interacted with age parent 0.0015** 0.0008 1.0015** 0.0008
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.1351 0.115 1.1447 0.1316
Child is female -3.7686*** 0.9199 0.0231*** 0.0212
Belong to OBC 0.0706 0.5591 1.0732 0.6
Belong to SC/ST -0.9498 0.6617 0.3868 0.256
Finish a master's degree
Percentage of financial support expected of the child -0.062** 0.026 0.94** 0.024
                Interacted with age parent 0.001** 0.001 1.001** 0.001
The ideal age of marriage for boys/girls 0.479 0.108 1.615 0.175
Child is female -2.414*** 0.848 0.089*** 0.076
Belong to OBC -0.334 0.561 0.716 0.402
Belong to SC/ST -1.371** 0.635 0.254** 0.161
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Includes all children up to the age of 18 currently enrolled in school except for the ones with 
missing data. Controlled for wealth, credit constraints, time preferences and selection effects. The mean and averages are computed 
following the procedure outlined in Table 4, and then averaged across the various levels of, respectively, primary and secondary, and 
higher education. The net contributions at the time of marriage are predicted on the basis of recall data (on dowry, education of bride 
and groom, joint versus nuclear family status, village and caste) on these contributions from the same villages. Note that as the 
recall data contains few children who received higher education, these estimates might be imprecise at these higher education 
levels. The percentage of family members who did no or some higher education is based on the education level of all members of 
the extended family older than 18 years of age (of the same gender) as reported by the decision maker. N=424. 8th standard is also 
included in the analysis but results not shown. 
Odds RatioCoefficient
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3.7 Discussion
This paper looks at the role of social norms, customs and pressures in the aspi-
rations parents have for their children with regard to education in rural India.
I take advantage of a detailed child level dataset which includes information
on determinants of these aspirations which are usually unobservable, such as
the perceived returns to education and expected contribution of the child to the
household income at old age. This detailed child level information allows me,
for the first time, to empirically disentangle the various sources of social norms,
customs and pressures in the education decision in a developing country.
Consistent with the national level statistics on attained education, I find that
the educational aspirations are lower for girls compared to boys, and for the
backward castes compared to the upper castes. Only 39% of the girls would be
allowed (by the parents) to pursue higher education, compared to 71% of the
boys and 70% of the UC individuals are allowed to continue higher education,
compared to 42% to 44% of the backward castes.
I find that parent’s aspirations are a (complex) function of the landholding,
the value of the other assets, time preferences and the age of the decision maker,
the perceived costs and returns to education, the education of the extended fam-
ily members, and the prevailing social norms, customs and pressures with re-
gard to marriage and old age care.
Incompletemarkets seem to affect the aspirations of parents in a critical man-
ner. Lack of credit access inhibits investment in higher education for poorer
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families and leads older decision makers (who are closer to retirement age) to
demand a return to education when the child is younger compared to younger
decision makers. Incomplete land and labor markets imply that land cannot be
sold easily to finance education and that the opportunity cost of the children’s
time is sometimes more that what they actually would contribute to the family
income as the family cannot always substitute hired labor for family labor.
With regard to the social norms, the minimum amount of education parents
aspire for their children is influenced by the ideal age of marriage they have
in mind and the effect of education on the expected dowry. Increasing the age
of marriage with one year, changes the relative odds of aspiring 10th standard,
rather than 12th standard, by a factorof 0.86, and the relative odds of aspiring
a bachelor’s degree, rather than 12th standard, by a factorof 1.30. Increasing
the expected dowry of a specific education level with 1000 Rs, increases the
relative odds of aspiring that particular level, rather than 12th standard, by a
factorof 1.02. Caste and gender does not affect the relative odds ratio of aspiring
a bachelors’ degree rather than 12th standard, but does have the expected impact
on the relative odds ratio of aspiring 10th standard, rather than 12the standard,
with lower aspirations for female and lower caste children.
The maximum amount of education parents aspire for, i.e., the maximum
their child would be allowed to complete, depends, in addition also on the fi-
nancial contribution expected from the child at old age, but in a non-linear man-
ner. Increasing the child’s contribution with 1 %, increases the relative odds ra-
tio of choosing a bachelor’s degree, rather than 12th standard, by a factorof 1.03
and decreases the relative odds ratio of choosing 10th standard, rather than 12th
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standard, by a factorof 0.94. This increase (decrease) is smaller (larger) if the re-
spondent is older, i.e., closer to ”retirement”. The same pattern cannot be found
for engineering, medical doctor and a master’s degree. The education level of
the extended family matters, but in not in the way that one would expect it
to matter. Increasing the percentage of family members who have obtained a
particular level decreases the relative odds ratio of aspiring for that particular
level, rather than 12th standard, by a factorof 0.97. This finding points to edu-
cational complementarity rather than social pressures, i.e., an extended family
might find it useful to have at least one engineer, or one medical doctor, or one
teacher in the family. Again, there is a remaining caste and gender effect for
some of the education levels, in particular for all higher education levels in the
case of girls, and for master’s and standard 10 in the caste of lower castes.
These results (partially) confirm the findings of Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001), who find that patrilocal exogamy reduces the investment in girls, and
show that in rural India, as in rural Bangladesh (Field and Ambrus ,2009), the
young age of marriage (of girls) impedes investment in education. Even though
I use a very different method compared to Field and Ambrus, the results are
similar, delaying marriage with one year results in (on average) 0.22 to 0.33 ad-
ditional years of education, versus 0.22 additional years of education following
Field and Ambrus. As the dowry depends both on the education of the groom
as well as the bride, it is difficult to directly test the predictions of Lahira and
Self (2007). It is clear however that even though male education might increase
dowry and female education might decrease dowry, dowry has no straightfor-
ward effect on the education chosen as social status comes into play.
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A limitation of this study is the lack of data on (perceived) direct cost of ed-
ucation. These costs were only elicited for one of the villages, Dokur. While the
direct cost of education is largely fixed at the caste level in each village up to 12th
standard (as the various prices are fixed by the respective state governments),
the direct costs of higher education seem to be institution specific. Even though
the analysis controls for the cost of education, by relying on school level cost
data up to 12th standard and the direct costs, as recalled by the respondents, for
higher education, it is not unlikely that there is some unobservable variation left
in this regard. From the Dokur dataset it appears that returns and direct costs
are positively correlated at the child level, and hence it is not unlikely that the
coefficients on the (perceived) returns to education are somewhat downward
biased.
In addition, the fact that for over one hundred children, the respondent had
absolutely ”no idea” of the returns to education is not only worrisome intrinsi-
cally, but also might have affected the analysis. At a minimum, losing one fifth
of the sample affects the standard errors of the estimated coefficients., especially
because the lost observations all belong to the lower tail of the socioeconomic
distribution. One could imagine that these children are in a way different from
the children in the analysis, and that these unobservables biased some of the
coefficients estimated.
To conclude, using a fertile setting, rural India, and detailed data set, this pa-
per takes a first step in distinguishing between the role of various marriage, old
age and education related social norms and customs in the aspirations parents
have for their children. I show that aspirations are a complex function of wealth,
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(perceived) costs and returns to education, time preferences and age, and that
multiple customs and norms matter, but all are equally important.
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CHAPTER 4
WHY FARMERS SOMETIMES LOVE RISKS: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
4.1 Introduction
In developing countries, where the majority of the population depends on agri-
culture, incomes are considerably more variable due to variations in rainfall,
crop diseases, etc. As few insurance possibilities exist, attitudes towards risk are
crucial determinants of economic decisions, and investment behavior in partic-
ular. As such, it is not surprising that a large empirical literature has emerged
with the goal of measuring attitudes towards risk.
In this paper, we investigate how credit constraints and the existence of a
production set shaped by the various technologies available to farmers (such as
irrigated versus non-irrigated, educated versus non-educated) may influence
farmers’ attitudes with regard to risk in a way which does not correspond with
the traditional measure of risk aversion based on the curvature of the Bernoulli
utility function.
We take advantage of a unique individual-level dataset collected among In-
dian farmers, which contains information on their assets, income in addition to
their attitudes with regard to risk. These attitudes were elicited via farmer’s
evaluations of hypothetical but realistic farm alternatives involving various
risky outcomes. Each alternative was presented as a probability distribution
over yield outcomes which the farmer evaluated in terms of willingness-to-pay.
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Using these data, we test a simple model of forward-looking dynamic risk
behavior, inspired by Lybbert et al. (2010). This model distinguishes be-
tween the familiar static concept of risk aversion (based on the curvature of the
Bernoulli utility function) and forward-looking dynamic risk responses. The lat-
ter take into account the fact that, in the absence of credit markets, a lucky draw
might enable the farmer to make a large fixed cost investment which would al-
low the farmer to move to a higher level equilibrium characterized by a higher
annual income, and consequently a higher standard of living.
We find that 85 % of the farmers are willing to pay more for a distribution
which is second-order stochastically dominated by the baseline distribution, in-
dicating risk-loving behavior. Across distributions, the farmers pay a dispro-
portionate amount of attention to the probability of best yield outcome (which
is double the size of the worst yield outcome). The estimated effect of increasing
the probability of the best outcome by 10% is about 4 times the estimated effect
of decreasing the probability of the worst outcome by 10%.
The results of our analysis support the model proposed. We find that risk
taking behavior can be (partially) explained by the need for a large fixed-cost
investment, such as, having school going children or dryland. This implies that
standard measures of risk aversion which look only at contemporaneous deci-
sions, whether they are inferred from observed economic behavior using struc-
tural models of behavior combined with econometric techniques, or elicited via
experimental techniques, might not be able to capture and predict actual invest-
ment behavior under risk.
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Among the studies that look at farmers’ risk preferences using experimental
data from developing countries, this study relates most closely to the work of
Binswanger (1980), Dillon and Scandizzo (1978), Just and Lybbert (2009), Liu
(2008) and Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009). Binswanger (1980) measures attitudes
towards risk among the same households studied in this paper (about 30 years
ago) using two methods: an experimental approach with real and hypothet-
ical payoffs of various magnitudes and an interview method. The results of
the experimental method indicate that, at medium sized payoff levels (equiva-
lent to the monthly salary of an unskilled laborer) virtually all individuals are
moderately risk averse with little variation according to personal characteris-
tics. He finds no statistical difference in the risk aversion estimates based on
real gambles versus hypothetical gambles, but a larger coefficient of partial risk
aversion when comparing high stakes gambles to low stakes gambles. Dillon
and Scandizzo (1978) assess risk attitudes of samples of small farm owners and
sharecroppers in Brazil using hypothetical, high stakes (within the range of the
farmers’ yearly income), questions involving choices between risky and sure
farm alternatives. Results indicate that most but not all peasants are risk averse.
Just and Lybbert (2009) use low stakes experimental data from farmers in India
with real payoffs. Measuring risk aversion as the change in valuation between
two gambles with the same expected value but a different variance, they find
that about half of the farmers are risk averse. Liu (2008), using a low stakes real
experimental method, finds evidence of both risk and loss aversion among Chi-
nese cotton farmers, in addition to the overweighting of low probabilities. Yesuf
and Bluffstone (2009), using medium stakes real payoffs experiments from the
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Ethiopia, find that depending on the expected payoff and range, one-third to
two-thirds of households are severely or extremely risk-averse.
Among the studies that derive risk aversion econometrically from observed
behavior, the results of this study could be compared with Moscardi and De
Janvry (1977) and Antle (1987) who also study farmers in developing coun-
tries. Moscardi and De Janvry (1977) who derive risk aversion from the ob-
served choice of fertilizers find that risk aversion is high among Mexican farm-
ers. Antle (1987), also using econometric techniques to estimate risk aversion
from observed choice of labor allocation and fertilizers among rice farmers in
Aurepalle village, one of the villages we investigate as well, finds that farmers
are both Arrow-Pratt and downside risk averse. His overall estimates are in
the same range as the experimental estimates obtained by Binswanger (1980),
but he finds considerably more heterogeneity in the population, ranging from
nearly risk neutral to risk averse.
Conceptually, this paper is linked to the work of Lybbert and Barrett (forth-
coming) and Lybbert et al. (2010). Lybbert and Barrett theoretically link noncon-
vex asset dynamics to risk preferences. Nonconvex asset dynamics can lead to
the existence of a poverty trap, i.e., a low-level dynamic stable equilibrium in a
system of multiple equilibria, and thresholds, i.e., a middle-level unstable equi-
librium which separates the asset path dynamics towards the low-level equilib-
rium from those toward the high-level equilibrium. They show that even when
the utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, observed behav-
ior may suggest that risk aversion actually increases with wealth near perceived
dynamic asset thresholds. Lybbert et al. (2010) continue this analysis and show
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via Markov simulations that ignoring this dynamic risk response introduces a
bias in static estimates of risk aversion. One underestimates risk aversion for
individuals just under the dynamic threshold and overestimates risk aversion
for individuals just over the threshold.1 This is due to the fact that ”those with
wealth just below the threshold value the gamble more because a lucky draw
can push them to a more favorable dynamic path, while those just above the
threshold value it substantially less because the gamble threatens their other-
wise safe wealth position”.
More generally, this paper answers the call of Just and Pope (2003) who ar-
gue that many alternative explanations can be offered for observed behavior
under risk, only one of which is curvature of the utility function. The observed
risk response might be due to preferences (risk aversion), technology, physical
constraints, or financial asymmetries and in order to properly infer or measure
risk aversion from observed choices, one must carefully isolate the impacts of
these factors. So in this paper, we look at the role of technology and financial
constraints in shaping the attitudes towards risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section de-
scribes the study site. Section 3 describes the risk experiment in detail, discusses
selected descriptive statistics and provides some preliminary results. In section
4 we outline a simple model of behavior under risk which we then test in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
1Using a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3, they find that one could under/over esti-
mate risk aversion by a factor of 3.
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4.2 Description of the study site
Table 4.1 introduces the three villages selected for this study. These villages have
been followed for over 35 years by the Village Level Studies (VLS) program of
the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).2
The experimental data were collected by the first author in 2007-2008 among
205 of the 246 ICRISAT-VLS respondents in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed.3
Table 4.1: Basic descriptive statistics of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
Number of households in village 925 319 189
Number of households in sample 128 63 55
Number of households in the experiment 95 57 54
Median rainfall (mm/year)¹ 434 748 745
Distance to nearest town (km) 10 9 12
Average land owned (acre) 3.39 5.24 5.92
Average number of household members 4.23 4.87 4.50
Average yearly income (Rs)² 43,543 53,720 38,087
Average education level of respondent (in years) 2.31 6.61 6.89
Average maximum level of education in HH (in years) 7.08 10.41 10
% of young adults enrolled in educational institute3 32 32 27
% of households that farm cotton4 60 84 82
Average cotton yield [Q/acre] 8.97 3.5 1.88
% of cotton farmers that adopt Bt cotton4 77 51 11
% of cotton plots that are irrigated 24 12 2
% of respondents who have access to irrigation 42 30 27
% of respondents with access to bank credit5 1.12 17.54 0
Notes: The average/percentage/median statistics refer to the sample in each village in 2007-08 unless otherwise noted; ¹2001-2007; 
²2004-2005, per household; 3These young adults include al l the individuals between the ages of 15 and 26; 42001-08; 5The respondent 
was asked to imagine he would need credit for agricultural inputs, who would he approach and how likely would he be to receive credit 
from this individual/organization. Multiple answers were possible. This percentage mentioned here corresponds to the respondents who 
said they have access to government bank or private bank credit.
2ICRISAT followed 300 households from six villages every three weeks during the period
1975-1985 . This dataset, known as the first generation VLS, contains detailed household and
plot level data. In 2001, ICRISAT restarted the panel, revisiting 185 of the first generation VLS
households and their split-offs, in addition to 261 newly added households, to make the sample
representative for each village in terms of land-holding size. For an overview of the goals,
methods and outcomes of the first and second generation VLS, respectively, see (i) Singh et al.
(1985) and Walker and Ryan (1990) and (ii) Bantilan et al. (2006) and Rao and Charyulu (2007).
3Due to the nature of the experiment, we could only conduct it among the ICRISAT-VLS
respondents who have farmed in the past seven years or were thinking of farming in the future.
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Aurepalle, with 925 households, is the largest of the three villages. It is
located in the drought-prone, poor, Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh and
in terms of average income situated between the richer Kanzara and poorer
Kinkhed. Kanzara and Kinkhed, with 319 and 189 households, respectively, are
located in the less drought-prone Akola district of West Maharashtra. The VLS
sample includes 128, 63 and 55 households in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed,
respectively. In both Akola villages, households own, on average, 5-6 acres of
land. In Aurepalle, this is significantly less, about 3.2 acres. The average size of
a household is between 4 and 5 members in all three villages.
The average education level of the respondent (i.e., the main decision-maker
with regard to agriculture) is low, especially in Aurepalle (2.31 years), but as
enrollment is relatively high (93 % up the children between 6 and 15 years of age
are in school in the sample), the average education level of the next generation
can be expected to be much higher. The current (average) maximum level of
education in the household is 7 years in Aurepalle, and 10 years in Kanzara and
Kinkhed. The enrollment rate drops sharply at the higher education level, only
21 % of the 19 to 21 year old are enrolled in an education institute. This might
be partially due to credit constraints. Higher education is expensive in India,
ranging from thousand to hundred thousand Rs for a degree. Very few of the
farmers in Aurepalle and Kinkhed report having access to bank credit and only
about 18 % in Kanzara claims to have access to bank credit.
As is typical for this region of India, cotton is the main cash crop in all three
villages. Over 80 % of the households in Kanzara and Kinkhed farmed cotton
in the last seven years. In Aurepalle, due to the relatively large number of land-
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less families, this number is lower, 60 %. The average cotton yield in 2007-08 is
around 9 Q/acre in Aurepalle, 3.5 Q/acre in Kanzara and 2 Q/acre in Kinkhed.4
As the average cotton yield in Kanzara and Kinkhed was lower in 2007-08 com-
pared to the previous years due to excess rainfall and flooding, it’s really only
the Kinkhed farmers who were presented with a distribution that (on average)
significantly exceeded what they are usually getting.
Losses in cotton production in this region are mainly due to its predomi-
nant cultivation under rainfed conditions and its susceptibility to 166 different
species of insects, pests and diseases. As such, the yield and profit an indi-
vidual farmer obtains is very much dependent on the pest protection used and
whether or not the farmer has access to a functional irrigation source. One of the
new pest protection technologies available in India is the genetically modified
Bt cotton. Bt cotton cultivars contain a gene sourced from the soil bacterium
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) in their DNA sequence which produces a protein that
is toxic to bollworms, one of the major pests affecting cotton production in In-
dia. The difference in average yield therefore largely reflects the difference in
Bt cotton and irrigation uptake rates between the villages. Among the cotton
farmers, 77 %, 51 % and 11 % have adopted Bt cotton since it was introduced in
the region in 2002, in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed, respectively.
While the Bt cotton seeds can be priced up to four times the non-Bt price, Bt
farmers on average still do better than non-Bt farmers.5 In Aurepalle, the aver-
age profit of Bt cotton farming stood at 7,760 Rs/acre (st. dev. 6,055 Rs/acre).
41 Quintal (Q) = 100 kg.
5For more details on the profitability of Bt cotton versus non Bt cotton in these villages,
taking into account the use of other inputs and farmer-fixed unobservables such as soil quality,
see Maertens (2010).
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In Kanzara the average profit of Bt cotton farming stood at 7,760 Rs/acre (st.
dev.5,299 Rs/acre) versus 1,367 Rs/acre (st. dev. 3,056 Rs/acre) for non-Bt cot-
ton. In Kinkhed the average profit of Bt cotton farming stood at 1,176 Rs/acre
(st. dev.3,842 Rs/acre) versus 153 Rs/acre (st. dev. 2,762 Rs/acre) for non-Bt
cotton.
In 2007-08, 42 %, 30 % and 27 % of the respondents in Aurepalle, Kanzara
and Kinkhed, respectively, reported to have access to irrigation as some point
in time during the year. In Aurepalle, 24 % of the cotton plots in were irri-
gated, versus 12 % in Kanzara and 2 % in Kinkhed.6 Irrigation not only reduces
rainfall related risks during the rainy season but also allows for cultivation dur-
ing the dry season. Both surface water (rivers, canals, ponds and basins) and
groundwater (wells) are used as irrigation sources. The water is applied on the
field through flood irrigation, drip irrigation or sprinkler irrigation. The cost
of a well or a drip/sprinkler irrigation system is substantial, amounting to sev-
eral times the (average) annual income and the investment entails some risk as
not all wells successfully reach the groundwater table. Considering the benefits
of irrigation in the rainy season, the average profit for an irrigated cotton plot
is 6,030 Rs/acre (st. dev. 8,298 Rs/acre) versus 4,051 Rs/acre (st. dev. 5,348
Rs/acre) for an unirrigated plot.
6Note that cotton is a rainy season crop, and that Kanzara and Kinkhed receive - on average
- more rainfall and, as such, there might be less need for supplementary irrigation during the
rainy season in those villages compared to Aurepalle.
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4.3 Description of the experiment and preliminary results
Typically, the experimental approach to measuring risk aversion elicits individ-
uals’ preference ranking over two gambles or their Willingness-to-Pay (WTP)
for a certain gamble. Imposing Expected Utility (EU), one can use these data
to derive a measure of risk aversion for each individual. Or one could extend
the EU approach to include various behavioral anomalies, such as, ambiguity
aversion, loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting7 (Engle-Warnick et
al. 2006, Liu 2008).
In this study, the farmers’ attitudes towards risk were appraised via their
evaluations of hypothetical but realistic farm alternatives involving various
risky outcomes. The experiments were conducted among all ICRISAT-VLS re-
spondents who have farmed in the past seven years or who were thinking of
farming in the future. Henceforward, we will refer to this set of respondents as
the ”farmers”.
Concretely, the risk experiment, based on Lybbert and Just (2007) and Just
and Lybbert (2009), consists of four hypothetical farming seasons.8 For each
7Ambiguity aversion (also known as uncertainty aversion) describes a preference for known
risks over unknown risks. Loss aversion says that people are significantly more averse to losses
relative to the status quo than they are attracted by gains, and more generally that people’s util-
ities are determined by changes in wealth rather than by absolute levels. Non-linear probability
weighting refers to over or under weighting certain probabilities in the distribution.
8The effect of using hypothetical payments versus real payments has not yet been settled in
the literature. The validity depends on the nature of the experiment and elicitation method. In
this case, ”the subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences” (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979, p. 265) as their decision has no financial consequences. hence, it is often
considered preferable to use high hypothetical payments over the low real payments that would
have been feasible within the project’s budget. Binswanger (1980) confirms that in the VLS-
ICRISAT villages hypothetical and real gambles eliciting risk preferences produce comparable
results. However, Holt and Laury (2002) find that respondents behave more risk loving when
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”season” the farmer was asked how much he would be willing to pay for a bag
of cotton seed that gives a particular yield distribution (sufficient to sow one
acre of cotton). We used Fisher Price building blocks, vertically stacked, to rep-
resent cotton yield distributions (in quintal (Q) per acre). Each block represents
5%. We started with two trial distributions to learn the game and then did four
experiments, in the order reflected in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Risk experiment design
Distribut ion 1 Distribution 2 Distribution 3 Distribution 4
4 Q/acre 25 30 30 10
6 Q/acre 50 40 30 55
8 Q/acre 25 30 40 35
Average 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.5
Standard deviation 2.0 2.4 2.8 1.6
Note: 1 quintal (Q) = 100kg
The first baseline distribution, has an average yield of 6 Q/acre and a stan-
dard deviation of 2 Q/acre. The second distribution has the same average, but
a higher standard deviation than the first distribution, namely 2.4 Q/acre. Thus
the first distribution second-order stochastically dominates the second distribu-
tion. The third distribution has a higher average yield than the first one, but
also a considerably higher standard deviation, 6.2 Q/acre and 2.76 Q/acre, re-
spectively. The fourth distribution first-order stochastically dominates the first
distribution with an average of 6.5 Q/acre and 1.55 Q/acre. Comparing these
outcomes with the average yield levels in the villages in 2007-08, one can see
that for the Aurepalle farmers, this distribution is at the lower end of what they
are currently achieving, and for the Akola farmers this distribution it’s at the
higher end.
using hypothetical experiments. See also and Laury and Holt (2008) for a general discussion of
this topic.
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Using information on individual-level output prices and costs for inputs
other than seeds, one can derive the respective profit distributions from these
yield distributions.9 The average output price is 2,086 Rs/Q (st. dev. 253
Rs/Q). There is little variation between farmers, but some variation between
states (Andhra Pradesh versus Maharashtra). The average costs of inputs, other
than seeds (not including the costs of the quasi fixed investments such as land,
irrigation and machinery) is 5,781 Rs/acre (st. dev. 2,942 Rs/acre).
Table 4.3 presents the main descriptive statistics of the WTP for the various
distributions outlined in Table 4.2.10 Recall that the first distribution second-
order stochastically dominates the second distribution. A risk averse farmer
obeying standard EUT should be willing to pay less for the latter. The summary
results in Table 4.4 indicate that this is often not the case. The average WTP
for the first distribution is 495 Rs in Aurepalle, 643 Rs in Kanzara and 1,141 Rs
in Kinkhed and the average WTP for the second distribution is 546 Rs in Au-
repalle, 647 Rs in Kanzara and 1,370 Rs in Kinkhed. As indicated in Table 4.4,
in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkhed, 100 %, 45 % and 98 %, respectively, of the
9To obtain these individual level output prices and input costs, we regress the output price
and input costs of 2007-08 on numbers of children, numbers of adult household members,
acreage of dryland, acreage of irrigated land, soil fertility (howmany plots the farmer has of self-
reported good and very good quality), education of the decision maker and a village dummy
variable. The input cost excluded the cost of seed but includes including the value of family
labor and self-produced inputs. Using the predicted values instead of the actual values has the
advantage that one has a value for all farmers, not only the ones who farmed cotton in 2007-08,
and that one avoids the bias caused by unobservables which are correlated with both price and
the other explanatory variables in the main regression. See also Appendix A.
10In the case of Kanzara and Kinkhed, the WTP is often lower than the minimum profit in
any of the gambles. Informal conversations with the respondents after the experiment took
place revealed that if the actual seed price would exceed what the farmer was willing to pay, the
farmer would still invest his time, money and land in a different crop, cultivar or activity. For
instance, the farmer could lease out his land, cultivate pulses and grain for self-consumption
only or leave the land idle. This implies that, unlike in the case of small stakes experiments,
where the outside option of ”not accepting the bet” is the initial wealth level, in our experiments,
the outside option is the next best investment plus the initial wealth level.
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respondents were willing to pay more for the second distribution than the first.
The differences between Aurepalle and Kanzara, on the one hand, and Kinkhed
on the other, in terms of absolute numbers could be partially explained by the
fact that Kinkhed farmers have a lower reference point as their average cotton
yield is lower. Likewise, the fourth distribution first-order stochastically domi-
nates the first one, yet 46 % of the respondents in Kanzara preferred the first dis-
tribution over the fourth distribution.11 This is strange, but might be explained
by the fact that may be not all respondents could recall the first distribution by
the time they were asked about the fourth distribution.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of Willingness-to-Pay
VILLAGE = AUREPALLE (N=95)
Distribution1 Distribut ion 2 Distribution3 Distribution 4
Mean 495.21 546.21 647.63 743.11
St. Deviation 187.35 232.75 338.62 395.26
Median 465 500 600 660
Min 200 260 280 360
Max 1500 2000 3000 3500
VILLAGE = KANZARA (N=57)
Distribution1 Distribut ion 2 Distribution3 Distribution 4
Mean 643.42 647.81 757.89 721.93
St. Deviation 306.21 336.88 380.32 385.22
Median 550 550 650 600
Min 200 150 200 200
Max 1800 2000 2100 2000
VILLAGE = KINKHED (N=54)
Distribution1 Distribut ion 2 Distribution3 Distribution 4
Mean 1141.67 1370.37 1597.22 1481.48
St. Deviation 344.46 401.83 445.25 419.60
Median 1100 1300 1600 1500
Min 250 350 400 500
Max 2000 2200 2600 2500
11Note that as 94 percent of the farmers reports having access to credit for small loans, paying
for seeds should not be a problem.
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Table 4.4: Further characterizing Willingness-to-Pay
[in percentage]
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
Pay more for distribution 2 than for distribution 1 100 45 98
Pay more for distribution 1 than for distribution 4 0 46 0
To get a better understanding of what drives these WTP, we regressed the
WTP on the probabilities of the distributions, education level, income, (pre-
dicted) input costs and (predicted) output prices.12 Note that we corrected the
standard errors through bootstrapping, as the input costs and output prices are
both predicted variables and, as such, may have artificially low standard errors.
Table 4.5 presents the results of this analysis. Model 1 is the basic set-up. Model
2 includes also the 2007-08 cotton output as a regressor, as this may influence
the results by setting a reference point in the farmer’s mind. Note the number
of observations used to estimate model is substantially less than model 1 as it
includes only the respondents who farmed cotton in 2007-08, as opposed to all
farmers. Model 3 includes individual fixed effects.
The results in Table 4.5 indicate that the WTP is largely driven by the proba-
bility of the best outcome. Increasing the probability of the best outcome by 10
% increases the WTP by, on average, 152 to 157 Rs, while increasing the prob-
ability of the worst outcome with the same magnitude decreases the WTP by,
on average, 32 to 37 Rs. A standard EU model with a concave Bernoulli util-
ity function would imply that the magnitude of the effect of an increase of the
probability of the worst outcome is larger than the corresponding effect of an
12Note that even when one uses a simple expected utility model to explain the variation in
the WTP, the WTP will depend in a non-linear manner on the characteristics of the distribution
of the outside option and the distribution of the gamble presented to the respondent, the output
price and input cost, and the respondent’s preferences with regard to risk and time.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Willingness-to-Pay
OLS regression / fixed effects
Fixed effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Probability to obtain 4 Q/acre -390.605** -326.576** -366.859***
(178.65) (172.015) (52.642)
Probability to obtain 8 Q/acre 1578.763*** 1554.009*** 1572.489***
(231.039) (237.819) (80.654)
Output price, predicted (Rs/Q) 0.097 0.77*
(0.447) (0.414)
Input costs, predicted (Rs/acre) -0.063 -0.065
(0.037) (0.041)
Education level of decision-maker (years) 3.998 1.540
(5.208) (5.360)
Wealth (land) per capita (1000 Rs) -1.256** -0.336
(0.411) (0.306)
Wealth (other assets) per capita (1000 Rs) 0.265 -0.150
(0.214) (0.327)
Aurepalle fixed effect 295.917 487.973**
(205.445) (222.423)
Kinkhed fixed effect 687.224*** 735.044***
(60.524) (69.405)
Output produced in 2007-08 (Q/acre) -8.017
(7.385)
Constant 287.652 -1169.04 414.547***
(904.709) (852.547) (20.626)
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; bootstrapped (N=10000) standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. Number 
of observations model 1 = 820; number of observations model  2 = 516; number of observations model 3 = 824; Adj. Rsquare model 1 = 
0.50; Adj. Rsquare model 2 = 0.59 . For one farmer we did not have the education level , this observation was left out. The value of other 
assets was estimated using the 2006-07 ICRISAT data.
OLS
WTP
increase of the probability of the best outcome. As such, it is clear that standard
EUT will not explain the variation in the data well.
Overall, the three models give very similar results. The output produced in
the last season, 2007-08, has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on
WTP in model 2. However, as the regressions include a village fixed effect, one
cannot conclude from this result that the reference point has no impact on WTP,
as the village fixed effects might be absorbing the majority of this variation.
Increasing the output price of cotton has, as expected, a positive effect on
WTP, which is only significantly different from zero at the 10% level in model 2.
And increasing the input costs has a negative effect onWTP, which is almost sig-
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nificantly different from zero at the 10% level in model 2. We included two sep-
arate wealth controls as asset market imperfections are likely to constrain sub-
stitution across types of wealth. Increasing the value of land owned (per capita)
decreasesWTP. Increasing the value of all the other assets (per capita), which in-
clude livestock, residence, agricultural machinery and savings, increases WTP.
The Aurepalle and Kinkhed fixed effects are substantial in magnitude. These
fixed effects could be capturing time preferences, the outside options available
to the farmer if the ”bet” is rejected, or reference point effects. The positive sign
implies that the outside options for farmers in Kinkhed are less favorable com-
pared to the Kanzara farmers. Education, which could influence WTP through
changing the outside option of the farmer, does not appear to influence WTP.
These preliminary results seem to reject a simple model of expected utility
maximization with a unique concave Bernoulli utility function. Instead, we find
that farmers pay a disproportionate amount of attention to the likelihood of the
best outcome.
We propose the following explanation for this phenomenon. Imagine that
a farmer is credit constrained and there are various production functions avail-
able to him, the optimum which depends, among others, on his level of capital
(e.g., land). In such a case, it might be optimal for a farmer to take on risky
projects (as long as subsistence is guaranteed), and utilize the high returns (if
realized) to make a large investment, such as installing an irrigation system or
investing in higher education which would allow the farmer tomove to a higher
production function, and consequently, a higher income level and standard of
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living in future periods. The next section presents a simple two period model,
describing such a behavior.
4.4 A simple model of behavior under risk
In this section we present a simple two-period model to motivate the empir-
ical specification. The model is inspired by the work of Lybbert and Barrett
(forthcoming) and Lybbert et al. (2010). We purposely abstract from several
aspects of the agricultural decision making process, such as, the pesticide and
fertilizer, and other variable input decisions, with the goal of focussing on the
discrete technology choice in the first period. In addition, we assume the farmer
is credit constrained (he has no access to credit), has a fixed amount of land L¯,
no savings in the first period and no irrigation system set up in the first period.
Assume that the farmer, in each time period t 2 f1; 2g (denoted by a sub-
script), can choose between two technologies: a ’safe’ technology which always
yields f (L;R) where R indicates whether or not the land is irrigated (R 2 f0; 1g),
and a ’risky’ technology which yields f (L;R)    with probability 1=2 and
f (L;R) +  with probability 1=2, with  > 0 denoting the random component
of the production function. Assume that f (L¯; 1) > f (L¯; 0), meaning, irrigation
increases the average land productivity.
The per-period Bernoulli utility function is denoted as u(c), where c denotes
consumption. We assume that this function is strictly increasing and strictly
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concave, i.e., the farmer is risk averse. Acquiring an irrigation system requires
a lump sum fixed investment r > 0.
In each period, the farmer has to first make a choice between the two avail-
able technologies, and then decide whether or not to invest in an irrigation sys-
tem. The uncertainty of the risky technology is resolved in between these two
decisions, i.e., after the farmer chooses the technology but before the investment
decision is made.
In the second (and final) period, the farmer’s decision problem is, where E
is the expected value operator:
max
f; ft2;r2g
E [u(c2)] (4.1)
c2 = ft2(L¯;R2)   r2
r2 2 f0; rg
ft2 2
n
f (L¯;R2); f (L¯;R2)  
o
It is clear that, as this is the final period, r2 = 0. The farmer will compare the
expected utility of the safe technology, u( f (L;R2)), and the expected utility of the
risky technology:
1
2
u( f (L¯;R2)   ) + 12u( f (L¯;R2) + ) (4.2)
As the farmer’s Bernoulli utility function is (strictly) concave:
u( f (L¯;R2)) >
1
2
u( f (L¯;R2)   ) + 12u( f (L¯;R2) + ) (4.3)
So the farmer will opt for the safe technology in the second period.
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In the first period, the farmer will take into account his choices of the second
period and will face the following decision problem:
max
f ft1;r1g
E [c(c1) + u(c2)] (4.4)
c1 = ft1(L¯; 0)   r1
c2 = f (L¯;R2)
R2 =
0 if r1 = 0
1 if r1 = r
r1 2 f0; rg
ft1 2
n
f (L¯; 0); f (L¯; 0)  
o
Assume that:
u( f (L¯; 0))   u( f (L¯; 0)   r) > u( f (L¯; 1)   u( f (L¯; 0)  C(L¯) (4.5)
(4.5) states that if the farmer opts for the safe technology, he will not invest in an
irrigation system. And assume that:
u( f (L¯; 0) + )   u( f (L¯; 0) +    c) < C(L¯) (4.6)
(4.6) states that if the farmer opts for the risky technology, and one obtains the
high yield, one will invest in an irrigation system. Then, if in addition:
C(L¯) > u( f (L¯; 0))   u( f (L¯; 0)   ) + u( f (L¯; 0)   u( f (L¯; 0) +    c) (4.7)
Under conditions (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7), one can show that the farmer will opt
for the risky technology in the first period and invest in the irrigation system if
and only if the farmer obtains the high yield.
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It is clear that whether these three conditions are satisfied depends on L¯; ; r
and the exact shape of the production and utility function. If the farmer has
irrigation installed already in the first period, he will never opt for the risky
option in this model.
4.5 Results
According to the model, the willingness to accept risk will depend on the
amount of dryland the farmer owns. One could imagine a similar model, substi-
tuting labor for land, and higher education for irrigation. In particular, farmers
who have school going children who are over the age of 15 years might ben-
efit substantially from a bumper yield, which would give them the option to
pay out-of-pocket for one or two years of higher education. Similarly, farmers
with a substantial amount of dryland might benefit from installing an irriga-
tion system, which would allow them to cultivate also in the dry season and
substantially increase (average) yield in the rainy season.
So, to test the basic implications of the model proposed we include informa-
tion on the asset position of the farmer, in particular, dryland, irrigated land and
school going children in a relevant age range.
In particular, we analyze the relationship between these assets and the will-
ingness to take on risks. Recall that distribution 1 second-order dominates dis-
tribution 2; therefore any risk averse farmer should prefer distribution 1. In
practise, we see that many farmers prefer distribution 2 (Table 4.4). We use the
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difference in WTP between distribution 2 and distribution 1 to reflect the will-
ingness to take on risks, i.e., the dependent variable is WTP2   WTP1. Figure
4.1 presents the distribution of the dependent variable. The mean of this distri-
bution is 84 Rs and the standard deviation is 127 Rs. We can see that the large
majority of the farmers are situated between 0 and 100 Rs.
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Figure 4.1: Difference in WTP
Table 4.6 presents the regression results. Note that as most farmers appeared
to be credit constrained, we did not include credit constraints as a separate re-
gressor. The first column, given for purpose of comparison, includes the stan-
dard set of variables: output price, input costs, education, income and village
fixed effects. The second column (model 2) adds the number of school going
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children above the age of 15 years, acreage of dryland and the acreage of irri-
gated land.13
Table 4.6: Determinants of difference in Willingness-to-Pay
OLS regression
Model 1 Model 2
Number of school children 17.153*
(10.075)
Dryland (acre) 7.293*
(4.164)
Dryland * dryland (acre) -0.235
(0.286)
Irrigated land (acre) 0.542
(3.981)
Irrigated land * irrigated land (acre) 0.097
(0.164)
Output price, predicted (Rs/Q) -0.274 -0.525**
(0.187) (0.245)
Input costs, predicted (Rs/acre) -0.015 -0.011
(0.017) (0.018)
Education level of decision-maker (years) 0.759 2.284
(2.844) (3.03)
Wealth (other assets) per capita (1000 Rs) -0.074 -0.13
(0.093) (0.128)
Aurepalle fixed effect 35.685 -40.13
(89.787) (100.876)
Kinkhed fixed effect 192.272*** 179.836***
(27.15) (28.923)
Constant 670.826** 1178.416**
(369.015) (496.394)
WTP2-WTP1
Notes: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; bootstrapped (N=10000) standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient. Number of observations model 1 = 205; number of observations model 2 = 205 ; Adj. 
Rsquare model 1 = 0.49; Adj Rsquare model 2 = 0.49. The dependent variable is the WTP for the second 
distribution minus the WTP for the first distribution. Note that as the majority of the farmers have either one or 
zero schoolgoing children, this effect captures really the dummy effect from having a schoolgoing child. See 
also notes of Table 5.   
The results in Table 4.6 indicate that having a school going child over the age
of 15 years in the household, statistically significant increases the difference in
WTP by, on average, 18 Rs. Increasing the dryland owned by one acre statisti-
13Asmost farmers have zero or one school going child above the age of 15, we did not include
a quadratic term for this variable.
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cally significant increases the difference in WTP by, on average, 7 Rs. Increasing
the acreage of irrigated land owned does not have a statistically significant im-
pact on the difference in WTP.
Increasing the output price decreases the difference in WTP. In model 2, in-
creasing the output price with 100 Rs, decreases the difference in WTP, on av-
erage, with 52 Rs. This number is statistically significant from zero at the 5%
level. There is little within village price variation in the output price of cotton,
but as the larger farmers tend to fetch a somewhat higher price (as they have
better storage, and often do not need cash urgently), this effect might partially
capture some residual, (uncontrolled) wealth effects.
The effects of input costs, education and income on the difference in WTP
are not significantly different from zero. Again, the village fixed effects are sub-
stantial. The difference between what one pays for the higher variance gamble
and the lower variance gamble is, on average, 180 to 192 Rs more for Kinkhed
farmers compared to Kanzara farmers (significantly different from zero at the
1% level). This might reflect the fact that for Kinkhed farmers the distributions
presented (significantly) exceed what they usually get, i.e., these distributions
very much exceed their expectations.
4.6 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine how forward-looking invest-
ment behavior influences risk behavior in the current period. We are able to
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take advantage of a unique data set, collected among farmers in India’s semi-
arid tropics, which contains information on farmer’s assets and the results of a
risk experiment.
This risk experiment consists of four hypothetical farming seasons. For each
season the farmer was asked how much he would be willing to pay for a bag of
cotton seed that gives a particular yield distribution. Comparing thewillingness
to pay for the various yield distributions, we find that 85 % of the farmers are
willing to pay more for a yield distribution which is second-order stochastically
dominated by the baseline distribution presented to them.
This is not consistent with what has been found to date in these contexts.
While none of the methods used in these studies are directly comparable to the
method we used in our study, it is useful to think through the reasons why
what we find might be different. Our study was set in the same villages as
Binswanger and Antle, but 30 years later. Our study elicits risk preferences
using hypothetical high stakes gambles which are explicitly forward-looking,
while these studies all use low to medium stakes gambles or an econometric
approach using data of input choices.
Using high stake gambles implies, by definition, that the farmer may stand
to gain and loose a substantial amount. The gains might be sufficient for a large
fixed-cost investment, which could shoot the farmer and his family to a higher
level equilibrium. For instance, one can use the returns of a bumper harvest to
invest in an irrigation system and be able to cultivate one’s land twice a year in-
stead of once a year from that point onwards. So as long as the potential losses
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do not bring the farmer and his family under some subsistence threshold, one
can understand how, if one takes into account the asset position of the farmer,
high stake gambles might be attractive for a certain set of farmers. Thinking
about risk preferences from this angle, it is also clear why this forward-looking
investment behavior would not be likely to impact risk preferences in case of
small stakes gambles, as, indeed, the proceeds from a small stakes gamble are
unlikely to be sufficient for the investment needed to move to a higher produc-
tion function.
We find evidence in the data that supports this explanation. For farmers
who are credit constrained, increasing the dryland owned by one acre increases
the difference in WTP between a high variance distribution and a low variance
distribution (with the same mean), by, on average, 4 Rs, which is 8 % of the
average difference in WTP. This indicates that farmers who own more dryland
are more risk loving compared to farmers who own less dryland or farmers who
own only irrigated land. Also, having one more school going child over the age
of 15 years in the household, increases the difference in WTP by, on average, 20
Rs, which is 20 % of the average difference in WTP. This indicates that farmers
who might want to invest in higher education of their children (but are credit
constrained) are more willing to take on risks compared to farmers who have
no school going children in this age range.
Note that we do not test the models by Lybbert and Barrett (forthcoming)
and Lybbert et al. (2010) directly. To test these model directly, one would have
to derive the dynamic asset threshold from the data, calculate the distance to
this asset threshold for each farmer and analyze the relationship between this
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position and the willingness to take risk. As in human capital is becoming more
and more important as part of the asset stock, this asset threshold would need
to take into account the education level of the various family members. This,
together with the fact that we do not have information on all assets in 2007-08,
and are missing information on the value of some of the critical assets such as
borewells and tubewells even for the earlier years, makes it difficult to pursue a
direct asset threshold based approach.
Also, when interpreting the results of this study one needs to keep in mind
that the experiments that we conducted were hypothetical, i.e., we did not actu-
ally pay out the farmers. The nature of the experiment, where we imitated the
experience of a farmer choosing a type of seed in the input dealer’s shop, would
not have allowed for an actual payout. Also, as the experiment was framed as
an actual purchase decision the farmers could easily relate to as it is a decision
they make each years, we are less worried about any bias originating from the
hypothetical method.
Binswanger (1980), who conducted monetary experiments among the same
households as we did, confirms that hypothetical and real gambles eliciting risk
preferences produce comparable results for low and medium stakes gambles.
However, Holt and Laury (2002), who conducted experiments with students at
three US universities find that respondents behave more risk loving when us-
ing hypothetical high stakes (over 100 US dollar) experiments versus real high
stakes experiment. They conclude that ”respondents cannot imagine how they
would actually behave under high-incentive conditions”. We hope that, as the
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experiment we conducted was framed as a seed buying experience, our respon-
dents had less problems imagining how they would react.
Finally note that the validity of the results also depend on the estimated
individual-level output price and input costs. If these are systematically over or
underestimated, and this bias is correlated with the variables of interest, such
as credit constraints, acreage of dryland or even the probabilities of the experi-
ment, the results will be incorrect.
To conclude, in this paper we provide a first empirical test of the role of
forward-looking investment behavior in risk behavior. We find that, when fac-
ing (realistic) high stakes gambles, the large majority of the farmers behave as if
they love risks. We find evidence of the following explanation for this risk lov-
ing behavior: in the absence of functioning credit markets, a lucky draw might
enable the farmer to make a large fixed-cost investment, such as an irrigation
system or higher education for one’s children. This investment could allow the
farmer, and his family, to move to a higher level equilibrium characterized by
a higher annual income, and consequently higher standard of living in future
periods.
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APPENDIX
Table 4.7: Predicting individual level output price and input cost
OLS regression output price input cost
[Rs/Q] [Rs/acre]
Number of members -11.3 216.8
(17.3) (155.8)
Number of adult members 20.3 -230.3
(22.3) (199.8)
Dryland (acres) 2.7 -5.7
(5.1) (45)
Irrigated land (acres) 3.4 40.6
(5.2) (40.9)
Access to a plot of good soil quality 50.8 1044.9
(81.2) (712.5)
Number of plots of good soil quality > 1 acre 14 -24.1
(20.6) (182.7)
Education level of decision-maker (years) 9.6 -2.7
(5.9) (53.7)
Aurepalle fixed effect -211.2*** 3763.8***
(57.8) (522.6)
Kinkhed f ixed effect -39.8 -799.3
(58.2) (508.2)
Constant 2037.1*** 3133.6***
(95.1) (836.7)
Notes: ** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; number of observations 130 ; Adj Rsquare output price = 0.23  ; 
Adj. Rsquare input costs 0.52.
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APPENDIX
The villages selected for this study are Aurepalle and Dokur in the Mahbub-
nagar district of Andhra Pradesh, Shirapur and Kalman in the Solapur district
in Maharashtra, and Kanzara and Kinkhed in the Akola district in Maharashtra.
I conducted the data collection in collaboration with the Village Level Study
program (VLS) villages of the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). This program has been collecting data in these six vil-
lages since 1975. The majority of the data collection was done by the ICRISAT
resident enumerators (junior investigators) who live in the villages. Some of the
data collection was done by myself (through translation), and by enumerators I
hired myself through the universities.
I structured the data collection in five rounds: (i) a qualitative round among
selected households, teachers and village pradhans (elected village leader) to
get some general insights and further narrow down the research topic, (ii) a
trial round during which I tried out the (largely) quantitative questionnaires,
(iii) a training round during which I trained the ICRISAT enumerators and the
enumerators I hired through the universities, (iv) an actual data collection round
during which the trained enumerators collected household and child level data,
in addition to village, school, and progressive farmers’ data, and (v) a data val-
idation round which happened after I checked each questionnaire for inconsis-
tencies – and where I went back to the villages to the respective households to
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ask the questions again which had problems. The entire process took almost 2
years, from October 2007 to July 2009.
This appendix provides an informal narrative of selected aspects of this data
collection process, focusing on the qualitative round and the trial round as these
shaped the final questionnaires. The final questionnaires are available from
my personal website (http://sites.google.com/site/maertensannemie/), in ad-
dition to the manuals used by the enumerators.
The qualitative round took place in October-November 2007. During this
trip, I visited all six villages, starting with Shirapur and Kalman, going on to
Kanzara and Kinkhed and finishing with Aurepalle and Dokur.
Schedule and general comments on the qualitative survey round
During this trip I tried to keep my main goals in mind (get a general idea of
what determines the education, market participation and technology adoption
decisions and decide on two specific topics for the two empirical papers needed
for my dissertation). The discussions ended up being semi-structured. I had
some topics I mind that I wanted to discuss with each family, but how much
each topic was explored depended on their answers.
The senior ICRISAT investigators of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh ac-
companied me throughout the entire trip. In the villages we met with the junior
ICRISAT investigators who reside in the villages. I conducted the interviews,
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together with the senior investigators. The junior investigators observed and
learned about the project.
The format of the interview – I ask a question – the senior investigator trans-
lates it – the answer comes back to me – I ask the next question, worked sur-
prisingly well. Due to the translation delay, I had plenty of time to write down
the answer and to observe the reactions of the people to my questions. In gen-
eral, people were very willing and happy to talk to me. The interviews lasted
between 1 and 1.5 hours per family, about 0.5 hours for the pradhan, teachers
and junior ICRISAT investigators.
I started the interview by stating that participation is voluntary and the re-
spondent could at each point in time withdraw from the interview and/or ask
us questions. At the end of each interview, I asked the respondents whether
they had any questions or suggestions for us. This invariably led to a second
interview during which I got questioned.
During the first five days, quite a bit of time was lost due to the fact I had not
established a clear daily schedule yet. One single day needed to incorporate the
interviews, but also some social timewith the villagers and discussions between
the senior and junior ICRISAT investigators. As a result I did not collect as much
data from Shirapur and Kalman as I did from the other four villages. In each
village I also did one or two field visits to get to know the soils, the crops and
the area.
Even though I had planned to interview non-sample households, I ended up
interviewing quite a few of sample households. There were two main reasons
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for this. First, ICRISAT offers the sample households each year a one or two day
excursion. If I would interview non-sample households, these people would
also start to ask for the trip. In addition, the non-VLS households were difficult
to get a hold of and as the daily cost of this fieldtrip was very high and the
trip could not be interrupted or postponed, I sometimes had to settle for VLS
respondents instead. I did give priority to non-VLS respondents, but if no-one
was available I switched to VLS households.
Deciding on a dissertation topic
One of the main goals of the qualitative round was to narrow down the topic of
the dissertation. As such I explored different kinds of agricultural technologies,
market participation behavior and various education decisions. It was clear
from the beginning that the education decisions were very much influenced
by identity and different social norms. It took me the remainder of the trip to
decide on a second topic.
It was difficult to find a suitable agricultural technology to focus on for sev-
eral reasons. First of all there were only a few new technologies: high yielding
crops, mechanization (tractor, harvester and thresher) and some new types of
irrigation techniques. Many farmers in Kanzara, Kinked and Aurepalle (and
some in Dokur) experiment a lot with the different varieties. Almost every year
or two years they try out a new variety for their crops. However for both the
mechanization and the new irrigation techniques, I could not find any evidence
of the presence of identity and social network effects. In addition, only few
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people in each village adopted these mechanization and irrigation techniques.
Moreover, in several villages, like Kalman and Dokur, agricultural techniques
have not changed much in the last ten years. In Kalman, where mainly dryland
farming is practiced, farmers said that there is little scope for improvement. In
Dokur, where mainly paddy is cultivated, the technique and varieties used have
not changed much either. Some new crops appeared in the villages, like fruit
orchards (mangos and citrus), grapes and soybeans. In addition, both pesticide
use and fertilizer use increased in all of the villages.
I did explore the option of looking at water management. This region of In-
dia seems to have been severely hit by climate change. Water is one of the main
production constraints. Both surface water (rivers, canals, ponds and basins)
and groundwater (wells) are used as sources. The water is applied on the field
through flood, drip or sprinkler irrigation. In general, surface water systems
are provided by the government. There is a main canal, which a bunch of sub-
canals. The entire system is build by the government and managed by a ‘water
committee’. That is, there is supposed to be a committee. If the committee is
not there or does not function, problems arise such as: who cleans the canals?,
who cleans which canal?, what if I am farmer at the end of a canal and I want
water, am I supposed to clean also the beginning of the canal? The farmers pay
a fixed price per season by acre for a fixed number of irrigations. For additional
irrigation they need to pay an additional sum. Sometimes there is not enough
water, and during that year, no irrigation will be provided. In addition, the land
tax on this ‘irrigable’ land is higher than the land tax on the ‘non-irrigable land’
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(independent of the use). Also, several farmers complained about the quality of
this surface water.
In case of groundwater, the investment is private. The farmers dig a well
on their own fields. These investments are very costly (equivalent to several
years of income) and tend to be a risky investment, depending on the village,
20% to 80% of the wells were dry or became dry after a few years. However, I
could not find any significant identity and social network effects in this private
investment decision. There are several government rules however related to
where to build a well, and how to finance the well etc, and these government
rules differ by state. Also, they locate the well using interesting tools like sticks
from some tree and lemons. As such, I concluded that even though this topic
of water management is a fascinating one, I would not embark on this research
now for my dissertation.
In the end I decided on Bt cotton for the technology adoption part of my
dissertation. Cotton is a major crop in three out of six villages. In the last three
to five years Bt cotton has gradually been adopted in those three villages. As
such, as I have panel data of the last seven years of the villages, with a lot of
details on their farming activities, this decision seemed a suitable one to study.
I also considered the topic of market participation. Most farmers decide si-
multaneously on their cropping pattern andmarket participation (as one cannot
consume cotton, castor or an entire orchard of mangos). There are four ways to
market the output.
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The first, and most common one, is the government regulated market in the
nearby towns. These government regulated market have a ‘market committee’.
This committee (in theory) ensures that the government minimum price is re-
spected, that no cheating (in weights) occurs and that disputes between farmers
and traders are resolved. In this case the farmer sells his produce to the com-
mission agent (he is often in the village) or the trader (in the market).
The relationship between farmer and commission agent/trader is a complex
one. In the case of a commission agent, he often also provides credit for inputs.
The farmer gives his harvest to the agent and the agent goes to the regulated
market with the harvest to participate in an open auction. The farmer often sits
next to the agent when the auction takes place (some expect cheating when they
do not go along to the market). While the farmer has no influence over the price,
he can always refuse to sell at the price they offer him. In this case the farmer
will store the produce for a few days (at the market) and sell later.
If the farmer does not use a commission agent he will go to market himself
and meet the trader (with or without harvest). In this case the trader imme-
diately announces his price of the day (also announced on a board next to the
shop). Again, the farmers said they had no influence on the price (some of them
recalled that things used to be different in the past and farmers then did have
some group influence, but today, they complained, farmers were not a ‘unit’
any more). The farmers had the impression that traders formed a ‘block’ and
seemed to agree in the morning on the price. This is why, according to them,
the price was the same in the market on a given day. As such, in order to get
a better price, farmers sometimes wait to sell their produce and visit or call the
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trader to get to know the price. How long they can wait depends on the stora-
bility of the produce and their financial situation (some need to pay back debts
immediately). In many cases, the trader provides credit and inputs. In this case
the farmer is often required to sell his output to the same trader.14 While switch-
ing traders does not happen frequently, unwillingness to provide credit is often
cited as a reason to switch traders if it does occur.
The farmers have some idea of the prices of the crops and the expected out-
put price enters their cropping pattern decision. Only a few farmers told me
that they did not think about the price at all when making the cropping pattern
decision. When the crop is growing, the farmers often sit in the field together
and chat about what they think the price will be this year. There was a general
sentiment that for the crops for which there is no government minimum price,
price fluctuations are on the increase. Also, in the past, farmers were better able
to predict the price. Now, (in their view) due to inter-state trade and imports,
the price is less predictable. When the crop is harvested, the farmers in general
will inform themselves about the market price in the regulated market. When
the farmer sells his produce to the commission agent, he will only get to know
the exact price at which he sold after the agent is back from the market. Simi-
larly when the farmer sells his produce to a trader, he will only know the price
once he meets the trader in the market.
14When asked about what would happen if they do not do this, farmers told me that they are
allowed to pay back the loan and then sell the output to someone else, but because the daily
price on the market is the same for all traders, no one has done this, as this would spoil the
relationship.
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The second way to sell the output is to sell the crop within the village. This
is not common. It used to happen more often, but now is done only by small,
marginal farmers.
The thirdway is to sell the produce to traders who come to the village. This is
only done by larger farmers, who can sell large amounts at once. These farmers
compare the traders’ offers and bargain. Once they agree on a price, the trader
comes and picks up the produce with his own tractor.
The last way is to sell the produce immediately to a factory. This is the case
for sugarcane in Shirapur and paddy in Dokur. In Shirapur, the relationship
between the farmer and the sugarcane factory owners is complex. The facto-
ries often provide credit and inputs to the farmers. Sugarcane factory owners
are often also local politicians. The farmers complained about the low price (it
was unclear whether this was a fixed price – even though the government. has
a minimum price on this crop). In addition, a few farmers told me that they
would like to switch crops, but in that case they would be unable to get credit
for inputs (apparently the sugarcane factory owners influence could reach the
moneylenders etc.).
Clearly, the topic of markets is very interesting to investigate. But I decided
not to dedicate another paper to this topic for a couple of reasons. First, it was
unclear to me which decision I would focus on. All produce is sold, the only
main decision left to the farmer is when to sell, and this decision is determined
by mainly non-identity and non-social network reasons. For the farmers who
did not buy inputs on credit, they might still have to decide where to sell their
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crop. But most farmers have sold to the same person for the last 5 to 10 years.
With so little variation over time, panel data analysis would probably not be
very interesting. Second, I did not have the funds to interview the traders. The
power relations between trader and farmer appear too complex for me to em-
bark on this topic as a side study. As such I decided to consider only the input
and output markets of one single crop, cotton.
Difficult questions
The first kind of questions that were sometimes difficult to answer are the hypo-
thetical questions which are forward looking in nature, like for instance, ‘if you
a friend of your daughter would be absent from school for a long time, would
you go up to her parents and say something?’ Often such a question was an-
swered with, ‘that would never happen’. In such a case, explaining that we just
are interested in what the respondent would do in such a situation rectifies the
problem.
A second kind of question that was difficult to answer concerns (detailed)
beliefs of the past, like for instance, ‘five years ago what did you think the cost
of one year in a private school in town X would be?’ I found that people recall
their general thoughts and ideas about the issues I was interested in (education,
technologies and markets), like ‘fifteen years ago I did not realize the impor-
tance of education, now I do, and I regret my decisions’ or ‘when my son was
young, I though he could become a doctor’. But recalling numbers/amounts of
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what they thought in the past about the future at the time is not possible (one
tends to project current beliefs on the past).
Recalling actual facts was not very difficult, and I found that, depending on
their education and intellectual abilities, people could recall up to 3 to 5 years of
cropping patterns, input use, market prices, wages and educational costs. These
kinds of questions were fun for the respondents as I asked ‘do you remember
the price you received for your cotton one year ago, yes? and now two years
ago?, yes, and now three years ago? etc’.
Eliciting quantitative beliefs about yields and wages went relatively well. I
also tried to elicit expected wages conditional on education level. It took us a
while to get the formulation of the question right as when you ask ‘what do
you think that your daughter would earn if she finished grade 10’, a common
answer was ‘God will decide that’, as such I needed to reformulate the question,
thereby emphasizing that even though God is influential, I was interested in her
personal expectations. For the parents with very small children, the question
could not be asked in terms of ‘their daughter’ but had to be asked in a general
way, otherwise I invariably got the answer that ‘it was too soon to be thinking
about these things’. So I rephrased the question and asked for a ‘if a child similar
to their daughter in ability, caste etc would reach 8th standard’. I also tried to
see whether people had some idea of the likelihood of obtaining such a job, and
they were able to answer these questions as well. I interviewed too few people
to say anything at this point, but I had the impression that thewage expectations
and the likelihoods of getting a formal job differed by caste.
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Eliciting beliefs about agricultural prices was more difficult. A few farmers
told me that they never thought about output prices, they only thought about
input prices and then maximizing yields. When asking the question how they
predict the price of next year, some farmers said that they took the price of last
year, other mentioned looking at the prices of the last few years, while other has
a more complex model in mind thinking about the expected production of that
year.
I did not find a suitable way to ask whether ‘discount rates’ were different
among gender/caste. It seems to me that the standard experimental economics
games are not relevant for the decisions I am considering. For education de-
cisions, time preference would matter and indeed more than once farmers re-
ferred to certain communities and castes (like Muslims) as ‘impatient’ in that
regard. Related to the Bt cotton decision, which is a yearly decision, it is not
clear how a different discount rate might matter as switching to Bt cotton does
not necessarily mean trading future consumption in for present consumption as
the seed are often bought on credit (while the normal cotton seeds are not).
I did not try to elicit risk aversion either using standard experimental tech-
niques. I did, however, have a several discussions with the farmers where I let
them talk freely about how they felt about risk in farming and the risk in the
education decision. Most farmers thought that being a farmer is by nature a
risky job. As such many of them had an extensive set of coping mechanisms to
minimize risk and to deal with risk once it occurs. The riskiness of the job was
also the main reason why farmers wanted their brightest sons to move out of
agriculture. Only the large (almost industrial) farms saw for their sons a future
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in farming. Related to riskiness of education investment, most people felt that
there was little they could do about it, and as such they could only educate their
daughter and son up to the ideal level and then they would ‘leave things up to
God’.
Caste and gender
With regard to caste, the neighborhoods in the villages are without exception
structured along caste lines. The previous untouchables, the Scheduled Castes
(SC), often live at the edge of the village. As people tend to interact with their
neighbors mostly, a high correlation between social networks and caste-identity
can be expected. Quite a few of the SCs live in concrete houses build by the In-
dira Ghandi Housing Scheme. In general, government programs are structured
along caste and gender lines.
Social norms related to marriage, education and labor market participation
differ between men and women. In addition, social networks and social con-
nections are clearly structured along gender lines.
Social connections
The general questions related to how social life in the village has changed (this
question asked to all pradhans, several school teachers and some household
members), invariably let to the same kinds of answers. People complain about
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the fact that the respect for elderly has declined in the last ten years, that people
tend to be less willing to help each other (provide labor, credit etc), that the
norms of reciprocity have changed15. Bad habits (like drinking wine) are on
the increase,16 and that the joint family system is being replaced by the nuclear
family system. It was easy to elicit the several groups active in the village from
the pradhan, even though sometimes they forgot to mention a few. In most
villages there were several self-help groups (SHG), chit funds and caste-based
organizations. Some villages had a school committee and a water committee. It
was difficult to ask the pradhan questions related to who-interacts-with-whom.
I often got the answer that ‘everyone in the village interacts with everyone else’
or ‘everyone likes everyone’.
To get an idea of the social connections of the villagers, I had several more
general discussions with the senior and junior investigators on the topic of who-
knows-whom?, who-interacts-with-whom?, and are many of the contacts out-
side of the village?. I was unable to have many of these general discussions
with the villagers themselves. With them I therefore asked very specific ques-
tions, like, who would you go to if you need some flower immediately?
In general, the villagers seem to know more people outside of the village
than ten years ago. The structure of the marriage networks however has not
changed much in the last ten years. In Maharashtra, the marriage networks are
generally within-caste, but outside the village, and sometimes even outside the
15Many villagers cited the example of financial help. If help is needed before help used to
come unconditional and from many people, now only few people offer to help, and many peo-
ple keep mental accounts or explicitly impose conditions.
16Related to those bad habits, in Maharashtra these are generally frowned upon while in
Andhra Pradesh these are sometimes also considered as a sign of wealth.
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district. In Andhra Pradesh, the marriages often take place within the family
(for instance, marrying your brother’s or sister’s child is very common). The
majority of the women in the villages interact mostly with people in the village.
The men often have several contacts outside the village, mostly market-related
contacts. These market-contacts outside of the village are a relatively new phe-
nomenon in the villages (last ten years).
The social networks differ by the use of the network: different sets of people
are contacted and relied upon for information related to agriculture, for infor-
mation related to education, and for credit. Even within the agricultural infor-
mation networks, people often rely on different people depending on the crop
they need information on. Similarly, if credit is needed, who is contacted de-
pends of what the credit is needed for, the amount and when the farmer expects
to be able to pay back. These different credit networks are function according to
different rules. For instance, if credit is needed for agricultural inputs either the
village money lender or input dealer (in the city) will be contacted. In this case
a relatively high interest rate will have to be paid (30-40 % per year). If credit
is needed for the marriage of a daughter, family members will be contacted.
The terms of repayment are much more flexible in this case. Repayment can
be spread over several years, often interest free, and sometimes the money will
be transferred as a gift. If a small amount of money is needed for immediate
consumption, friends and neighbors in the village (often cast fellows) will be
contacted, the money will be repaid immediately with very little to no interest.
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Schedule and general comments on the trial survey round
During the trial survey round, which took place in December 2007, I tried out
two draft questionnaires, one on Bt cotton and one on education, through 16
interviews: 4 in Kinkhed, 4 in Kanzara, 4 in Aurepalle and 4 in Dokur. I did not
do all interview questions with each household, but worked through selected
sections depending on howwell the sections went. It was not an option to work
through all sections as trying out new questions tends to take more time than
asking a routine question: looking at their reaction, reformulate things, try them
again, and all this through translation. The respondents were told that we were
doing a trial round, and were asked to be critical of the questions. Most of
them took up their job as ‘judge’ very willingly, and suggested changes in the
questionnaire. If I saw that two or three households had no problems with a
certain section, I moved on to another section. I had to rewrite several sections
multiple times, notably the identity section, the general education section and
the learning and norms sections.
As each questionnaire was about 60 pages long, I decided to limit make
three village ‘education only’ and the three others ‘Bt cotton only’. Aurepalle,
Kinkhed and Kanzara, a total of 248 households, would receive the Bt cotton
questionnaire. The remaining 352 households in Dokur, Shirapur and Kalman
would receive the education questionnaire.
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Rewriting the perceived identity section
I rewrote the identity section (in Section II of both questionnaires) almost en-
tirely. The caste/religion section needed to incorporate the fact that people can
belong to two castes at the same time: a personal one and an official one. There
are still very few to no inter-caste marriages. In the case of an inter-caste mar-
riage the wife sometimes takes over the caste of her husband. Sometimes they
both keep their own caste and the children end up without a caste. To incor-
porate these cases I have asked for the caste/religion at birth, the current (per-
sonal) caste/religion and current (official) caste/religion. In addition, I have
moved this section towards the end of the identity section, as to begin the ques-
tionnaire with such sensitive questions did not seem like a good idea.
I also rewrote the next set of questions (on perceived ability, risk aversion,
impatience and degree of fatalism). The goal of this section was threefold: (i)
understand how the respondent views himself with respect to his relevant in-
formation network in terms of qualifications related to farming and education,
(ii) understand how risk averse the respondent views himself with respect to
his relevant farming information network, (iii) get a measure for time prefer-
ences. For the latter, I was inspired by the recent work of Loewenstein et al.
(2001). They distinguish (i) impulsivity, (ii) planning/compulsivity, and (iii) be-
havioral/emotional inhibition. Ideally, these elements should be measured on
an absolute scale to allow comparison between villages, but it seems that it is
easier to get variation if one measures these on a relative scale (compared to
others).
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It appeared impossible to ask these perceived identity questions without a
benchmark. For instance, if one asks ‘how often do you have doubts related to
agricultural practices?’, all respondents chose ‘sometimes’, or if one asks the de-
gree to which one agrees with a statement, the respondents invariably respond
‘somewhat’. As such, to get after perceived ability, I decided to include in the
sentence ‘with respect to others’. This made a huge difference in the way these
questions were answered, and I managed to get a decent amount of variation
in the answers. Thinking about this inclusion of ‘with respect to others’ in the
question, I initially thought that this was not a good idea, as in this way, I would
not be able to compare the farmers across villages as ‘the others’ tend to refer
to the other villagers. On the other hand, even when the question is asked in a
non-comparative way, people tend to think in a comparative way in their mind,
and as such, it is probably a good idea to make this comparison explicit. It ap-
peared not possible to get after who ‘the others’ were in these questions. I then
tried to answer the question myself, and indeed the ‘others’ were difficult to
define. From that moment, I started to use the following ground rule: if I can’t
answer the question, I won’t ask the farmer, and as such, I did not bother asking
about ‘the others’ any more.
With regard to the time preference questions specifically, Loewenstein et al.
(2001) suggest two ways: one is to ask questions related to the individual’s char-
acter, the other way is to ask questions related to the individual’s behavior. The
problem with the behavior questions proposed by them is that none translates
well in the Indian context. The impulsivity and inhibition character questions
did work, and were a source of enjoyment and laughter for the respondents.
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However, one should be careful in the interpretation of the impulsivity ques-
tion. People sometimes told me that they often ‘had’ to make decisions quickly
(even though they do not always like to make decisions quickly). I thought of
changing the question to ‘compared to others do you enjoy making decisions
quickly’, but even though I never tried this version out (as I only thought of
this after I came back), I fear that this formulation will make the question too
complex. The planning question was problematic. All people say that they
‘somewhat’ plan ahead and using the agree – disagree scale, the majority ended
up in the middle. Similarly, all respondents told me that ‘if they make a plan,
they stick to it’. When I then decided to ask planning ahead towards specific
things, like a lump-sum investment for agriculture, wedding daughters, saving
for education etc, not all people had experienced these and in addition, many
people answered these questions by referring to their financial capacities (so
instead of capturing the ‘intentions’, we end up capturing the ‘constraints’). I
then finally decided not to ask questions related to certain behaviors, as not all
respondents could relate to these, but to stick to the general attitude question
related to planning, but to add a ‘with respect to others’ as well.
Rewriting the Bt cotton survey
Related to the landholding section, the ownership status was more complex
than I thought. The share-in/share-out plots don’t only share outputs but often
also inputs. If the landlord shares the input he will get 1/2, if he shares only
output he will get only 1/3.
177
I decided to add functionality of the irrigation source in the recall section
rather than in the landholding section. The reason is that while irrigation source
is mentioned in the VLS data of the last 7 years, the functionality of these sources
is not mentioned. It is not uncommon that irrigation is present but the amount
of water available is insufficient. For instance, in the case of canal irrigation, the
canals are often dry, and in the case of well irrigation, the groundwater perco-
lation into the well from the aquifer might be too slow. People tend to recall
whether the irrigation source they had was functional.
I dropped the question in the random-matching-within-sample excercise on
whether people were willing to talk to someone, as everyone always answered
yes to this. I tried to go back with several of the questions in time (seven years
back) to see whether the relationship and/or position field changed, but I al-
ways got a negative answer on this. So in the interest of time and space, I de-
cided to drop the recall questions in this module. I had to include the option
that the other farmer belongs to a household, and sometimes even though the
two farmers don’t talk, their wives do. Surprisingly, the farmers tend to know
a lot of details about each other’s plot, like soil, and irrigation facilities; even
recall questions worked fine here (see Hogset and Barrett 2010 on the accuracy
of self-reported peer behavior). I decided to drop the recall questions though,
also in the interest of time and space.
In the input/output schedule, I decided to ask for less details related to the
dates of the operations as people do not tend to remember these. They tend to
remember the week and month of sowing, and the week and month of harvest.
The other field operations, people tend to remember in broad intervals (‘about
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half a month after I did operation X, I did operation Y’). Also, land preparations
are often done in stages, and people do not tend to remember when they did
these (other than the months).
In the section on additional recall details on cotton production, I dropped
the question on the level of bollworm attack, as how the farmers perceived this
depends on whether or not he used Bt cotton and pesticides. I also dropped the
question on the producer of the seed as the farmer does not know the answer
to this in general. In addition, the farmers in general do know whether their
seed is legal or illegal; as such I dropped that question as well. In Aurepalle, the
farmers also explained me that they often do not buy pesticides together with
the seed. Many of them only buy pesticides at a later stage, when they need
it. They told me that it is dangerous to keep pesticide, which is essentially a
poison, in the house with small children around. I also dropped the question on
whether the yield of cotton was more or less than expected during the last seven
years (in the section on beliefs, the last section). The reason is that we would
need the expectation with respect to what they thought at the beginning of the
season. People do not remember exactly what they thought at the beginning of
the season and answer these questions in a back-ward looking fashion: judging
now whether that was a good or bad year. It is doubtful that this will as such
generate any useful information.
After the training round, I decided to give the questionnaire one more re-
vision. I rewrote the asset schedule on machinery based on the World Bank’s
Living Standard Survey questionnaires (Gross and Glewwe 2002). Then, I also
decided to split up the machinery into: big investments and small investments.
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I did this because almost all farmers have smaller machinery and it won’t be
possible for them to recall the details, as they bought these items several years
ago.
In the random-matching-within-sample excercise, I changed the formulation
of the question to incorporate the possibility that it’s not always the household
heads that talk to each other, but also their wives, etc.
Finally, I changed the elicitation of the yield to incorporate the case that the
respondent does not have any land and is not farming. In this case a hypotheti-
cal plot will be used of average soil quality.
Rewriting the education survey
I realized on the field that the concept of household for the education question-
naire was not trivial. In this survey, we go back 25 years in time, during which
people have moved in and out, people have died, and new members are born.
Imagine a joint family as in Figure A1. In this family any one of the males could
be the respondent, and, as such by referring to the sons and daughters of the
respondent, one might not capture the relevant children.
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 Male C 
married, 40 
years, 4 kids, 
1 child passed 
away 
Male D, 
married, 
22 years, 1 
kid, lives 
outside of 
the house 
Male E, 
unmarried 
30 years 
Male A     *     Female B 
(passed away) 
Female F, 
unmarried 
22 years, 
lives 
outside of 
house 
Figure 4.2: Complex family structure
I had to carefully think about who we need to include for what purpose.
There are four sections of the questionnaire involved where the structure of the
household matters: the identity and household composition section (section II),
the wealth section (IV), the education of the older members (V) and the edu-
cation of the younger members (VI). I first decided on the following structure.
Section II (identity) includes all members included in Section V and Section VI.
Section IV (wealth) includes all members included in Section V and Section VI
and the members who used to live in the house and passed away. Section V (ed-
ucation of older members) includes all members older than 25 who currently
belong to the household or who used to belong to the household and also all
daughters in law. Section VI (education of younger members) includes all mem-
bers younger than 25 years who currently belong to the household or used to
belong to the household.
The wealth section (section IV) includes recall questions on assets on wealth.
This is needed to reconstruct income as the VLS only has income data from 2001-
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2007, while my education panel data structure goes back to 1985 for the oldest
kids. I decided upon the following wealth variables: irrigable land, dryland, the
number of working male/female adults/children. This recall section follows
the household of the respondent, assuming this is the household in which the
children of the household (of section VII) are growing/grew up.
For the education variable, we need to explain the education level of all chil-
dren of the household under the age of 25. This includes the young adults who
have moved out by now, but who used to live in the household. For instance,
this includes female F and male D. In theory, this includes also the children who
would have been between 0 and 25 now but who passed away. But talking
about children who passed away is difficult, and as such, we should keep these
questions to an absolute minimum. So I decided to transfer all the questions
related to the family members who passed away to a small section in the wealth
section (section IV).
During the training round, the enumerators found it difficult to work with
this structure. As such, I decided to focus section II only on current household
members and past household members under the age of 25. As such, we are
sure to catch all the kids in the relevant age group. The basic information on the
current household members older than 25 is still asked in section V, but the past
family members are dropped – instead this information is directly included in
the social learning section. Section VI remains the same as does section IV.
Section V of the questionnaire includes the education information of the cur-
rent and past family members older than 25 and the daughters/sons in law. I do
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not explain these educational choices, but need to collect sufficient information
on these members to serve as control variables. I tried out several additional
questions here on details of education. I was surprised by the details the re-
spondents could remember of their own education 30 to 40 years ago. They
remembered the schools they had been to, how they commuted, how well they
did in school, and whether they attended frequently. I did not bother asking
them about the cost, as it were their parents who paid the costs, I doubt that
reliable information could have been obtained. A selection of all these possible
questions had to be made, keeping in mind the goal: control for unobservable
genetic (ability) factors and unobservable parental inputs in the child’s educa-
tion. I could do the Raven’s matrices test which captures innate ability (formal
schooling is supposed not to affect the outcomes) or even a cognitive achieve-
ment test of the respondent. However, these tests are bound to take a lot of time,
and due to practical reasons we will only be able to do one of the parents. As
such, I decided against this. An imperfect control of the parent’s ability is their
education level. This education level can also serve as an imperfect control of
the parent’s inputs in the child’s education. I added a question on employment.
As the immediate family is the first information neighborhood, the answers to
these questions can be used to construct the social learning term.
Section VI is an extensive section on education of the current and past house-
hold members between 0 and 25 years (excluding family in law). The majority
of these questions worked well on the field.
Regarding social norms, I tried several questions in this section: ‘how did
your environment react when you enrolled the child in this school’, if the stu-
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dent attended irregular ‘did anyone come and say something about this to
you”). These questions all worked fine. Past hypothetical questions such as
‘your child attends frequently, would someone have come and said something
if he did not?’ does not work. In general, forward looking hypothetical ques-
tions work, as one can still (with some effort) imagine such a thing to happen,
but to imagine what would have happened if the past was different doesn’t
work. I decided to drop the question for children who are currently enrolled:
‘Did you ever think of stopping this child’s education’. Even though this ques-
tion gave interesting responses, I will just capture a few interesting stories, but
bother all of the respondents with a longer questionnaire.
Even though I know that discrimination in school of lower castes and girls
used to be very much an issue, I decided to drop these types of discrimination
questions. I asked these questions during the trial round and most parents say
things were quite all right in this respect. But, I had doubts related to the transla-
tion. The enumerators themselves did not believe there could be discrimination
in the schools, and as such, their view might have (unintentionally) influenced
the average response we got.
I decided to add a section VII with all the remainder questions that have
to be asked for each individual member between the age of 0 and 25. These
questions are not conceptually related, but still I’ve put them together as this
section will need to be asked to each member, so from a practical point of view,
this was more convenient. These include additional questions on exam results,
and dowry and marriage. The marriage questions of the trial questionnaire
were fine, but the dowry questions had to be adapted.
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The parents do not think in terms of gifts to the couple and gifts to the family,
but rather in terms of gifts to the child and gifts to the family. In addition, it
seems impossible to distinguish gifts from dowry. Dowry is often described
as a large amount, and an amount that has been agreed upon, while gifts are
typically of a smaller value and were not discussed before hand. My estimate
would be that for the poorer families themajority of the gift and dowry expenses
are in the form of a dowry, while for the richer families, there are mainly gifts.
Dowry can be paid in cash, but this is not necessary. Gifts are mainly non-cash
gifts. I decided to drop the question on ‘on which do you decide first dowry or
education, as it’s seems to be an alternating decision-making process which can
not be discovered by asking such a relatively simple question’ Naturally, the
dowry decision comes later, physically speaking, but people keep the dowry in
mind when deciding on the education level.
The last part of section VII included a health question and child-dependent
expectations. I tried out several different versions of the stone game on the field.
The first way was ‘if this child finished 12th what are the chances of finding a
job?’. The respondents interpreted this question as ‘what are the chances of find-
ing a salaried job?’ Indeed, in the end, everyone works, as one cannot afford not
to work. The respondents had no problems with ‘double’ conditional questions
such as ‘if this child finishes 12th standard and the child finds this (salaried)
job, what is the minimum that you would expect her/him to earn?’ I also tried
questions for specific ‘majors’ of study, such as ‘if this child gets an engineering
degree, what are the chances of finding a job as an engineer?’ and the double
conditional one, ‘if he or she finds that job, what is the minimum/maximum
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earnings to be expected’. The question ‘if he/she gets an engineering degree
what is the minimum/maximum earnings to be expected’, works as well. I was
only able to go up to three categories in the stone game. It seems that parents
think less of the risky-ness of the educational investment than they do about
the risky-ness of their agricultural activities. More than three boxes resulted in
confusion, with uniform distributions, stones left over or all stones in one box.
I thought quite a bit about the issue of power. Intuitively, it seemed to me
that the concept is related to the concept of social networks. Two kinds of power
influence are of interest to me: power to influence the education admission deci-
sion, and power to influence the job-hiring/earnings. The source of this power
is the position in a social network and/or interlinked markets. To understand
this power of a particular individual, one would have to look at the web of net-
works surrounding this individual. This is clearly not feasible in this study. I
did include however a question on whether ‘influence’ was used to enroll the
child in a particular school in section VI. It seemed not possible to include ques-
tions on whether power was used to obtain particular jobs, as the number of
jobs that the family members could have had over the last 25 years is just too
high. I also decide to drop the power question in the open question on social
learning (‘whowould you go to’) as whether or not the influence of those people
is relevant very much depends on the kind of job they are applying for.
Section VIII aggregates all remaining household level questions on social
learning, child ability, and contribution of the children during old age.
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Related to social learning, one ofmymain underlying assumptions appeared
incorrect: the population of the information networks related to costs and bene-
fits of education could not be approximated by the village. I found this through
questions such as ‘who would you go to if you need information related to ed-
ucation?’ and ‘how many people do you know (by first name) that have a BA
degree, and howmany of these live in the village?’ As such, the randommatch-
ing within sampling approach is not the right approach any more to get after
the information networks. I therefore tried out several alternative approaches.
First, I wanted to get some control variable for the information coming from
institutional sources. It is of course impossible to ask for every event when
they received information from media, etc. I asked the question during the trial
round in an open manner, as people answered this question telling me they
‘never’ or ‘sometimes’ received information from the source I mentioned, I de-
cided to frame the question as such using these options.
Second, one can ask the respondent approximately how many people he
knows who finished Xth standard, XIIth standard, diploma, bachelor’s, mas-
ter’s etc. The possible answers are none, one, two, three, four, five, between five
and ten, between ten and twenty, between twenty and fifty, between fifty and
one hundred, etc. Ask the respondent what the approximate share is relatives
and people in the village. As the number of people that the respondent tends
to answer is too high, asking detailed questions about the properties of these
people is not possible.
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Third, ask the respondent more position-based questions, like ‘How many
people do you know with job X?’ By phrasing the question in a more specific
way, people are better able to recall the information. In addition, these ques-
tions might help in distinguishing learning within the several higher education
careers.
Fourth, I added an open question (hypothetical question) on who they
would go to if they need information related to education and jobs. This open
question is mainly relevant for the future decisions and in addition, will give
some idea of the structure of the strongest links in the information network. In
this section, I dropped the question on ‘would you have gone up to the person 5
to 10 years ago etc?’ as the answer to this question was always yes if they knew
the person at that time, and no otherwise (during the trial round). I did not
distinguish the different education levels here, as everyone interviewed during
the trial round here points at the same set of people. In this section, dropped
the question on learning about job opportunities (actual job openings) as the
occasions are too numerous to count here, a different kind of questionnaire and
focus would be needed to justify these questions (in addition in this case, peo-
ple do hear from different people depending on the job). Naturally, questions on
the actual use of job-information networks of the currently employed members
would lead us too far once more, so these questions were not included either.
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